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“Benevolent Intentions: Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel” describes 
how representations of hospitality in British novels of the last half of the eighteenth century 
engage new ethical questions raised by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. The 
novels explore a philosophical turn towards intention from the vulnerable position of the guest. 
As opposed to traditional conceptions of hospitality that combined ideals of hospitality with 
culturally specific actions, the new hospitality portrayed in the eighteenth century novel exhibits 
suspicions about hospitable actions and seeks instead to establish benevolent intentions in both 
host and guest. I argue that the host position is particularly mistrusted: benevolent hosts are 
exposed to be weak and ineffective, while bad hosts are shown to be a greater threat to the guest 
because of their ability to mask selfish designs under the outward signs of hospitality. I trace 
how these exposures of the potential dangers in hospitality reveal the guest’s difficulty in making 
accurate judgments about the host’s intentions, thereby creating anxiety in the guest. I examine 
representations of hospitality in five novels: Henry Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling, Sarah 
Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple, Tobias Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry 
Clinker, Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia, and Frances Burney’s Cecilia, or, The Memoirs of an 
Heiress. The guests in these novels respond to the host’s weakness or corruption by seeking 
hospitality in fellow guests; because the guest position requires a passive response to others’ 
needs and two guests approach the relationship as equals, the guest-guest exchange of hospitality 
exemplifies the ideal of benevolent intentions in practice. This relationship imposes new 
restrictions on the practice of hospitality, limiting its practice to like-minded individuals. These 
new restrictions threaten the ideal of hospitality. In many of these novels, the imposed limits 
cannot be enforced, and the hospitable company is forced to open its doors to hostile or self-
seeking hosts. Ultimately, these novels reveal a tension in the ethics of hospitality: benevolence 
and limitations to benevolence are necessary and at odds, leaving the guests in a quandary of 
how to balance a necessary self-interest against an ideal of benevolent intention towards one’s 
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In 1787, Vicesimus Knox’s Essays Moral and Literary was published.
1
 Among his 
reflections on the state of British literature and culture is this reflection on the moral state of 
hospitality: 
 The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors 
were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country 
crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against 
modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality 
was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the 
nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and 
its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from 
the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all 
their consequent vices. (315-316) 
Here, Knox questions any nostalgia for an older country house ethic of hospitality. Interestingly, 
Knox does not take issue with the act of hospitality itself, which, with its open doors and 
crowded tables, was certainly “generous” and hospitable. Instead, Knox objects to the motivation 
for such hospitality; because he finds such motivation springs “from the love of power and from 
ostentation,” he no longer reads the act as generous or “magnificent” but as a producer of further 
vices. Indeed, by connecting this hospitality to such inhospitable intentions, Knox no longer sees 
such acts of welcome as emblematic of good hospitality but a sign of “indiscriminate” hosting. 
For Knox, open doors and crowded tables are too open and crowded; a less “indiscriminate” 
hospitality would be more virtuous.  
 In this passage, Knox identifies two large changes in the ideal of hospitality that took 
place in the eighteenth century. First, intentions became markers of ideal, virtuous hospitality; 
second, “indiscriminate” hospitality fell under a cloud of suspicion, thus generating a need to 
impose limits and conditions on hosting. This project investigates how eighteenth-century 
literature was instrumental in formulating these changing values. The novels of 1745-1780, 
                                                 
1
 Knox was a minister and head of Tonbridge School. His Essays and Elegant Extracts were popular at the turn of 





written a generation before Knox’s confident revision of Elizabethan hospitality, are preoccupied 
with ethical questions raised by the exchange of hospitality. These novels explore the motives 
behind hospitable and inhospitable actions and the limitations such motives depend on. 
Throughout these works, hospitality is depicted as an anxious, uncomfortable and confusing 
experience; rather than offering community and welcome, hospitality produces concern about 
others’ intentions, one’s own intentions, and the nature of the pursued relationship. Now 
suspicious of the country house idea of hospitality—with its “dinner-bell” and “smoking 
table”—literary hosts and guests work to establish a new ethical standard, and new standards of 
limitation, for the exchange of hospitality.  
 In so doing, these novels describe hospitality in its more modern form of practice, in 
which the public house or inn aids the common traveler and private hospitality is offered in more 
limited ways. At the same time, by placing these new standards and limitations in context, these 
novels also question the nature of hospitality as an ethic: what are the host’s and guest’s 
obligations if hospitality is determined by intention? New standards of disinterested motives 
confuse the practice of hospitality because neither host nor guest can be assured of the other’s 
intentions. New requirements for limitations impose regulation on an inherently uncontrollable 
exchange that depends on a range of actors, conditions and cultural norms. In essence, these 
novels introduce a new understanding of hospitality but, as they do so, they also undermine the 
ethic they create by exposing its uncontrollable and unpredictable nature.  
 Two particular trends in these novels serve to create this paradox. First, eighteenth 
century novels emphasize the guest rather than the host position. Guests, as recipients rather than 
instigators of hospitality, have less control over limiting the exchange and less authority to judge 
intentions. In such a position, the flaws of the new system are made apparent and visceral in the 
guest’s discomfort. Second, though this new hospitality emphasizes judging and limiting, 
hospitality remained a passive virtue of service to another. This passivity, because of the new 
emphasis on intention, required more than just serving another’s physical needs but also made 
emotional openness necessary. This very passivity, in fact, became a marker of the disinterested 
intentions necessary to offer virtuous hospitality. At the same time, however, this passive nature 





argue that the novels put forward a new system for hospitality, while simultaneously exposing its 
weakness as an ethical standard.  
 
The Nostalgic Past: Practice and Ideal 
The problems of hospitality depicted in eighteenth-century novels are indicative of a 
problem inherent in the hospitality system—namely that hospitality is both an ethical ideal and a 
social practice. Though both forms of hospitality are designed to structure human behavior, their 
approaches for doing so differ. The ethical ideal functions on a theoretical level and encourages 
the greatest possible achievements in openness and service; the social practice of hospitality, on 
the other hand, offers a logistics of action to determine normalized behaviors for inviting a guest 
to one’s home and providing them comforts like food and shelter. Because of these different 
approaches, ideal and practice rarely correspond. Indeed, Jacques Derrida and other recent critics 
have pointed to the impossibility of putting hospitality’s ideal into practice.
2
 Derrida 
distinguishes between the Law (ideal) and the laws (practice) of hospitality and argues that the 
two are in essential contradiction. The Law requires one “to give the new arrival all of one’s 
home and oneself…without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the 
smallest condition” (Of Hospitality 77). This giving of the self opposes the laws of hospitality, 
which seek to preserve the authority of the host and provide “rights and duties that are always 
conditioned and conditional” (Of Hospitality 77). While hospitality idealizes the host’s openness 
and generosity, this ideal is difficult to put into practice because such complete generosity would 
bankrupt the host emotionally and financially. Yet, any attempt to codify the ideal and protect 
the host in practice will necessarily work against the ideal. This paradox is central to the 
novelistic investigation of hospitality in the eighteenth century; while the novels propose an 
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 Derrida’s theory of hospitality contends that hospitality is “the impossible,” a term that Derrida also uses to 
describe gifts, forgiveness and mourning in his works. In their introduction to God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon define Derrida’s “the impossible” as “a dream and a desire for something 
tout autre, of something that utterly shatters the present horizons of possibility, that confounds our expectations, that 
leaves us gasping for air, trying to catch our breath” (3). They also investigate Jean Luc-Marion’s competing 
definition, which emphasizes not the waiting or the desire but the actual experience of “what these prior constraints 
declare impossible…what does not have to be…something whose givenness neither objectivity nor being can 
contain” (6). For more on Derrida and Marion’s work and the appropriation of their definitions of the impossible by 





ethics of generosity and benevolence, the contexts and characters of the narrative reveal the 
difficulty of putting such an ideal in practice.    
Yet Knox’s quotation indicates an additional problem for the eighteenth century—
agreeing on an ideal of hospitality. Knox criticizes an ideal of hospitality wherein the host’s 
duties are limited to the actions of providing literal openness of the home through food, drink 
and lodging. By critiquing the motives for and consequences of these actions, Knox suggests that 
ideal hospitality should not proceed “from the love of power and from ostentation” or lead to 
“vices.” While the older practice Knox criticizes required only physical openness and not the 
giving of oneself that Derrida defines, the new ideal that Knox implies does begin to incorporate 
this moral denial of the self and the corresponding denial of the desire to gain power and 
position. Thus, the eighteenth-century hosts and guests also faced a conflict of how to define the 
ideal of hospitality: would it be judged by the actions of hospitality or the motivations that 
spurred such action?   
Studies of early modern hospitality suggest that this question was not as pressing in 
England before the eighteenth century. Rather, the conflict between ideal and practice was 
framed in terms of the extent of the physical offering of hospitality. Indeed, the loss of 
Elizabethan hospitality Knox’s contemporaries mourned failed to fulfill its own ideals. When the 
“neighbouring country crowded to the smoking table,” the list of guests remained limited and the 
events themselves rarely occurred outside of the Christmas feast days. Felicity Heal’s history of 
early modern hospitality finds that, for all the later nostalgia, hospitality was often lacking.
3
 
Though highly spoken of, hospitality was rarely offered to those outside the host’s class or 
family, and strangers were often treated with reserve (Heal 394). Any hospitality beyond the 
simple duties of feeding and lodging one’s family and giving charity on holidays was often 
politically motivated, and hosts expected a reimbursement in the form of social prestige or 
political position (Heal 73). Hospitality beyond these limits was rarely offered in early modern 
England despite society’s general praise of such acts.  
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 Heal’s book-length work provides the most thorough and complete study of early modern hospitality. Other studies 
that include discussions of hospitality in England tend to emphasize politics, economics, or social hierarchies and 
thus fail to offer the level of detail about practice and rhetorical ideal found in Heal’s work. As such, much of the 





Even if the practice of hospitality was actually quite limited, there existed an ideal of 
hospitality that valued openness and charity. Much like Knox’s contemporaries, “railers” against 
eighteenth-century culture used the ideal of hospitality as a “rhetorical weapon” (Heal 403). This 
early modern rhetoric, unlike Knox’s in his moral essay, showed less concern about motive and 
consequence and instead emphasized action.
4
 More to the point, early modern constructions of 
the Elizabethan ideal suggested that action and motive were inseparable and a courtier’s actions 
directly displayed a generous interior.
5
 Though concerns of “dissimulation and hypocrisy” were 
raised against specific men, the ideal supported the notion that public hospitality reflected a 
moral interior (Heal 105). The act of openness, then, would suggest a corresponding openness in 
the heart of the host. The ideal itself, however, began with action and was only radical in its call 
for equal openness to “the neighbour and the stranger, the rich and the poor” (Heal 3). The acts 
performed for the guests were what determined the moral integrity of the host.
6
 Though action 
often failed to meet the ideal, the ethical standard measured actions and public behavior.  
The separation between practice and ideal in early modern England was partly caused by 
the ideal of hospitable openness competing against a tradition of hospitality that worked to 
preserve social hierarchies. The exchange of hospitality itself presupposes a hierarchy because 
the host enjoys authority and power in his ability to bestow or withhold the invitation of 
welcome. This position of authority limits the ideal of hospitality as well; rather than relinquish 
his power, the host offers hospitality “on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his 
own home … and thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the household” (Derrida, 
“Hostipitality” 4). Derrida finds a radical ethics in the disruption of this authority, a disruption 
that the ideal of hospitality seems to promote. Yet, hospitality has traditionally worked to support 
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 Among these are James I and Charles I’s decrees to the nobility to return to their country estates to provide 
hospitality to their surrounding communities and  1615 broadside listing “Certaine wholesome Observations and 
Rules for Inne-keepers, and also for their Guests, meet to be fixed upon the wall of every Chamber in the house.” 
(London: J. Beale, 1615. Early English Books Online. Web. 27 October 2011.) For more on the rhetoric of 
hospitality, see Kari Boyd McBride’s Country House Discourse in Early Modern England: A Cultural Study of 
Landscape and Legitimacy.  
5
 This belief was closely aligned to the Renaissance idea of “sprezzatura,” a means of hiding the training behind an 
art or behavior so to present it as occurring naturally. The term was popularized by Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of 
the Courtier.  
6
 Ben Jonson’s To Penshurst provides a literary example: the poem praises the acts of hospitality at the country 
manor, such as providing food and wine, providing comfortable rooms and grounds, and establishing prosperity in 






rather than disrupt hierarchies of class and authority. In her work on postcolonial hospitality, 
Mireille Rosello notes that the ideal of hospitality often hides cultural systems’ support of 
oppressive social structures. While the ideal of hospitality “blurs the distinction between a 
discourse of rights and a discourse of generosity, the language of social contracts and the 
language of excess and gift-giving,” the rhetoric surrounding the ideal can be used to “[mask] 
ruthless forms of non-rights” (9).
7
 Hospitality was certainly used in the early modern period to 
maintain social distinctions and confirm power structures. Rather than relinquish his authority, 
the host used hospitality to display his superior wealth and position.  
The rhetoric surrounding hospitality was in fact used to support and justify the host’s 
superior position in the early modern period. Hospitality was used by the host to prove worth and 
maintain separation from lower, more dependent, guests. Even for those guests of equal rank, the 
host often used hospitality, and the rhetorical position it offered, as a political tool, displaying his 
merit as a way to get preferment (Heal 6).
8
 The rhetoric surrounding hospitality in the early 
modern period thus allows for motives of self-interest and even encourages them. In practice, it 
was used as an exchange system whereby both host and guest could gain. In this economy of 
hospitality, the host offers material comforts and social connections; the guest, in response, must 
return the hospitality with some expression of gratitude often in the form of “prayers and praise” 
(Heal 192). The host confirmed or added to his social prestige, and the guest entered this social 
hierarchy with the hopes of using his skills of conversation and accommodation to gain further 
favors from the host. Promoting the exchange of both tangible and intangible goods, early 
modern hospitality embodied motives of self-interest that contradicted the larger ideal, even as 
this ideal underlay the exchange.  
By the eighteenth century, both the ideal and the hierarchy supported by hospitality had 
been weakened. Indeed, the practice of hospitality lessened considerably for many reasons. First, 
economic changes upset old hierarchies and simultaneously disturbed old methods of hospitality 
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 In fact, Rosello is one of the few contemporary critics to think of hospitality as a practice in her study of 
postcolonialism and hospitality. Studying the hospitality in its cultural and historical use, Rosello insists that 
hospitality “exists through constantly reinvented practices of everyday life that individuals borrow from a variety of 
traditions—from what their parents have taught them, from what they identify as their own traditional background—
and practices that are sometimes similar to, sometimes different from, a supposedly shared norm” (7).  
8
 Queen Elizabeth, for example, famously used the status of the guest to enact her political desires. For more on her 





that depended on and supported those hierarchies. Among these economic changes was the 
growth of a commercial hospitality industry that rendered hospitality from country estates largely 
unnecessary.
9
 Moreover, political upheavals associated with civil war further disrupted the old 
hierarchies on which hospitality depended; as sides were taken in the rebellion, strangers and 
outsiders were targeted with suspicion and found less welcome in homes. More gradually 
destabilizing to the hospitality exchange was the growth of the central state and the transition of 
peers and gentry to a more urban life, where opportunities to gain influence and participate in 
“the world of civility and fashion” were more easily pursued (Heal 402).
10
 Finally, a growing 
secularism and Protestant emphasis on faith over works questioned the act of offering 
hospitality.
11
 Taken together, these social changes all threatened traditional hospitable exchange 
and so forced a redefinition of hospitality.  
The eighteenth century, then, saw a period of flux in the system of hospitality. The ideal 
of hospitality faced a debate of definitions: was hospitality to be defined by intentions or actions? 
The answer, I will argue, became increasingly defined by an intentional ethic, an ethic that 
determined morality based on the motives that inspired the action rather than on the 
consequences of the action.
12
 Yet, at the same time, the old conflict of how to match practice and 
ideal remained, even as this ideal was shifting definitions. To further complicate the debate, ideal 
and practice are difficult—perhaps impossible—to separate. Derrida attempts to mediate this 
problem through a paradox; he argues that “the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws.” 
Without them, The Law “would risk being abstract, utopian, illusory” and, as such, would never 
enter the realm of practice. Though these laws “contradict The Law, or at any rate threaten it, 
                                                 
9
 Heal finds that, by the end of the seventeenth century, the inn system was well established but points to evidence 
that this system had made early progress in the medieval era as the alehouse culture expanded (395-396).  
10
 The gentry had been moving to the city throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a practice which so 
noticeably disrupted the hospitality exchange that Elizabeth I, James I and Charles I all issued decrees ordering the 
nobility back to their estates in times of economic trouble. During and following the civil war, however, no such 
decrees were issued.  
11
 Protestantism still highly valued charity, and  John Calvin numbered it among the signs of a soul destined to be 
saved. However, Calvinism and other Protestant sects encouraged the giving of charity and the building of 
institutions rather than the offering of personal hospitality. Though Max Weber famously argued that Calvinist 
ethics discouraged charity in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this claim is too strong for the 
eighteenth century. For more on the institutions of charity in the eighteenth century, see Hugh Cunningham and 
Joanna Innes, eds. Charity, Philanthropy and Reform: from the 1690s to 1850. London and New York: Macmillan 
Press, 1998.  
12
 By intentional ethic, I refer to what philosophers call “virtue ethics.” However, I chose to use the term intentional 





sometimes corrupt or pervert it,” the laws also give The Law a possibility of existing in the world 
(Of Hospitality 79). Though dependent on one another, ideal and practice do not coincide and 
often result in an abstract ideal disconnected from the public practice. To understand the 
eighteenth-century debates over hospitality, then, I will turn to literature because it offers 
perspectives on both ideal and practice. Since novelists depict both the public manifestations of 
hospitality and the internal dispositions of the characters who offer, refuse or accept hospitality, 
novels offer a view of the changes and debates hospitality faced in the eighteenth century.   
 
The Philosophical Shift: From Action to Intention 
The ideal of hospitality explored in eighteenth-century novels was a product of a larger 
intellectual movement found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. This philosophy 
helped define and promote ethical ideals based on intention. This shift was a part of the larger 
philosophical Enlightenment; as Cartesian ethics spread throughout Europe and the British Isles, 
philosophers began to privilege the individual and explore the human psyche.
13
 An ethics of 
personal motives became a part of this movement; rather than be defined by family, occupation, 
or social position, an individual came to be identified by disposition and intention. At the same 
time, personal and public morality were being defined by these personal intentions. My concern 
here is not to paint a sweeping picture of Enlightenment philosophy but to show how—even in 
texts from a variety of philosophical backgrounds—ethics was becoming more and more 
concerned with intention rather than action.  
In particular, my interest lies in the philosophies of the British Isles and those that 
promote intentional ethics and influenced many of the novels of the second half of the century.
14
 
I will draw from works by four philosophers: Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary on 
These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14.23, “Compel Them to Come In, That my House May Be 
Full”; Richard Cumberland’s Treatise of the Laws of Nature; Francis Hutcheson’s Inquiry into 
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 For readings of this philosophical turn towards individuality, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 127-176 and 
J.B. Scheewind, The Invention of Autonomy.  
14
 Scholars of eighteenth-century fiction have commonly made connections between the philosophical movements 
and literary trends of the century. Sentimental novels in particular have garnered attention for their use of moral 
sense theory derived from John Locke’s work and promoted by Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis 
Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. Modern critics, including Barbara Benedict, Liz Bellamy, Scott Paul 
Gordon, Lori Branch, Wendy Motooka and Adela Pinch, among others, draw connections between the social work 





the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
These works were written across the Restoration and eighteenth century, with dates ranging from 
the 1660s to the 1750s from various philosophical schools, yet all define disinterested intentions 
as ethical. Bayle, a contemporary of John Locke, writes on tolerance from a less political and 
more personal position than his peer to denounce religious persecution;
15
 Bayle contends that 
moral behavior and religious belief depend on the motivations behind them. Cumberland, a 
member of the Latitudinarians, offers this school’s most thorough response to Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan;
16
 countering Hobbes’ view that all human action is motivated by self-interest, 
Cumberland argues that moral action demands a disinterested intention. Hutcheson, a proponent 
of the moral sense theory, responds to a later proposal of natural human selfishness put forth by 
Bernard Mandeville;
17
 Hutcheson counters that humans instead respond to a moral sense that 
guides actions towards disinterested ends. Finally, Smith, writing as a contemporary of the 
novelists discussed in this project, proposes that disinterested intentions are the most ethical but 
also the most difficult to consistently pursue.   
Though these texts do not directly address hospitality, they do share hospitality’s chief 
ethical concern—how to best treat one’s neighbor.
18
 This ethic certainly has Christian 
connotations, most notably in the Love Commandment found in both Matthew and Luke’s 
gospel which called for Christians to love their neighbor as they love themselves. Indeed, each of 
the philosophical texts discussed here is influenced by Christianity and the Christian beliefs that 
surrounded and defined each of the philosophers: Bayle reinterprets Biblical texts to convince 
both Catholic and Protestant readers to be more tolerant, Cumberland finds God’s will in the 
                                                 
15
 The two men’s works were published simultaneously but separately; there is no evidence that either man 
influenced the other and it seems as though they never met, despite Locke’s travels in exile and Bayle’s later 
friendship with Locke’s student, the Earl of Shaftesbury. For more on the relationship between Locke and Bayle’s 
work on tolerance, see Alex Schulman, 328-60 and Perez Zagorin, 240-288.  
16
 On Cumberland’s education as a Latitudinarians and the importance of his response to Hobbes, see John Parkin’s 
foreword to Cumberland’s treatise, pp.x-xvi. The Latitudinarians sought to prove the rationality of Christianity and 
its contributions to a greater good. For a discussion of the impact one of its most popular members, George 
Tillotson, had on English preaching, see James Downey, 6-29.  
17
 Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Virtues was first published in 1705 as just the poem, 
“The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn’d Honest” and then reissued with extensive prose additions to explain the 
poem in 1714. Mandeville’s initial poem received little attention but his revised text was denounced b y a number of 
contemporary thinkers as an attack on Christian values.  
18
 I share Nancy Snow’s sense of hospitality as an “application of the broader virtue of benevolence to the specific 
relationship of host and guest.”  Defining hospitality as “an expression of benevolence… [is]to imbue it with a depth 







 Hutcheson concedes that God is the source of our moral sense,
20
 and Smith, perhaps 
the least directly concerned with Christianity, rewrites the Love Commandment to illustrate his 
theory of sympathy.
21
 Despite these Christian influences, these texts approach ethics from a 
secular perspective; in fact, the earlier philosophers define their work as secular as a means to 
validate their message.
22
 Without the aim of advancing any religious position, these texts 
consider how ethical criteria outside of the Christian doctrine help guide interpersonal 
interactions. Hospitality is essential to that goal because it is itself a secular ethic meant to 
determine behavior in this world and to facilitate interactions between strangers—including 
strangers in faith.
23
 These philosophies argue for the importance of good intentions in 
determining the morality of an action; in so doing, they help define hospitality as an intention.  
As early as the 1660s, this ethical shift to use intention for moral judgments can be seen 
in Pierre Bayle’s call for religious tolerance in a Philosophical Commentary on Luke 14.23, 
‘Compel them to come in, that my house may be full’. A Huguenot exiled from Catholic France, 
Bayle argues that personal conviction as a motive to act is vital to moral and religious belief.
24
 
Bayle begins by defining motives as “Acts of the Mind” and argues that physical actions “are 
approved by God only in proportion to the internal Acts of Mind from whence they proceed” 
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 In one of many examples of how Cumberland conflates nature and God, he contends that “our Mind is, by the 
Light of Nature, let into the Knowledge of the Will or Laws of God” (252). For more on Cumberland’s discussion of 
the Will and God, see Jon Parkin, “Probability, Punishments and Property: Richard Cumberland’s Sceptical Science 
of Sovereignty.”  
20
 References to the design of a deity or higher being are made throughout the work. In one example, Hutcheson 
looks at the order of the universe and asks, “what possible room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe? 
None but the barest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing every thing which is not strict 
Demonstration” (53).  
21
 Smith’s use of the Love Commandment will be discussed in more detail later in this section.  
22
 The earlier philosophical texts explored here emphasize their secular position. Bayle opens his text by proclaiming 
that he will “leave it to the Criticks and Divines to comment on this Text in their way” and instead examine the text 
from “Principles more general and more infallible than what a Skill in Languages, Criticism, or Common-place can 
afford.” To do so, Bayle claims that he will not look at religious matters but at those of “natural Reason” (66-67). 
Likewise, Cumberland writes in his introduction that he “purposely contain’d myself wholly within the Bounds of 
Philosophy, and have therefore abstained from Theological Questions” in order to more directly respond to Thomas 
Hobbes’ claims in the Leviathan and not dissolve into “dispute with Mr. Hobbes about the Sense of Scripture” (280-
81). Those texts written later in the century also take secular positions but no longer feel the need to justify this 
approach.  
23
 The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10. 25-37) follows Luke’s version of the hospitality commandment—
“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy 
mind; and thy neighbor as thyself”—with a story that illustrates the hospitable neighbor is not defined by faith but 
by the feeling of compassion and response to another’s need.   
24
 For more on how these earlier religious persecutions and questions shape Bayle’s life and work, see Elisabeth 





(76). These “Acts of the Mind” are separate actions that occur internally and often influence 
physical behavior. This duality of action—in the mind and external to it—is used to promote 
religious tolerance; force should not be used to convert a person because physical threats cannot 
sway internal “Acts of the Mind.” Indeed, these internal acts are of more importance than their 
external counterparts, and physical actions, to be ethical, must respond to these internal acts. This 
privileging of internal “Acts of the Mind” restructures ethical standards around the individual 
rather than the community and has consequences for how social interaction is judged. Bayle uses 
an example of almsgiving to illustrate the nature of this change.
25
 According to his philosophy, 
merely giving alms no longer constitutes a moral act; rather, the mind must also agree with the 
morality of the act. Thus, almsgiving is immoral if the alms are given when the giver imagines 
the receiver is undeserving and is moral only if the giver believes the receiver to be worthy (222-
25). In this example, Bayle insists that an act such as almsgiving is only moral if the mind’s 
action corresponds with the physical action. Thus, Bayle finds that motive is more important than 
the act itself in determining the ethical nature of a situation: “of the two Actions, one of which 
we call good, the other bad, the good being done against the Instincts of Conscience, is a greater 
Sin than the bad Action done from the Instincts of Conscience” (221). Bayle thus works to 
rewrite ethical standards to privilege intentions over action. By defining these intentions as an 
alternative type of action, he seeks to encourage his peers to calculate these intentions, along 
with the traditionally judged external actions, into their moral systems of thought.  
Philosophers in England were also debating the importance—and nature—of intention to 
ethical standards. Thomas Hobbes’ conclusion in his 1651 Leviathan that human motivation was 
primarily selfish was viewed with alarm by his contemporaries.
26
 Working to redeem humanity 
from this negative definition, philosophers scrambled to describe human motivation as 
disinterested and social. Among those who responded to Hobbes, Richard Cumberland designed 
the most extensive and thorough rebuttal to reclaim human intention as a valid indicator of 
ethical action in his A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Cumberland’s long response to Hobbes 
                                                 
25
 For more on Bayle’s unusual, narrative style of philosophy see Thomas M. Lennon’s in-depth analysis, Reading 
Bayle. 
26
 There is debate among modern scholars whether this pessimistic simplification of Hobbes’ philosophy is fair and 
accurate; however, many of Hobbes’ contemporaries certainly read his work in this way. For more on seventeenth-
century reactions to Hobbes’ theories, see John Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 





attempts to establish humans’ natural perfection; he based this thesis on his interpretation of the 
Love Commandment, which he redefines as the “general Law of Nature” or “the greatest 
Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all” (292).
27
 Following this Law, Cumberland 
argues, will lead society at large as well as the benevolent agent to the greatest good. If each 
person chose to follow this Law, then his or her actions would, as a matter of course, lead to 
hospitable ends. Knud Haakonssen summarizes Cumberland’s argument as a proposal that “true 
happiness lies only in one’s perfection and perfection only in intentionally contributing to the 
common good, that is, in making God’s will one’s own” (Natural Law 35). Indeed, the idea of 
will, like Bayle’s “Acts of the Mind,” turns attention to human intention and how these 
intentions correspond to physical actions. Cumberland claims that “whatever a Man can will, he 
can also resolve to effect the same, as far as it is in his Power” (473). This will is defined as 
intention but also, according to Cumberland, “assumes the complete Nature of an End,” thereby 
asserting control over action and consequence as well (473). Will, then, like the “Act of the 
Mind” attempts to bridge the gap between action and intention; at the same time it privileges 
intention as the source of action and the determiner of consequence.  
Cumberland’s work became more popular in the eighteenth century when it was 
translated from its original Latin to English in 1727.
28
 Yet, by this time, the emphasis on 
intention had been adopted and expanded by the moral sense philosophers. Francis Hutcheson’s 
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue was a contemporary of the 
Cumberland translation and proposed a similarly optimistic view of human motives. This 
optimism is reflected in how Hutcheson’s theory is based on an internal moral perception he 
calls the moral sense. His first thesis maintains that “some Actions have to Men an Immediate 
Goodness; or, that by a superior sense, which I call a Moral one, we perceive Pleasure in the 
Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin’d to love the Agent, …without any 
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 J.B. Schneewind notes that Cumberland opens his treatise with two biblical quotations that offer love as the 
ultimate Christian law: Matthew 22.37-39, which outlines the two commandments to “love the Lord, thy God with 
all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind” and to “love thy neighbor as thyself,” and Romans 13.10, 
which says “Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” Schneewind then likens 
Cumberland’s philosophy to a justification of these hospitable laws in order to “show that love is the core of 
morality, and law only its instrument” (102).  
28
 Cumberland’s work was certainly not ignored in the seventeenth century; in fact, three editions of the Latin text 
were printed before 1700. The work was also adapted into a shorter text in 1701 and reprinted in Latin in 1720 
before an English translation was produced by John Maxwell. Jon Parkin speculates in the Foreword of the Liberty 





View of further natural Advantage from them” (88). This moral sense, like Bayle’s “Acts of the 
Mind” and Cumberland’s “will,” guides humans to ethical action in the world. Those actions 
which elicit positive responses from the moral sense are ethical and are themselves thought to 
spring from moral intentions. Like his predecessors, Hutcheson continues to consider motive to 
be the chief determiner of ethical behavior. Indeed, actions without proper intentions are found 
unethical, and “external Motions, when accompany’d with no Affections toward God or 
Man,…can have no moral Good or Evil in them” (101). Hutcheson insists that moral judgment 
of an act should be based solely on the intention that motivates the action rather than on the 
action or its consequence.  
But Hutcheson’s theory does differ from earlier philosophies that were concerned 
primarily with the actors in an exchange and therefore found the chief stumbling block for their 
theories in proving an association between intention and action. For example, this problem of 
association is inherent within Bayle’s ethical system. One cannot, after all, know without doubt 
whether a beggar is worthy of alms. Thus, for Bayle, the problem of judging is the problem of 
belief itself—what if we believe in error? Bayle’s answer is to accept the logical conclusion such 
false belief would have on his ethical construct. Bayle contends that “a Murder committed from 
the Instincts of Conscience, is a less Sin than not committing Murder when Conscience dictates” 
(249). Murder and other sinful acts, if they are believed to be just, are moral acts because the 
intention was to do right.
29
 Bayle’s conclusion is rather unsatisfactory because it ultimately 
condones the very persecution he writes against. Cumberland’s theory approaches the problem of 
association differently, arguing that rationally determined probabilities will inform actions to 
produce the desired end. Cumberland argues that “whereas we know not what shall hereafter 
happen, we may, nevertheless know what is possible” and logically work through which 
possibilities have the greatest probability of leading to the intended result (492). Through this 
crucial connection, Cumberland provides a philosophy that allows intention, action, and 
consequence to easily coincide—perhaps too easily to be believable in a flawed world.
30
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 For a discussion of how this conclusion fits into Bayle’s larger philosophy see Lennon, 81-101.  
30
 J.B. Schneewind ponders this happy conflation and argues that Cumberland is proposing a world view of social 





Hutcheson inherits this difficulty but, unlike his predecessors, does not approach the 
problem from the actor’s perspective. Rather, Hutcheson introduces an observer who can more 
easily stand back from the action and determine the probable intentions of the actors.
31
 Yet, this 
approach also has a flaw; the moral sense is determined not by the actor but by an observer, and 
this new position creates new problems of perception. Because intention occurs in the mind, it is 
difficult for an observer to determine what intentions are influencing the actions produced; 
moreover, good intentions do not necessarily lead to good consequences, and actions are not 
always an accurate means of judging intention. Hutcheson acknowledges that “Human Laws 
however, which cannot examine the Intentions, or secret Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in 
gross of the Action itself.” The judgments of the observer must work as though it is possible to 
determine the intention, “presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain’d, which we are 
oblig’d to attain” (131). The observer is to act as responsibly as he can in his judgment of others’ 
intentions but cannot completely overcome the limitations of the physical world. Intention, 
which is of utmost ethical importance, cannot be accessed by the public observer much as the 
consequences cannot be foreseen by the actors.
32
 Thus, the observer perspective Hutcheson 
introduces might overcome the problems of associating intention and action faced by the actor 
but introduces a new problem of judgment in properly assessing the connection between 
intention and action. While the actor cannot determine the outcome of his intentions, the 
observer cannot be sure of the intentions of the actors. While this observer stance is designed to 
make the connections of intention, action and outcome more easily connected, it ultimately raises 
more difficulties for determining the now essential intentions of actors.  
By the mid-eighteenth century, the era in which the novels in question were being 
written, the ethical importance of intention was well established. The corresponding problems of 
understanding which actions would lead to the intended outcomes and identifying intentions 
from physical actions were also established. These trends are apparent in the work of Adam 
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 The observer position as a moral standpoint had been popularized in the previous decade in the Spectator, a 
newspaper that used the persona of a detached observer to comment on the vices and virtues of public life in 
England.  
32
 Daniela Gobetti reads this paradox as both a “source of problems for Hutcheson’s thought” and “an important 
symptom of the changing nature of moral discourse, and of the changing relationship between morality, legality, and 
politics” (118). Gobetti cannot answer for the problem of perception in Hutcheson’s work but does connect this 





Smith, who continued to privilege motivation as an ethical standard but tempered the dependence 
on intentions with an array of corruptions and barriers that complicate such an ethics. Intention 
still remains central to morality, but its ability to be exercised is questioned more intensely. 
Smith agrees that “the only consequences for which [the actor] can be answerable, or by which 
he can deserve either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were some way 
or other intended, or those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the 
intention of the heart, from which he acted” (93). Intention is found to be the determinant of 
morality. Actions and consequences remain less important but, for Smith, they tend to 
problematize the ability to discern intention. As Hutcheson’s theory began to suggest, humans, 
limited to basic observation, must use action and consequence to judge. Smith argues that, 
though intention is what should determine the “whole merit or demerit” of an action, these are 
private and thus “beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction.” Thus, Smith claims, we 
function through a necessarily flawed system wherein “men in this life are liable to punishment 
for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions” (105).
33
 Intention is clearly the 
standard by which judgments should be made, but actions are the only accessible object to judge.  
Smith turns even further towards the observer’s perspective, asking even actors to take up 
the viewpoint of a disinterested observer. Like Hutcheson, Smith finds that every man possesses 
the means to be benevolent and reach an idealized morality; he argues man knows right from 
wrong because a “demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct” creates, “in 
the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the 
character and conduct both of himself and of other people” (247). Though each man possesses 
this “demigod within the breast” with the capacity for benevolence, Smith qualifies that each 
person will only be so good as the “delicacy and acuteness” of their observations (247).
34
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 V.M. Hope claims that Smith actually proposes two systems of ethics, one based on the merit and demerit of an 
action and the other on propriety and impropriety. See Hope, 88-100.  
34
 Yet, despite discussion of how human behavior often fails to meet an ideal of open, active hospitality, Smith’s 
philosophy continues to insist on the potential of a naturally benevolent nature and strengthens this position in 
subsequent editions. Wendy Motooka argues that, in each revision of Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith deals less 
and less with the particulars of life or the active application of moral sentiment, which thus allows him to insist more 
and more on the ideal of the impartial spectator within each man (211). She argues that Smith, by emphasizing the 
universal potential of benevolence, creates a flawed system that only works “when everyone agrees…when it is least 
needed” (220). The ideal, which Smith acknowledges is difficult to maintain, is only explicated within the 






Benevolence may still be a natural response in this theory but it requires training and diligence to 
turn this benevolence into action. This qualification of universal benevolence reflects Smith’s 
tendency to dwell on the difficulty of removing the obstacles to benevolence, a tendency that 
distances Smith from Hutcheson. His use of the Love Commandment illustrates this move: “As 
to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great 
precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same 
thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us” (Smith 25). For Smith, even actors in an 
exchange of hospitality are required to take an observer’s perspective. Rather than act on the love 
of neighbor, the actor is asked to step back and observe what that love is and then apply it 
internally rather than externally. By revising the commandment, Smith emphasizes neither active 
love of neighbor nor benevolent intentions towards others but rather explores an internalized 
consideration of another’s perspective and potential intention. When applied to hospitality ethics, 
the result is a host whose perspective and distance from self allows for greater benevolence but 
does not suggest that this intention will lead to action as was proposed by earlier philosophers.
35
  
 The ethics of intention and the problems it creates parallel the ethical problem of 
hospitality: the ideal relies on judgments of the actors’ intentions but practice, by necessity, can 
only consist of action and consequence. The ethical questions introduced in these philosophical 
texts are apparent in the system of hospitality as well. As intention became the ethical standard in 
the eighteenth century, hospitality became increasingly defined by the benevolent intentions 
thought to promote its ideal. The questions surrounding intentional ethics thus are applied to the 
hospitable exchange: how can an intention of open hospitality be translated into action and how 
can its consequences be predicted? How can the observer of hospitality determine from viewed 
actions the intentions of the actors in the exchange? These two questions—one of association, 
one of perspective—are crucial to the ethical inquiries found in the eighteenth-century novel. 
These novels often take the perspective of the protagonist, a limited perspective which illustrates 
the difficulties of reading another’s intentions. Likewise, these novels explore ethical obligation 
through plots of action, placed in the contexts of a larger world; this approach details the 
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 Wendy Motooka discusses the “circularity” of Smith’s moral claims and the eighteenth-century responses to the 
inactive nature of Smith’s ethics in The Age of Reasons: Quixotism, Sentimentalism and Political Economy in 





problems of association as actions and intentions are both vital to the ethical practice of 
hospitality. These novels use hospitality to work through the dimensions of these questions and 
possible solutions to the problems of association and perception.  
 
Literary Ethics: Guests in Context  
 Eighteenth-century novels investigate these two questions but approach intention as an 
ethic from a different perspective. The early philosophy discussed here was concerned with 
actors in what would be considered the host position—those actors in the position to offer 
hospitality, charity, or welcome—and the later philosophy viewed ethical exchanges from the 
detached perspective of an observer. Novels—and narrative in general—tend to focus on the 
guest perspective, following the stories of questing heroes, pilgrims, travelers, orphans, or exiles 
as they seek shelter and kindness from the strangers they meet on their journeys.
36
 Eighteenth-
century novels, which repeatedly take these characters as their central focus, approach the ethical 
questions of hospitality from this guest perspective. This shift in perspective emphasizes the 
cultural and social changes of the eighteenth century. The marginalized guest position resembles 
that of Britain’s new social voices in their vulnerabilities to authority and their lack of guidelines 
for behavior; these new Britons, including migrating Scotsmen and women, responded to their 
surroundings much like hospitable guests. The complications of this shifted perspective are 
evident in the depictions of the common scene of a carriage ride in the novels. Not a traditional 
form of hospitality, the carriage ride becomes a site for hospitality as travelling guests meet 
together in a space that requires each traveler to accommodate the other. However, in these 
scenes, there is no host but a wide spectrum of guests from diverse backgrounds and varying 
philosophical foundations. The lack of host in these scenes emphasizes the complexities of the 
guest perspective; asked to be both welcoming of others and wary of harm, these guests in the 
eighteenth century are asked to navigate a complex social system of social and ideological 
diversity. For example, a carriage ride depicted in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple brings together 
the characters of a clergyman, an atheist, and a fop; without a host, these guests must themselves 
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 As their philosophical predecessors, modern ethicists also predominantly write about the host rather than the 
guest. The works of Derrida, Caputo, and Tracy McNulty discussed in this work all investigate the obligations of 
one who hosts. Concerned primarily with how this host might encounter the Other with more openness, they 





manage their interactions and ride peacefully despite their conflicting worldviews (161). The 
guest’s moral obligations we find in this scene and others are multiplied in the eighteenth 
century. Further complicating the guest perspective, questions of hospitality and its obligations 
are generally framed for the host or observer, asking for judgment of whether to act prior to an 
exchange or whether the act was good after the exchange. Novels, by taking up the guest 
perspective, offer important insight into the ideals and practice of hospitality from within the 
exchange itself.  
 This point of view is immediately troubled; the questions of association and perspective 
framed for the host and observer are unsolvable to the guest. For the first, the nature of the guest 
position requires passivity; the guest must set aside prejudice and ambition to receive 
accommodation. Moreover, the guest’s duties are to respond to the host’s lead and be receptive 
to the host’s own position. As such, guests are rarely in a position to control action; no matter 
their intentions, their ability to act on them is limited. Second, the guest is thoroughly involved in 
the hospitable exchange and so cannot view the situation from the position of an observer. Often 
in a position of dependency, the guest is unable to see the motivations behind his received 
hospitality or predict the outcome of his acceptance of it. Thus, the guest can ask how to translate 
intention to action but faces more difficulty completing that transaction. Likewise, he can, and 
must, attempt to see the motivations behind a host’s hospitality but, from within the transaction, 
is often misled or confused. The novels’ carriage scenes highlight the uncomfortable ethical 
position of the host. Placed into a carriage with strangers, the guest must evaluate the other 
travelers. Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling illustrates these problems. Harley seeks to accommodate 
his fellow travelers by taking a seat although he knows “being driven backwards always 
disagreed with him” (99). His desire to make his companions more comfortable is limited, and 
his self-sacrifice seems foolish since it cannot make any one else’s ride more enjoyable and even 
threatens to make the ride less pleasant for all. Despite his good will towards his fellow guests, 
Harley also immediately begins to scrutinize their “physiognomy” to reveal their characters; as a 
guest, he attempts to observe his company though the narrative reminds the reader of Harley’s 
ill-luck with the practice in London, suggesting that Harley will have similar difficulty 
discerning the characters of his companions. As both host and observer, then, Harley is largely 





position is well-equipped to fully investigate the problems of practicing hospitality and, more 
particularly, of practicing the new ethical ideal of hospitality so concerned with intention.  
Indeed, the guest position exposes the discomfort of guest dependency and the difficulty 
of determining the ethical nature of hospitality. As an actor in the ethical exchange, the guest is 
necessarily concerned with the nature of that exchange. But in the eighteenth century, this 
concern expanded to include the host’s intention as well as his actions. Because the ethical value 
of the exchange is determined by intention, the guest must observe the situation and analyze the 
associations between action and intention. This change in ethical focus takes hospitality from the 
authority of the host—who traditionally had to determine the worthiness of the guest—and 
places it with the guest—who now must judge the intentions behind his welcome into a 
household. The guest takes on the traditional host duty of calculating the morality of the 
exchange but, unlike the traditional host, is concerned not with his own intentions and actions 
but with those of the host. Though holding ethical responsibility, the guest does not have the 
power to act on his judgment. Instead, the guest must view the exchange from the perspective of 
a detached observer in order to more accurately read the host’s intentions. In the carriage scenes 
mentioned above, for example, the traveling guests must attempt to uncover the intentions of 
their fellow travelers; Harley attempts to read “physiognomies” and Cynthia, a guest in David 
Simple, finds herself labeling her companions as “the Clergyman,--the Atheist,--and the 
Butterfly” according to the behaviors she observes (161). These observations, however, leave 
little room for action in the literal confines of the carriage. These new duties of observer and host 
do not negate the former role of the guest. This role is necessarily passive and follows the 
“customary parameters” of the host’s household, passively accepting “the goods and services” 
that the host considers hospitable (Heal 192). The very essence of the guest’s role is reactionary 
as he responds to the hospitality of the host. Thus, the need for the guest to determine the 
intention of his host asks for this role to be reevaluated. The guest must remain passive but also a 
detached arbitrator. While the guest’s earlier duties were merely to make judgment of himself 
easy by providing confirmation of his own identity (Heal 215), the guest now had to search into 
the private identity of the hosts to determine the morality of their hospitality. Both of these 





ethics of exchange if unable to act and the guest cannot see the exchange as an observer when 
involved in the exchange.  
Literature was particularly suited to explore this relationship because literature had 
traditionally used the guest’s perspective to discuss hospitality and its ethics. The guest position 
had always been an anxious one, and scholars have noted this trend.
37
 These anxieties have 
generally been rooted in the physical exchange and the vulnerability of the guest. Though 
susceptible to the bad intentions of the host, the guest is only concerned with those intentions 
that are manifested physically. Starting with ancient Greek tales of heroic journeys, narratives 
use the guest position to explore the ethics of welcome and gratitude. Greek and Roman epics, 
for example, follow a journeying hero, who must often act as a guest along the journey and 
meets with a range of exemplary good and bad hosts. In these narratives, hospitality is 
encountered as an action in a series of plot points.
38
 Steve Reece breaks down these points into 
moments of “arrival, reception, seating, feasting, identification, bedding down, bathing, gift 
giving, and departure” to argue for hospitality as a culturally and generically coded event that 
produces a system of hierarchy and reciprocity. Gifts pass from the host to the guest with 
gratitude and some sort of reciprocation asked in return (Reece 35). The guest’s primary function 
in such tales is to offer reassurances of his identity and purpose in travelling. Reece considers 
this revelation of the guest’s identity the “most critical element” in the hospitable exchange and 
one that determines the nature of hospitality and its potential for exchange (25). These depictions 
of hospitality, then, dwell on the ethics within the actions themselves. The host and guest are 
expected to perform their own duties and ethical values are only questioned when these duties 
are not performed. These responsibilities also support hierarchies; the guest’s duties are more 
passive and involve primarily giving information when requested. The host’s duties require more 
action, and his ability to be a good host depends entirely on his ability to provide the proper 
stages of hospitality.  
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 The following will explore those scholars who speak specifically of host-guest relationships; however, 
connections to the anxious guest position can be seen in the foundations of modern narrative study. For example, 
Joseph Campbell’s “hero’s journey” or Northrop Frye’s “theory of modes” both discuss literature’s propensity to 
follow a hero along a journey of discovery that results in either integration or separation from a larger society.  
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 For example, Odysseus is taken off course from his journey home, where he is host, and made a guest (or hostage) 





  Medieval romances are structured like classic epics as they follow the heroics of a knight 
on a quest. As he journeys, the knight often finds himself in the role of guest who must interpret 
the actions of the host to determine any danger to himself or those he has pledged to protect. This 
judgment tends to be primarily concerned with the performance of the exchange and the social 
hierarchy it upholds rather than motivations for the action.
39
 Instead, romance uses the figurative 
power of hospitality to establish a hierarchy and obligations for the guest to negotiate. Matilda 
Tomaryn Bruckner reads these hospitable exchanges in medieval romance as “a rite which 
validates or invalidates the social identity of all those involved” while it “confers or confirms 
status” (117).  The guest and the travelling adventurer can use hospitality to receive favors from 
the court or other forms of social prestige. Hospitality is not just an action that offers room and 
board but it also serves as an “instrument of social identity, [or] a proof or test of his merit” 
(Bruckner 119). The knight must then use these instances of hospitality to further confirm his 
valor or personal merit. The ethics depicted in the medieval narratives are concerned with 
external markers of social position and the fulfilling of social obligations. They offer critiques of 




Early modern texts continue to use the guest’s position to explore the ethics of social 
exchange through the guest’s vulnerability. Increasing diversity within the social systems on 
which exchange depends—always a factor for the traveler—becomes of greater ethical 
importance in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Charles Ross notes that, what he 
terms the “custom of the castle” disrupts an universal sense of ethics because it suggests that 
proper behavior is dependent on the traditions of a specific place and thus primarily a “social 
construction” (Ross 85). The guest, when entering a castle, is asked to determine the conventions 
specific to that estate and act according to the host’s expectations and demands, and this 
interpretive act begins to demand that the guest judge his host’s intention. Ross sees this literary 
use of custom shifting in the early modern period; Spenser’s Fairie Queene, for example, no 
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 For example, in Lanval, the eponymous hero is offered ideal hospitality by a fairy lady and then receives poor 
hospitality from Queen Guinevere and King Arthur; though Guinevere is shown to be motivated by jealousy. Lanval 
is notably uncouth about deciphering such motivations. Likewise, Sir Gawain must guess at the motivations of the 
Green Knight to be beheaded and to threaten beheading his guest.  
40
 In the examples offered in the previous note, Lanval critiques the lust and greed of the court hosts and Sir Gawain 





longer limits morality to “doing the right thing” but also insists on “a man’s knowing right from 
wrong” (16). Ross finds that in these situations where the guest is asked to judge the host the 
knight finds an “inability to perform” (16). The problem of guest passivity is immediately 
apparent in these formative texts and suggests a burgeoning concern with the personal 
motivations that drive the public social system. Early modern drama and poetry continue to 
explore the nature of hierarchies but use the guest position to question the ethical obligations of 
the host and the nature of the exchange. Daryl Palmer sees the use of a host character in drama as 
immediately invoking “questions of societal order and survival” (28). Indeed, the host character 
often signifies political disruption in this period and the guest’s point of view is often utilized to 
display that worry.
41
 Philip Sidney’s Arcadia, for example, includes a king who retires from his 
political obligations and the hospitable entertaining his position expected, thus leaving his 
kingdom vulnerable to attack. Here and elsewhere, Sidney shows that the “other side of 
hospitality is warfare between the ranks” (Palmer 56). By allowing for a power vacuum, the king 
has asked his subjects to compete to move upward in the social hierarchy. Hospitality in the early 
modern period remains concerned with physical exchange; yet, by proliferating the ways such 




As civil war, economic change, religious questioning and the growth of London disrupted 
the enactment of hospitality in the seventeenth century, it also shifted the depictions of 
hospitality in literature. Many aspects remained, including the central focus on the travelling 
guest; however, this guest was no longer a noble hero but often a common man or, increasingly, 
a woman. Moreover, the locale and identity of the host changed. Much eighteenth-century fiction 
follows the travel of a protagonist from his or her home in the country to London. In the city, 
they search for hospitality, not at the country estate, but at court, in coffee-houses, markets, 
plays, and public parks. The hosts are not landed gentry in control of the surrounding 
community, but any individual with more social or political power than the travelling 
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Country-house poems, for example, detail the hospitality of a host by celebrating the order that host maintains on 






protagonist. Often, after the failure of these hosts, hospitality is sought from peers and even those 
of lower orders. Indeed, these novels often look for hospitality in new places from members of 
all social classes. In this varied world, these novels try to establish how good hospitality is given 
and how to recognize good hospitality when it was offered. The successes and failures these texts 
depict work to define the problems of hospitality as well as a new ideal; at the same time, 
however, these texts indicate new challenges or threats faced by hospitality in a changing 
environment.  
 
Literary Hospitality: New Problems of Exchange 
Eighteenth-century novels bring together an ethical standard that prizes intention, a 
cultural form that controls moral practices, and a literary emphasis on the guest. As a result, 
depictions of hospitality in these texts navigate intention, practice and the guest position and 
expose the ethical changes and struggles faced during an exchange. In exploring the new ethics 
of intention, these novels reveal the difficulties of problems of associating intention with action 
and problems of perceiving intention from action and highlight how these problems affect the 
hospitable practices meant to build relationships. Moreover, by viewing these relationships from 
the guest perspective, the novels discussed here make clear the anxieties surrounding hospitality 
and the specific vulnerabilities of the guest. In understanding these vulnerabilities, eighteenth-
century novels propose and accept limitations in the practice of hospitality. These novels make 
clear that limitations are necessary to protect those involved in hospitable exchanges but, at the 
same time, make known the difficulties of maintaining such limitations. As a result, these novels 
propose limitations as a solution to problems of perception and association only to suggest that 
limited hospitality is impossible in an uncontrollable world.  
 Chapter one investigates the turn to intention during the eighteenth century and the 
resulting problems of association that derive from this shift. These problems, connected with the 
host who is responsible for making his actions conform to and express his intentions, are most 
notable in philosophical texts which take the host’s position as the ethical standard. I will return 
to the treatises of Bayle, Cumberland, Hutcheson and Smith, which all address problems of 
diversity; in a world constantly encountering new cultures and their ethical traditions, normative 





accept that such diversity makes choosing actions that accurately reflect intention all the more 
difficult. Looking closely at these works, this chapter argues that philosophy fails to reconcile 
this diversity and its subsequent problems associating actions with intentions. Instead, 
philosophers point to narrative as a better way to resolve differences between the host’s and 
guest’s expectations because narratives provide a context of practice against which the actions of 
individuals involved in an exchange can be examined.  
 Thus establishing literature as a potential ethical force in the eighteenth century, this 
chapter turns to an example of hosting in literature in the character of Harley, the focus of Henry 
Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling. While most narratives take the perspective of the guest, this text 
closely follows the life and death of a hosting character. More importantly, though two-
dimensional examples of hosts abound in literature, Mackenzie’s work delves into the psyche 
and motivations of the host, almost obsessively portraying the emotional responses that drive 
Harley’s benevolent behavior. Reading this text closely, however, reveals that intentional ethics 
do not resolve problems of association when context and characters are provided. Instead, Harley 
proves to be a startlingly inactive and ineffective host, unable to change his environment despite 
his flawless intentions. Indeed, as this chapter shows, the host position is weakened by an 
intentional ethic that fails to prescribe how an environment can be controlled by the host.  
 Chapter two considers the fate of the guest when good hosts, like Harley, are weakened 
or removed from the system. Without a strong guiding force, the guest must rely on his own 
judgment when pursuing hospitality. Still dependent on the care and service hospitality provides, 
the guest is increasingly asked to determine the motives of the host; however, the guest is 
particularly ill-equipped to perceive any ulterior motives behind a host’s hospitable actions. This 
chapter investigates the depictions of bad hosts in the novel, ranging from classic negative 
examples, such as misers and spendthrifts, to new forms of negative hosts who prey on the guest 
through the use of deceptive hospitality. To do so, I will look at four texts which will frame the 
next three chapters: Tobias Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, Charlotte Lennox’s 
Sophia, Sarah Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple, and Frances Burney’s Cecilia, or, 
Memoirs of an Heiress. In each of these four texts, the central character is made to withstand the 





negative forms of hospitality range from disgust to discomfort to debilitating anxiety that 
correspond to the nature of deception in the offered hospitality.  
 To help make this claim, chapter two uses gift theory, and particularly the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, to illustrate the steps of an exchange of hospitality. Gift studies shares with theories of 
hospitality a concern with both ideals and practices as well as an awareness of cultural norms. By 
likening the guest-host relationship to that of the giver-receiver, the depth of the perception 
problem becomes clear. Though bad hosting is always a threat, only those forms of predatory 
hospitality that conceal themselves behind seemingly benevolent actions disrupt the psyche of 
the guest. In other words, it is only when the guest is deceived that hospitality is portrayed as 
threatening to the guest and destructive to the larger system of hospitality. The novel thus 
contends that bad hosting, made possible by the weakening host position, exacerbates the guest’s 
problems of perception, which can in turn undermine the entire system of hospitality.  
 Indeed, chapter three contemplates how guests attempt to restructure the hospitality 
systems to combat their vulnerability to deceptive hospitality. Though hosts have the traditional 
power to limit hospitality by accepting or rejecting guests, the guests of these novels place limits 
on hospitality by cutting out the host position entirely. Noting the weakened position of the host, 
these guests create a society of like-minded guests. This society is open only to those guests that 
exhibit ideal guest behavior, specifically disinterested motives and passivity to the desires of 
others. In these closed environments, the guest is no longer vulnerable to the host, and the 
exchange of hospitality is pursued in an equal exchange.  
 The ideal guest behavior, however, manifests itself differently in male and female guests. 
Defense against bad hosts depends to a certain extent on the financial and social positioning of 
the guest and a resulting capability to leave the exchange; only female guests are shown to be 
made more vulnerable by a passive, disinterested state. Though their male counterparts might 
suffer emotional turmoil because of their passivity, they do not risk physical harm; instead, the 
benefits of their disinterested care for others outweigh the potential risks to their persons. 
Chapter three addresses this gender split and argues that men like Matthew Bramble and David 
Simple have the ability to limit their hospitality to other guests in order to act more comfortably; 
in this society of guests, these men are prized for the openness, passivity and disinterestedness 





shown to require a more limited expression of these prized traits than their male counterparts; 
instead, the use of reason and control of personal desire is particularly valued in female 
characters. The women discussed in this chapter—Cecilia Beverley and Sophia Darnley—are 
both depicted as moral characters because of their ability to use reason to combat their natural 
tendencies towards passivity, openness and disinterest which leaves women vulnerable to desires 
or deceits of others. Passivity, a gendered trait in these texts, is shown as a potential danger to the 
women that possess it; though disinterest is still highly prized and necessary to the exemplary 
behavior of these women, reason must be used to limit the company worthy to receive their 
hospitable attention.  For both male and female guests, limitations and exclusions are necessary 
to the exchange of safe and agreeable hospitality.  
 These exclusions, however, do not result in unequivocally happy endings in these novels. 
Rather, as chapter four argues, these new limits are questioned even as they are proposed in the 
texts. In each of the novels discussed here, the hospitable relationship is changed into a familial 
one; through marriages and discoveries of kinship, hospitality is overwhelmed by the more 
permanent and stable bonds of family. This shift suggests that hospitality as an ethic cannot exist 
without its trademark of openness to others; instead, such limits cause hospitality to be replaced 
with an alternative value system. Moreover, in several cases—those of David Simple and 
Cecilia—the loss of hospitality is not glossed over by a comedic end to the novel. Rather these 
two texts dwell on how the world cannot be excluded from the newly-established circle of like-
minded guests but constantly intrudes into the limited world and makes such attempts to limit 
social interactions futile. Thus, the eighteenth-century novel undermines the very theory of 
hospitable limitations it puts forth.  
 These novels suggest, then, that there is no good answer to the problems of association 
and perception in hospitality ethics; any attempt to mediate the intentions of others results in 
limitations that effectively displace hospitality as an ethic. The only means to maintain 
hospitality, these texts suggest, is to remain open to the very problems that the ethics creates. 
This paradox—one that modern day thinkers still face and one that still plagues the practice of 
hospitality today—defines the eighteenth-century novel as it approaches the revolutions and 
social upheavals of the Romantic Era. Depicting the journeys of average guests, these texts 





century. At the same time, they expose the struggle faced by individuals who were caught 
between traditional and new ethical systems and remind the reader of the discomfort and 







CHAPTER ONE:  
THE DEATH OF THE HOST 
 
The emphasis on intention in hospitality ethics replaces an older system more interested 
in the active responsibilities of the host; this ethical shift begs the question of how the host might 
adapt to an intentional system. This question haunts some eighteenth-century narratives, but in 
Henry Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling it is the very subject of the narrative. Mackenzie’s novel 
shows a host so exhausted by the benevolent welcome intentional ethics demands that he 
weakens and dies; the ethical ideal, his death suggests, is unable to adapt to the more 
materialistic world. The narrative thus explores the implications of the death of the host for 
hospitality’s ethical choices and reciprocal obligations. In so doing, Mackenzie’s narrative tells 
of the death of traditional hospitality. By further examining the tenets of the philosophical 
thinkers from the introduction, I will show that the new emphasis on intention deprives 
traditional hospitality of the rather simple scheme of beneficence and obligation that organized 
social relationships of an earlier time. I will argue that, in its place, the ethical responsibilities of 
the host are transferred to a guest whose own vulnerable position perpetuates the weakening of 
the hospitality system.  
Mackenzie begins the Man of Feeling (1771) with a narrative prelude presenting the 
novel as a found text. In this prelude, the reader meets the narrator after the events recounted in 
the text have already occurred. The curate, the owner of the found text who gifts the papers to 
their later “editor,” describes the supposed narrator as 
a grave, oddish kind of man…The country people called him The Ghost, and he was 
known by the slouch in his gait, and the length of his stride. I was but little acquainted 
with him, for he never frequented any of the clubs hereabouts. Yet for all he used to walk 
a-nights, he was as gentle as a lamb at times; for I have seen him playing at te-totum with 
the children, on the great stone at the door of our church-yard. (48) 
Marked as a ghost, the narrator is a man without a place in society. He fails to attend clubs and 
participate in the community but instead lives detached from social life only to be observed as an 





and a “stride,” this ghost lacks any position or place to identify him within the adult world. 
Rather than participate in the public sphere, The Ghosts limits his actions to walking at night and 
playing games with children, a choice that marks the narrator as detached from social influence 
and without significant influence himself. Associated here with the graveyard by name 
(“Ghost”), personality (“grave”) and physical proximity (he plays “on the great stone…of our 
church-yard”), the narrator functions as a link between worlds. As a ghost lingers between the 
living and dead, The Ghost wanders between a living world of exchange and interaction and a 
lost world of ideals. When we first hear of The Ghost, he is a liminal figure, between rather than 
of the worlds of the living and the dead.  
In the events that the text recounts, however, The Ghost takes part in exchanges of 
hospitality. Indeed, as a character in the text, The Ghost fulfills the traditional duties of the guest. 
He is the guest of two exemplary hosts who express the good intentions of the new hospitable 
ideal: Harley, the hero and primary focus of Man of Feeling, takes The Ghost in when “the 
malevolence of fortune” leaves him with few friends (135); and Ben Silton, the late head of 
Silton Hall remembered in the text as an honest and welcoming man of sense and virtue, is the 
idealized former host of The Ghost. In this recounted past, The Ghost lived actively as the guest, 
Charles, a man searching for welcome in a world of discomfort. When he receives hospitality 
from Harley and Silton, Charles praises their welcome with the gratitude of an ideal guest.
43
 
Each mention of Silton is followed by an effusive interruption of praise, often accompanied by 
tears.
44
 Likewise, Charles displays his appreciation of Harley’s hospitality with his own concern 
for Harley’s well-being on his deathbed (135). In each case, however, the accommodating host 
dies, and Charles’ praise must be expressed in the past tense in the narrative. Their deaths 
indicate the loss of good hosts but also deprive Charles of his position as ideal guest; without the 
benevolent hosts Harley and Silton, Charles is no longer an ideal guest. Indeed, the narrative 
opens on Charles spitefully harassing a lapdog who is napping on Silton’s old chair rather than 
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 The behaviors of an ideal guest include public expressions of gratitude and uncomplaining acceptance of the 
host’s offers of hospitality (Heal 192).  
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 For example, the narrator sheds a tear to the memory of Silton when recounting his visit to Silton Hall after his 






acting the part of grateful guest (50); though still welcomed into Silton hall, Charles is unable to 
fulfill his duties as a guest when the hosts themselves are less accommodating.  
When he loses the company of these two idealized hosts, Charles also loses his own 
social position. No longer participating in the hospitality cycle, Charles is outside the system and 
becomes the Ghost of the novel’s introduction. He maintains a connection to the system, 
however, by elegizing the loss of his two benefactors in writing, memorializing them in the text 
he creates. In this writing, The Ghost takes on some of the duties of a host, introducing others to 
the idealized behavior of his former hosts. Indeed, The Ghost’s strong narrative voice functions 
as an authoritative guide to the proper reflections on the events in Harley’s life; this authority and 
ability to guide the reader establish the narrator as a host-like figure to the reader. Yet, though a 
hosting figure, The Ghost is not a true host: he does not publish his work but leaves it to be 
found; he does not welcome the reader into his own life or identity, but presents the life of 
another; his text is not welcoming but fragmented and dependent on the interpretive work of the 
reader. As such, The Ghost as narrator functions more as a guide to the reader— able to show a 
life but lacking the authority to invite others to be a part of it. This reserved position means that 
The Ghost’s narrative differs from traditional hospitality in its passivity. In this way, the 
narrator’s passive position maintains important connections to the guest’s position. Though The 
Ghost possesses the openness and “gentleness” necessary to offer hospitality, his ability to act is 
limited and thus remains in the passive position of the grateful guest. Burdened with a sense of 
responsibility to fulfill the ethical obligations of the host and to memorialize the host’s ethical 
work but also unable to regain an active connection with society, the narrator becomes a 
transitory figure between guest and host and becomes a ghost in his attempt to blend the two 
positions.  
 The Ghost exists outside hospitality but still comments on it, mourning the loss of strong 
hosts throughout the novel; whereas many other texts depict hosts neglecting their duties and the 
loss of a working system of hospitality, Mackenzie dwells on the loss of actual hosts who took 
their obligations seriously. While other texts make clear that something is lacking, Mackenzie’s 
text identifies the lack. Mackenzie does so, I will argue, by directly addressing the philosophical 
turn to intentional ethics that defined the eighteenth century. This turn begins with seventeenth- 





The new ideal of benevolence towards others, however, is complicated by the diversity of lived 
experience, an experience that literature is better suited to explore. Indeed, whereas philosophy is 
primarily concerned with active choice more in keeping with the host’s duties, literature has 
traditionally used the guest’s perspective to explore diversity, commenting on the range of host 
behaviors and the dangers of bad hospitality. Mackenzie builds on this tradition, using the guest 
perspective to explore how an intentional definition of hospitality threatens the existence of the 
host. When the guest begins to judge the intentions behind the host’s welcome, he takes over 
many of the duties of the traditional host; whereas the host was previously asked to judge 
character and worth to determine whether to extend an invitation, the guest now makes such 
ethical judgments; however, as Mackenzie’s Ghost illustrates, these responsibilities cannot be 
acted upon—the guest cannot invite. Though the guest may intend to welcome others, he often 
lacks the ability to fulfill that intention. This fiction shows that, when the guest is made 
responsible for determining the legitimacy of hospitable intentions, the hospitality system 
becomes unstable because the guest had no authority—literally no place—to enact this ideal. 
Outside of a hierarchical system, the roles of guest and host and the duties associated with each 
became difficult to define. As Mackenzie’s Ghost disappears, leaving behind only his 
remembrances of a working system, eighteenth-century novels depict how ill-defined roles of 
host and guest question the possibility for the ideals of hospitality to be enacted in the world.  
 
The Problem of Diversity 
Ideals of hospitality became increasingly defined by intentions. As I discussed in the 
introduction, philosophy encouraged this shift in ethical standards, proposing that the goodness 
of an action depended on the actor’s intention. Yet these same philosophies uncover the problem 
of association inherent in intentional systems: the ability to predict the connection between 
intentions and the actions and consequences they produce is unstable. For the primary actor—in 
the case of hospitality, the host—this instability is one of predicting association; good intentions 
do not always produce good results. Moreover, the available courses of action that would reveal 
good intentions were diverse and dependent on context. Benevolence might be universally 
admired, but the actions that were considered to be evidence of benevolence varied widely. This 





among Christian religions, prescriptions for charitable behavior ranged broadly, and new contact 
with foreign cultures furthered a sense of relative ethics.
45
 For hospitality, this variety meant that 
no one method of hosting was prescribed and a host might consider certain behaviors, such as 
constant attendance on a guest or queries into his travels, to be hospitable, whereas the guest 
might find such behaviors invasive. To produce the desired association, the primary actor or host 
needed not just good intentions but the knowledge and luck to properly act on those intentions.  
The very philosophers who proposed intentional ethics struggled to overcome this 
problem of association in their texts and show clear guidelines for choosing which actions reflect 
good intentions. These thinkers identify the root behind the association problem as one of diverse 
ethical codes. Indeed, basing morality on intention was a means to combat diverse cultural codes 
of behavior; with so many systems for moral action available, intention was seen, in some ways, 
as a more accurate indicator of the ethical value of a particular action. If many codes exist to 
regulate activity and all are accepted systems, then the only universal code would be one based 
on the intentions that inspire this range of action. Intentional ethics, then, might narrow ethical 
standards to their root source but did not clarify which system to pursue or how to practice this 
ethics. The individual consequently had much more responsibility in choosing how best to 
respond to an intention. The following philosophers attempt to guide the individual choice while 
struggling to overcome the diversity of choice.  
Bayle perhaps knew this diversity best; a Huguenot within Catholic France, his 
Philosophical Commentary incorporated the idea of diversity into his ideal for universal 
tolerance. He claims that religious tolerance is necessary because there is no way to ensure 
universal belief in one religion. Indeed, each religious belief claims the right to persecute 
believers of other faiths. But Bayle takes this position even farther to argue that diversity of 
intention also exists. He notes, “I have firmly believ’d a thousand things in some part of my Life, 
which I am far from believing at present; and what I now believe, a great many others I see of as 
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 Such differences were reported as part of the Grand Tour. Travelers debated the relative hospitality of the 
countries visited. Though religious differences were mentioned frequently, the perception of hospitality was not 
based on religion; Catholic Italy was generally considered very hospitable while Spain was not, while Protestant 
Germany was considered inhospitable even as the cities of the Netherlands were praised. For more on British 
perceptions of hospitality in Europe, see Jeremy Black, The British and the Grand Tour, 41-59. Trade to the Middle 
and Far East also created knowledge of cultural differences; though these accounts discuss hospitality, they often 
include the perspective of a merchant encouraging trade rather than a tourist evaluating guest accommodations. For 





good Sense as my self, believe not a tittle of: my Assent is often determin’d, not by 
Demonstrations which appear to me cou’d not be otherwise, and which appear so to others, but 
by Probabilitys which appear not such to other men” (94).
46
 Here, Bayle admits his own diversity 
of thought and questions the accuracy of his thought process, while at the same time admitting 
that his, and others’, beliefs are often unable to be proven. Bayle only rehabilitates the ideal, 
then, to promote not an active hospitality, but a passive lack of judgment upon non-believers. 
The diversity of belief compromises the host position; Bayle no longer encourages the host to 
perform to an ideal of an open house, but simply asks him not to “compel” non-believers to 
accept his mind-set by threat of violence.  
Cumberland, too, notes the problem of diversity for the benevolent ideal but maintains 
the possibility of his ideal even within a diverse world. Knud Haakonssen notes that 
Cumberland’s “value-pluralism” is what makes his theory stand out within the large number of 
attacks on Hobbes’ theories. Cumberland’s theory supposes that “People have the ability to find 
a wide, indeed, an unspecifiable range of things valuable; hence human motivation is complex 
and constantly changing. More particularly, it is not possible to reduce human motives to mere 
self-interest, let alone a concern just with self-preservation, as Hobbes is supposed to have done” 
(Haakonssen, Natural Law 33).
47
 By making human motives more complex than self-interest, 
Cumberland both allows for a benevolent idealism and opens up his moral system to diversity. 
While avoiding the negative view of human nature Hobbes proposes, Cumberland fails to 
address the problems of idealistic conflict that Bayle asks his readers to overlook and also 
suggests that benevolence can never be the sole motive for human interaction.
48
 As such, the 
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 Indeed, Bayle knew he had to have been convinced in error at least once. Raised a Protestant, Bayle briefly 
converted to Catholicism while attending a Jesuit college. At the time of his conversion, he was fully convinced of 
the Catholic teachings but as convinced in the Protestant beliefs when he reverted back to his Huguenot faith a few 
years later.   
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 Whereas Haakonssen reads diversity as strengthening Cumberland’s opposition to Hobbes, J.B. Schneewind finds 
that diversity weakens Cumberland’s philosophy. He explains that Cumberland’s theory supposes that “no two true 
propositions can be inconsistent,” thus allowing that what is permissible in one context, such as stealing to combat 
starvation, need be permissible in another. Schneewind observes that “it is interesting that Cumberland does not see 
this principle as in any way threatening his claim that we are to maximize the good in each of our acts. He sees it, 
rather, as bringing home to us the blessings of mutual dependence in a harmonious universe. Avoiding the 
inconsistency of judging like cases differently is a source of social harmony” (115). Thus, Schneewind argues, 
Cumberland’s philosophy depends on ignoring diversity and instead emphasizing universal happiness.  
48
 Cumberland’s translator, John Maxwell, had difficulty following this logic, noting contradictions in Cumberland’s 





universalism of his benevolent ideal is questioned. The host may have a number of reasons for 
inviting his guests in or offering them hospitality, including interested and disinterested ones; his 
intentions are ethical only if the interested motives do not supersede the disinterested ones. By 
blending motives, Cumberland makes intentional ethics more practical but exacerbates the 
problem of association. The actor, or host, must now also determine which intentions are 
influencing his actions more and not just which would best reflect his intentions.  
Hutcheson effectively sidesteps the problem of diversity by separating intention and 
action; ideal, benevolent intentions, he claims, precede action and so precede the moment of 
public judgment. He admits that, while man is intuitively benevolent, the means to enact 
benevolence might vary. In other words, while the intention remains ideal, the actions and 
consequences that come from that motive can vary. D.D. Carey points to Hutcheson’s nation-
building examples as an indication of his problems of accounting for diversity. When Hutcheson 
introduces “the bold, liberty-loving country and the timid, peace-loving country,” he proposes 
that both countries arrived at these opposite ideals using the moral sense. Moral sense, influenced 
by cultural ideology, determines the particular actions and consequences of individuals (Carey 
176). Though mankind all agree on the proper motivations for action, they disagree on what will 
provide the greatest good. Diversity thus makes Hutcheson’s benevolent ideal hard to identify 
within the practical world.
49
 In a hospitality scenario, each host may offer good intentions to 
their guest, but each might practice a different way of doing so. The ultimate morality, however, 
has been determined prior to the actual hosting and is not contingent on the actions themselves or 
the guest’s interpretation of them.  
Smith, building on Hutcheson’s moral sense that reacts prior even to conscious motive, 
admits that practical rules of morality are hard to determine. He qualifies moral philosophy in 
                                                                                                                                                             
this paradox. For example, he acknowledges the potential to object “That, according to our Author’s Scheme, the 
Principle of Self-Love is more strong and uniform than that of Benevolence.” He rejects this critique but then argues 
for its place in Cumberland’s overall philosophy: “I don’t see, that our Author has advanced anything from which it 
particularly follows, ‘That we desire our own Advantage more strongly than that of others.’ However, I am of the 
Opinion that it is so in most People, and that it is not inconsistent with Virtue: Nevertheless I believe there are some, 
of so exalted and generous a Disposition, as to entertain as great, nay, a greater, Desire of the general Good of 
Mankind, than of any private Advantage” (Cumberland 606).  
49
 Daniela Gobetti argues that Hutcheson tries to reconcile this diversity by privileging man’s “natural sociability” 
over self-interest. But, as Gobetti points out, the “the epistemological facts” skew any means to judge whether 
sociability or self-interest have inspired action, thus leading Gobetti to contend that Hutcheson creates a separate 





general by noting that “the general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which 
determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, 
are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many 
modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them” 
(Smith 174). Even what he considers the most stable virtue, gratitude, allows for many 
exceptions, and the rules governing behavior as to how or when to show gratitude remain vague 
and open to diversity. The general virtues are much less clear when one attempts to describe 
them in detail.
50
 The diversity in even defining these terms that Smith points out causes difficulty 
for understanding norms of hospitality; hosts are unsure how to act, and guests are unsure how to 
respond.  
It is the problem of diversity that most often plagues these moral philosophies, 
particularly those that suggest a moral sense theory or propose sensibility as a virtue. Wendy 
Motooka evaluates the downfall of this eighteenth-century trend and argues that the “pejorative” 
sense of sentimentalism arises from “moral diversity, for moral ideas can be recognized as 
‘sentimental’ (pejoratively) only in the context of plausible alternatives. Moral ideas in the 
absence of such alternatives are never dismissed as sentimental, rather they are accepted as self-
evident truths” (21).
51
 Indeed, as the century advanced, sentimentalism became increasingly 
ridiculed and the benevolent ideals that were often supported by sensibility were dismissed in the 
wake of other moral options.
52
 It became harder and harder to believe the disinterested assertions 
of a host when practical motives of self-interest were also available to explain behavior. The 
problem of association could not be reconciled and so riddled the ethic that it caused the demise 
of moral sense theories. In some ways, the same demise came to an ethic of hospitality. The 
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 Richard Teichgraeber argues that Smith overcomes this problem of diversity in practice by his theory of a 
“correspondence of sentiments” which would allow one to pursue his own interests while also requiring him to 
attend to others’ interests. This balance, Teichgraeber contends, successfully mediates the diversity (115); while 
Smith certainly promotes understanding, a “correspondence of sentiments” is not shown to overcome the diversity 
of cultural and personal expectations encountered in a hospitality exchange.  
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 Motooka sees this move as an influence of skepticism, which dwelled more extensively on the subjective nature of 
moral judgment. Marking Hume as the quintessential skeptic, Motooka argues that he, and other skeptics, helped 
expose the  diversity of moral behaviors and subjectivity of moral judgment (20).  
52
 Philosophically, this new thought might be characterized by Immanuel Kant’s privileging of “understanding” over 
“sensibility.” Though still building on moral sense philosophy and seeing the value of sensibility as a means of 






diversity of choice for welcoming guests coupled with the distrust of intention made it difficult 
for the host to reconcile his intentions and actions in the eyes of the public. With weakened 
standards for action, the host struggled to continue to offer hospitality. It is this process of 
diminishing the host’s power to act that eighteenth-century narratives explore.  
 
An Ethical Narrative 
Novels, and narrative in general, approach the ethical problems the host faces with 
greater flexibility in explaining the diversity of ethical choice. Able to follow the contexts of an 
ethical quandary, novels can portray how choices are made, implemented and evaluated. It is 
perhaps because of the lack of particularity in the philosophical ideals that many of their own 
proposers turn to narrative as a philosophical vessel. Both Hutcheson and Smith suggest that 
narrative can explore more fully the benevolent ideals that their philosophies espouse. 
Hutcheson, for example, recommends fiction’s flawed rather than ideal characters because they 
resemble more closely those we see in real life and because the reader will be more “touch’d and 
affected by the imperfect Characters” and thus more likely to condone their virtuous behavior 
(43). Likewise, Smith recommends the works of “poets and romance writers” for moral 
improvement because of how well they “paint the refinements and delicacies of love and 
friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections” (143).
53
 While these two 
philosophers offer their own works to uncover the principles behind morality, they suggest that 
narratives are a better source for virtuous instruction. These philosophers hope that narrative’s 
use of particular contexts and characters can effectively display how best to overcome problems 
of association and act in ways that reflect their good intentions.  
What these early philosophers noted in their own theories, contemporary philosophers 
and scholars have discovered as well.
54
 Martha Nussbaum, most famously, uses her background 
in philosophy to argue for the ethical lessons found in literature. She finds that novels 
“characterize life more richly and truly—indeed, more precisely—than an example lacking these 
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features ever could; and they engender in the reader a type of ethical work more appropriate for 
life” (47).
55
 The detail and depth, indeed the diversity, of narrative offers the reader more 
practicable and instructive moral direction. Similarly, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argues 
that narrative is where contemporary morals might have a chance to re-emerge in today’s 
society. He finds narrative essential to virtue and argues that “any specific account of the virtues 
presupposes an equally specific account of the narrative structure and unity of a human life and 
vice versa” (243). Morality and life, he contends, are thus understood through narrative; narrative 
is essential to understanding ethics, and, without it, the ideals become separated from real life. 
Thus, narrative presents an opportunity for the practice of hospitality to work through an ideal 
hospitality exchange and show how to overcome problems of association. However, narrative’s 
own purpose, I will argue, has a different, though perhaps as powerful, ethical goal to pursue. 
The novel, unlike philosophy, is more concerned with the recipient and his ethical 
response to diverse possibilities than with the actor and his diversity of choice. While it was the 
responsibility of the actor to properly match intention and action, the recipient must judge 
actions and results to determine intention. These ethical struggles are often depicted as scenes of 
hospitality; a guest receives hospitality but must decipher his host’s intentions for self-
preservation.
56
 Faced with diversity, the guest also faces trouble deciphering the connections 
between action and intention. This trouble, however, is not a problem of association but one of 
perception; the guest’s primary concern is not in choosing which actions reflect his intentions but 
in determining his host’s intentions from his actions. These judgments certainly affect the guest’s 
actions. Even as the guest evaluates his situation, he is also required to respond to the host with 
gratitude. In a position of dependence, the guest must evaluate how best to act on his own 
intentions and how best to respond to the host. These duties are often in conflict, making the 
guest position even more ethically complex. It is perhaps because of this level of complexity that 
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narrative more often takes the guest and his ethical situations as their subject, despite its potential 
to work through problems of association.  
One of the few novelists to create a protagonist in the host’s position in the eighteenth 
century is Henry Mackenzie in Man of Feeling.
57
 Mackenzie’s central figure, Harley, is a host; 
yet the narrative is told by his guest and, as the novel progresses, his experiences in the exchange 
of hospitality take more and more precedence. At the same time, the story closely follows 
Harley, who, though clearly a rather disempowered host, still retains the estate and abilities to 
host others even if his fortune is small and his personality eccentric. While a large portion of the 
narrative shows Harley traveling and staying in London, he consistently orders his own space, 
holds the power to welcome others into his company, and controls his own moral action without 
applying to others for counsel or direction. As such Man of Feeling offers a rare inquiry into the 
host’s problems of association. Yet, ultimately the novel reveals exactly how perplexing the 
problem of association and hosting by intention can be. Mackenzie’s novel defines the host as 
one stymied by the good intentions necessary for ethical hosting; Harley’s disempowerment 
rejects the possibility of the benevolent ideal proposed in the philosophical treatises. When a host 
is filled with only disinterested ideals, he is unable to overcome problems of association and, 
often, unable to act or to act effectively.
58
 This weakness is manifest in many of Harley’s 
hospitable actions: he gives money to beggars but does not materially change their position, he 
enjoys the company of two gentlemen in what he believed to be an ideal exchange but discovers 
that he has only “hospitably” aided their gaming schemes. In a scene that clearly illustrates 
Harley’s benevolence and impotence, Harley meets an inmate at Bedlam, a woman whose ill-
fated love results in the loss of her sanity. Harley responds benevolently, shedding a tear, giving 
a coin, and sympathizing with her story; at the same time, however, Harley’s benevolence is 
never practiced as hospitality. He extends no welcome, offers no protection, and is unable to 
even comfort the woman. Harley’s benevolent intentions result in his tearful and hurried exit (x-
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x). Though perhaps Harley felt unauthorized to host in this position, his reaction to feel for others 
but not extend welcome is typical. Mackenzie’s text thus turns to the guest’s position as an 
ethical standard. Portraying Harley’s hosting through the voice of one of his guests, the reader’s 
sympathies and attention are shifted away from the protagonist and host Harley and towards the 
narrator as guest. Harley’s death makes clear the exhaustion inherent in the problem of 
association. Harley, always filled with good intentions, has difficulty acting on those intentions; 
those actions he does decide to pursue, however, seem to further weaken Harley as he sacrifices 
his own interests. Overcome by the demands of hosting, Harley wastes away, leaving behind his 
guest to provide a moral voice.  
Certainly the eighteenth-century novel still offers an ideal—and often a benevolent 
ideal—to the reader, but the formal elements of the text, the need to develop both character and 
plot and to offer some sort of conflict, ensure that this ideal is never unquestioned or unqualified. 
The goal of narrative is not to present a clear standard for behavior as philosophy tries to do but 
to push new ethical thoughts by questioning norms and offering new illustrations of behavior. 
Yet, it is perhaps this limiting of context that makes narrative a better way to explore hospitality; 
able to ask questions of practice and ideals, narratives can provide the nuance hospitality ethics 
require. Indeed, narrative assures the reader of the need to strive for ethical ideals and search for 
practical systems that can approximate the results desired; novels thus promote an ethics of 
intention but also place it in a situation that would allow for good practice.  
Eighteenth-century novels were quite aware of their potential as moral guides as the 
convention of boasting their virtuous teachings in introductions illustrates.
59
 Henry Mackenzie 
takes this trend one step farther in Man of Feeling. The introduction is a narrative itself that 
depicts a literal transference of ethical power from philosophy to narrative through the curate and 
Editor’s exchange of texts. Mackenzie introduces the inner text by allowing his readers to hear 
the manner in which the curate has disliked it. Indeed, the curate has been using the narrative as 
wadding for the hunting expedition he and the Editor have been engaged in. The Editor, 
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however, rescues the narrative and its reputation, exchanging his wadding text with the curate. 
The Editor, we discover, had been using a work of philosophy—“part of an edition of one of the 
German Illustrissimi”— to load his shot. The reader is then made privy to the Editor’s much 
more favorable opinion of the narrative, an opinion that led him to publish the text. As the reader 
is introduced to the text through the perspective and values of the Editor, the novel that follows is 




Indeed, the novel approaches its philosophical teaching very differently than does 
philosophy and even rejects several of its approaches as being untenable in real life situations. 
The narrator, for example, at times rejects the ability to understand the causes of human emotion. 
To explain Harley’s love for Miss Watson, he does not look for causes and effects, or original 
impulses. Instead he claims that “In times not credulous of inspiration, we should account for 
this from some natural cause; but we do not mean to account for it at all; it were sufficient to 
describe its effects” (58). Here, the narrator clearly asks different ethical questions than does 
philosophy. Rather than query origins, the narrator acknowledges a skeptical public and looks to 
the less controlled realm of Harley’s actions. These actions, the narrator tells us, “were 
sometimes so ludicrous, as might derogate from the dignity of the sensations which produced 
them to describe. They were treated as such by most of Harley’s sober friends, who often 
laughed very heartily at the aukward blunders of the real Harley, when the different faculties, 
which should have prevented them, were entirely occupied by the ideal” (58). Instead of asking 
the philosophical questions about Harley’s emotional state and care for others, the narrator 
separates the idealism of benevolence and its execution from the real abilities and character of 
Harley. While the “real Harley” “blunders,” the ideals he espouses occupy his mind and have 
real effect on his actions. Yet the narrative here contends that it is not interested in the 
philosophical ideal, proving its existence or describing its “natural cause.” Rather, narrative 
looks to its “effects” and in doing so shows the complexity of an ideal of benevolence. Although 
his feeling of benevolence results in Harley’s humiliation, it is also the cause for admiration.  
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The host’s practical position is separated from its ideal and instead contends with a reality 
of diversity. When Harley must decide whether to visit the prostitute he has befriended, he 
worries about the possibility that she has been lying to him about her situation to extort money 
and favors. After some hesitation, Harley decides to proceed with his promised visit because “to 
calculate the chances of deception is too tedious a business for the life of man!” (84). Harley’s 
actions cannot rely on being sure of others’ intentions. Instead, he must trust in the goodwill of 
others in order to remain benevolent. But while in this quandary he has judged correctly and he is 
successfully able to use his influence to reconcile the woman and her father, he more often fails 
to notice immoral behavior and corruption. The novel thus complicates the very notion of a 
benevolent ideal. The man of feeling represented in the novel is certainly filled with the 
sensibility, tolerance, and good intentions that the philosophers suggest as part of the moral 
framework necessary to the ideal host; but the outcomes and actions that these same philosophies 
propose will reasonably follow from such intentions are noticeably lacking. The narrative cannot 
provide a guide to hosts concerning how to avoid problems of association; in fact, Mackenzie 
still supports the very approach to hospitality that causes these problems.  
 
Ethics, Distance and Man of Feeling 
The ethical standards presented in Man of Feeling, then, do not offer a system of how to 
act but instead explore how an ethic of intention might function in the world—to limited success. 
Harley is often shown observing others’ distress and perhaps relieving it with a little money; he 
does not, however, address the larger social issues creating their distress. While this inactivity 
can be seen as unethical, particularly from a modern standpoint, eighteenth-century culture 
proposed an ethics of observation to cultivate a greater awareness of moral obligations. Addison 
and Steele’s Spectator papers and Smith’s “impartial Spectator” asked their readers to step back 
from the world and analyze others’ intentions.
61
 Indeed, it is a similar emphasis on Harley’s 
benevolent intentions and their lack of real impact on the world around him that has caused Man 
of Feeling and its central character to be criticized as passive.
62
 This ethics of observation 
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requires personal distance from the situation, even as it asks the viewer to identify with what is 
virtuous in the scene.
63
 Eighteenth-century authors similarly create narrative distance, asking 
readers to contemplate the narrative and identify with the virtue presented therein.
64
 Man of 
Feeling creates distance through two narrative frames; an Editor introduces the text and 
occasionally interrupts its performance, and a narrator relates the narrative, intruding his own 
opinions and experiences into Harley’s life. Harley, at two removes, is thus presented to the 
audience for observation as a character of ethical interest.  
The double frames of this narrative create distance between the character Harley and the 
reader, and similar frames are the most common distancing effect discussed by critics seeking to 
understand the ethics of observation in eighteenth-century narratives. R. F. Brissenden notes the 
novel’s particular emphasis on observation and argues that it calls for moral judging from the 
audience but criticizes that this call is not for “moral action” but for “moral discrimination.” This 
distinction indicates the growing importance of intention rather than action or outcome in 
narratives. As narratives increasingly show “the conflict of motives within the minds of 
characters” rather than in an active morality (119), the reader is increasingly asked to consider 
models of behavior based on intention. Barbara Benedict ultimately claims this emphasis on 
judging motive creates distance between reader and character. The episodic nature of eighteenth-
century narratives, including Man of Feeling, is used to create examples of behavior that 
“conjure a social context and the conventional values of restraint, discrimination, and moral 
hierarchy.” In doing so, however, Benedict claims that these novels “seek to draw the reader 
back from too fervid an identification with the character and into a balanced evaluation of their 
behavior and moral standards” (10). Benedict’s view suggests that eighteenth-century narratives 
did not seek to create an involved reading experience where the reader identifies with the 
characters (12). Rather, the reader remained detached in order to glean the moral of the story. 
Likewise, Patricia Spacks argues that it is the voyeuristic nature of Harley’s behavior that 
distances the reader from Harley’s perspective; Harley’s sympathy towards those in need 
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“dramatizes the separation between victims and agents of providence so forcefully as to make 
them seem virtually members of different species.” She claims that the episodic nature of the text 
and the “plotlessness” and passivity of its main characters are attempts to “deny separation 
among people” that ultimately fail (Desire 121). According to Spacks, the reader is unable to 
interact with the characters and this lack of action and interaction exacerbates the gap between 
individuals. Maureen Harkin, editor of the latest scholarly release of Man of Feeling, argues that 
it is not just Harley’s passivity but also his own inability to judge that creates this distance. 
Indeed, Harley’s judgment is suspect in the text as he is shown repeatedly being duped by 
sharpers and imposers in London. Harkin claims that the reader reacts to this poor judgment by 
feeling distanced from Harley and “superior” to him (331-32). The reader is aware or at least 
suspicious of Harley’s judgment as he makes his way through London, losing money to gamers, 
poorly navigating the political bribery game, and mistaking the rank and character of 
“gentlemen” he meets along the way. This awareness ultimately serves to separate the reader 
from Harley’s viewpoint. All of these scholars see distance within the text and attribute it to the 
elements of the character himself.  
But to dwell on the reader’s distance from Harley misses the much more complex way 
that the narrator creates distance in the text. Some critics have argued that the narrator is the 
source of the reader’s distance rather than Harley himself. For example, Ildiko Csengei argues 
that   
the description of Harley’s mind…simultaneously reveals the speaker’s own narrative 
and epistemological standpoint. When describing Harley, the narrator interprets Harley’s 
way of reading the world…The exposure of Harley’s distorting vision is at the same time 
the narrator’s self-exposure, and a confession of his own epistemological skepticism. His 
framework of thought is embedded in its context of contemporary philosophical ideas on 
subjectivity and perception. (957)  
The narrator reveals himself in his description of Harley’s experiences and his insight into 
Harley’s motives. Though the narrator observes and describes Harley and his surroundings, he 
cannot present Harley’s intentions without his own mediation. Csengei sees this distance from 
Harley’s perspective as a means of improving the reader and ultimately argues that it closes the 





“reveals more about those who read him than about Harley himself…[H]e is never the subject in 
question, but instead brings about a shift in focus, turning both the narrator and the reader into 
men of feeling” (954). In this construction, the reader and narrator become like Harley even if 
they do not identify as Harley while reading. In fact, the narrator often uses irony to expose when 
Harley’s judgment is flawed; unlike Harley, the narrator is not fooled by the corrupt men he 
finds in London and, because of the focalization of the text, neither is the reader. Benedict 
addresses this satiric nature of the narrator as a source of distance from Harley, but sees both 
narrator and character as distanced from the reader. She argues that the narrator’s tone 
“condemns the literary refinement of feeling that replaces judgment with a self-regarding 
emotion wrongly portrayed as sympathy.” Benedict continues to explain that this ironic distance 
is created by a “double frame of two narrators, each of whom represents an ironic variation on 
the theme of the title” (118). Benedict defines these two variations as the “self-conscious, literary 
taste” of the Editor and the “outraged morality” of The Ghost, a disembodied narrator (119). In 
both cases, Benedict sees both narrator and Editor separating themselves from Harley and his 
moral faux pas.
65
   
Csengei and Benedict, I would argue, have identified a more likely, though perhaps not 
the complete, source of distance in the effect of the narrator’s commentary on Harley’s choices 
and judgments. The reader is kept from feeling emotions with Harley from early in the narrative. 
This distancing goal is evident in the manner in which the narrator relates Harley’s love for Miss 
Walton. The narrator describes Miss Walton in details that emphasize her unremarkableness:  
Her complexion was mellowed into a paleness, which certainly took from her beauty; but 
agreed, at least Harley used to say so, with the pensive softness of her mind. Her eyes 
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were of that gentle hazel-colour, which is rather mild than piercing; and, except when 
they were lighted up by good-humour, which was frequently the case, were supposed by 
fine gentlemen to want fire. Her air and manner were elegant in the highest degree, and 
were as sure of commanding respect, as their mistress was far from demanding it. Her 
voice was inexpressibly soft…The effect it had upon Harley, himself used to paint 
ridiculously enough; and ascribed to it powers, which few believed, and nobody cared 
for. (56) 
From such an unremarkable appearance and personality, the reader might like Miss Walton but 
does not love her with Harley’s passion. In fact, the narrator insures reader distance through his 
own careful separation from Harley’s feelings. He qualifies his praise of Miss Walton by placing 
it solely in Harley’s view—“at least Harley used to say so” or “the effect it had upon Harley.” At 
the same time, he qualifies his harshest views by associating them with a sarcastic reference to 
“fine gentleman.” The effect of this description of Miss Walton is that the reader does not 
actually see her, but instead is introduced to her reputation as seen by others. The reader is not 
introduced to Harley’s feelings in order to identify with them but instead views Miss Walton 
much as the narrator does—as a kind and generous woman but not interesting enough to capture 
our attention. The effect of this is also to distance the reader from Harley; rather than observe 
Miss Walton with Harley, the reader is shown their relationship as observed by the narrator.  
Thus the narrator is seen to be distanced from the character Harley. But even this distance 
is more complex than separation between narrator and character. Each of these critics has missed 
a crucial element of Man of Feeling—the narrator is a character within the text. This character 
may distance himself from many of Harley’s judgments and viewpoints but also connects 
himself to Harley as a friend and, I would argue, a guest. The two share a host/guest dynamic 
that shifts the ethical force of the novel to the narrator’s state as a guest. Indeed, the guest’s 
responsibilites—gratitude, receptivity, responsiveness, passivity—become more important in the 
text. The character as guest, not narrator, allows the reader to experience Harley as a host 
without personal distance or the problem of association distance attempts to overcome. 
Mackenzie thus illustrates the ethical shift of literature away from the host and his problems of 





of perception, showing the reader first the clear benevolence of the host. Not worried about 
deciphering Harley’s intentions, Charles—and the reader—are able to admire his hospitality.   
 
The Disappearing Host and the Ghostly Guest 
Indeed, Charles does not face the problem of perception that other guests do but is 
assured of the good intentions of his host. The first two-thirds of the novel establish Harley as a 
benevolent ideal. Never self-interested, Harley’s good intentions are proven through the relation 
of his fragmented interactions with others. The last third of the text marks the narrator’s entrance 
into the text as Harley’s friend and a shift in sympathetic approach to Harley as a host, a fact 
commonly overlooked by critics. Well informed of Harley’s good intentions, Charles never faces 
a problem perceiving the motivations behind Harley’s hospitality. Indeed, Harley now actively 
realizes his role as host and is shown inviting Edward, his old steward fallen on hard times, and 
his grandchildren as guests into his home; he hosts them according to an ideal, setting up 
Edwards in a comfortable home on the property and even helping work his land.
66
 Harley’s ideal 
hosting also includes welcoming Charles, allowing the narrator to emerge physically in the text. 
Losing the sense of self-conscious distance found in the narrator’s voice early in the text, Charles 
interacts and identifies directly with Harley. Assured of his host’s aim, Charles abandons the 
doubleness of his earlier narrative where he was simultaneously observer and character as well as 
the doubleness of many guests, who must both serve another and protect oneself.  
Instead, Charles is a part of Harley’s world and relates Harley’s motives as they would be 
received by a separate person; in other words, Charles no longer announces the inner thoughts of 
Harley directly to the reader, but instead finds them physically. For example, he discovers 
Harley’s sentiments concerning Miss Walton left “on the handle of a tea-kettle, at a neighbouring 
house where we were visiting; and as I filled the teapot after him, I happened to put it in my 
pocket by a similar act of forgetfulness” (126). This amount of detail concerning how the 
narrator learns about Harley’s thoughts or actions is new to the narrative style. The disembodied 
voice of The Ghost has taken on a physical body—one that eats and drinks, wears clothing, and 
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is capable of being distracted from the Harley narrative. Moreover, the relationship between 
Harley and the narrator is given more distinction. The narrator claims that “Harley was one of 
those few friends whom the malevolence of fortune had yet left me: I could not therefore but be 
sensibly concerned for his present indisposition; there seldom passed a day on which I did not 
make inquiry about him” (135). The narrator Charles is discovered to be friends with Harley, and 
the gaps in the text leave more questions concerning this character’s situation than in Harley’s. 
The reader is not made privy to the specific causes of the narrator’s deeper affection for Harley, 
but it is clear that the narrator is no longer sarcastic about Harley’s sentimentality but feels 
gratitude and friendship towards him. These emotions work to create a deeper relationship with 
the reader as well. No longer is Harley’s observation the focus of the narrative; rather, the reader 
now encounters the despair and difficulty of Harley’s life with the narrator. No longer kept at a 
distance, the reader is asked to feel for Harley what the character narrator does, namely 
friendship, gratitude and concern.
67
  
 This relationship with Harley resembles that of another guest-host relationship in the text; 
Charles had previously been the guest of Ben Silton and mourns the loss of this ideal host 
throughout the narrative. Indeed, the very first fragment offered to the reader begins not with 
Harley but with a scene featuring Silton and Charles. The narrator makes clear that what he 
mourns is the loss of a host: 
 He is now forgotten and gone! The last time I was at Silton hall, I saw his chair stand in 
its corner by the fire-side; there was an additional cushion on it, and it was occupied by 
my lady’s favourite lap-dog. I drew near unperceived, and pinched its ear in the bitterness 
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of my soul; the creature howled, and ran to its mistress. She did not suspect the author of 
its misfortune, but she bewailed it in the most pathetic terms; and kissing its lips, laid it 
gently on her lap, and covered it with a cambric handkerchief. I sat in my old friend’s 
seat; I heard the roar of mirth and gaiety around me: poor Ben Silton! I gave thee a tear 
then: accept of one cordial drop that falls to thy memory now. (50-1).  
 Without Silton, Charles clearly feels unwelcome at Silton hall. Though the trappings of 
hospitality are still there—a roaring fire in a comfortable room filled with happy guests—the 
narrator is unable to enjoy them. Certainly, some of this distance is caused by the loss of his 
friend; however, the quality of hosting is also diminished. The hostess coddles her lap-dog, a 
traditional symbol of idle luxury, in the scene, suggesting a motive to display wealth and prestige 
to a crowd rather than enjoy the company of a friend. Moreover, this passage also highlights the 
irreplaceable nature of the host. Charles mourns Silton in the past tense here but also in the 
present. Each time his grief is equal and draws the same response of a tear. The discomfort the 
narrator feels in this first episode displays how the loss of an ideal host leads to the dissolution of 
social connection in general. 
 Ben Silton reappears in the narrative to nostalgically reinforce this loss, this time in 
conversation with Harley as he makes his journey home. The two men and their exchange of 
benevolent ideals links them as exemplars of hospitality. Sharing the disinterested mindset 
necessary to host well, the loss of both men signals the loss of good hosts in general. Indeed, at 
the end of this interaction between the two hosts, the narrator draws the reader back to his state 
of mourning: “And Silton indeed it was; Ben Silton himself! Once more, my honoured friend, 
farewel! –Born to be happy without the world, to that peaceful happiness which the world has 
not to bestow! Envy never scowled on thy life, nor hatred on thy grave” (104). In mourning the 
loss of Ben Silton, the narrator predicts his similar mourning of Harley seen at the end of the 
text. In both cases, Charles mourns the loss of a friend and host. This insertion of the narrator’s 
emotional state into the narrative also serves to draw attention to the guest perspective. In this 
case, the narrative explains how the narrator detaches himself more and more from society with 
the loss of each ideal host until the curate and townspeople consider him a Ghost.  
 Man of Feeling, then, is a text to explain how Charles, a flesh and blood character, 





“how” lies not within Charles’ own character but in his state as a guest. As such the narrative 
follows the host’s movements and not Charles’ own. Yet, because Charles is defined by his guest 
status, the death of the host requires his own character to falter. The Ghost described at the start 
of the narrative is what is left of the guest’s identity when the host is lost. Ultimately, what 
Charles experiences is the death of his host and the loss of an ideal. Harley’s generosity and 
openness, indeed the very passiveness that makes him a good host, also leaves him vulnerable. 
Unable to pursue his own self-interest, his love for Miss Watson, Harley weakens and dies. His 
slow demise reveals a crucial problem in the ideal for a host, namely, complete openness is 
impossible to maintain. But Harley’s death also reveals the vulnerability of the guest. Without an 
ideal host, Charles also fades, becoming the ghost who narrates the story. Mackenzie’s text, then, 
reveals that the host’s problem is larger than one of association but lies in the very possibility of 
practicing an ideal. Likewise, Man of Feeling reveals that, as problematic as the ideal is to the 
host, the true sufferer is the guest. If the ideal host does not exist in the world, then the guest is 
left to protect himself from the cruelty of the world, including the cruelty of other hosts. It is no 
surprise, then, that Charles’ ultimate narrative function while a guest is mourning the loss of 
ideal hosts and the possibility for hospitality.  
 When both hosts have died, the narrator is left to chronicle his own actions and 
intentions; the novel ends with the narrator’s thoughts as he places himself fully in the setting of 
the story. Rather than hover in the background of a scene, here the narrator is the focus and the 
text turns to the present tense to drive home his presence. The narrative ends with the narrator’s 
declaration: “I sometimes visit his grave; I sit in the hollow of the tree. It is worth a thousand 
homilies! every nobler feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens a virtue!—but it 
will make you hate the world—No: there is such an air of gentleness around, that I can hate 
nothing; but, as to the world—I pity the men of it” (139). The host, indeed the ideal host, has 
died, carried along in his illness by the very exertion and giving that the ideal of hosting 
demands. The guest, however, is left behind, lonely and uncomfortable. The narrator’s final line 
of pity to the world bemoans the lack of hospitality to be found in it. Without the ideal host, 
virtue, the narrator suggests, cannot exist in the world. The memory of this virtue—“every nobler 





others, and, if the curate is right about the character he defines as The Ghost, does not reestablish 
hospitality but absents himself from the exchange entirely. 
As such, Man of Feeling is less a text about specifics of virtuous behavior and more a text 
mourning the loss of a stable morality. The mourning reveals that hospitality as a moral system 
has lost its controlling force; without proper hosts to lead the exchange, immoral hosting 
dominates and guests are left unprotected and unaccommodated. Without these hosts, the ideal 
guests are unable to remain involved and active in the system and the system itself can collapse. 
Mackenzie’s text, then, reveals the new problems that are caused if the problem of association is 
overcome; if the host is able to perfectly match his intentions with his actions and the guest is 
able to set aside worries about the host’s intentions, they both become vulnerable. Harley wastes 
away, dying from his complete openness to others and inability to pursue his own desires. 
Likewise, Charles disappears, leaving behind only a fragment of both men’s relationship. 
Intentional ethics, it is seen, have changed the exchange and the conception of morality to 
emphasize the motives and interior life of the actors; they do, however, at a price that weakens 
the external practice of hospitality. The following chapters will look at how eighteenth-century 
novels attempt to construct guest obligations to fill the role of this lost host and overcome the 








BAD HOSTS AND ANXIOUS GUESTS 
 
 
In The Adventures of David Simple, Sarah Fielding introduces the character Cynthia 
through her position as a guest in the house of an unnamed lady of fashion. Though educated and 
of genteel birth, Cynthia has been denied an inheritance or any means to support herself and is 
completely dependent on her host. This dependency earns Cynthia the label of “toad-eater,” a 
derogatory term for a guest seeking to gain from the host.
68
 Cynthia describes the label to David: 
It is a Metaphor taken from a Mountbank’s [sic] Boy’s eating Toads in order to show his 
Master’s Skill in expelling Poison: It is built on a Supposition, (which I am afraid is too 
generally true) that People who are so unhappy as to be in a State of Dependence, are 
forced to do the most nauseous things that can be thought on, to please and humour their 
Patrons. And the Metaphor may be carried on yet farther, for most People have so much 
the Art of tormenting, that every time they have made the poor Creatures they have in 
their power swallow a Toad, they give them something to expel it again, that they may be 
ready to swallow the next they think proper to prepare for them: that is, when they have 
abused and fooled them, as Hamlet says, to the top of their bent, they grow soft and good 
to them again, on purpose to have it in their power to plague them the more. (103) 
Cynthia reevaluates the use of “toad-eater” to describe an inhospitable guest by returning to the 
term’s etymology.
69
 She notes that, as the Mountbank’s boy is asked to swallow poison, the 
guest, rather than the host, is asked to accept inhospitable behavior because of his dependent 
state. The power relations in this scenario place the guest in an uncomfortable situation wherein 
she is “forced,” “tormented,” “abused and fooled” by her host in order to display the host’s 
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 There are few outright definitions of the term in the eighteenth century but plenty of context clues. Just briefly, 
toadeater is considered a synonym for adulator in several translation dictionaries, and Lord Chesterfield includes in 
his instructions to his son advice that “indiscriminate familiarity will either offend your superiors, or make you pass 
for their dependent or toad-eater” and lower one’s own station by the appearance of dependence (42). 
69
 There is circumstantial evidence that Fielding was successful in recasting the term. Following the publication of 
David Simple (1744), the term is used to chastise hosts. Toad-eaters are considered victims of poor hosting in 
several later novels, including Frances Brooke’s The Old Maid (1764), Frances Burney’s Evelina (1779), Sarah 
Gunning’s History of Coombe Wood (1783), Miss Smythies’ History of Lucy Wellers (1754), and the anonymous 
History of Lady Emma Melcombe (1787). Interestingly, these novels are all written by women, perhaps gendering 





“skill”; here, however, the skill is not “expelling Poison” but bestowing gifts on the less 
fortunate. As the original toad-eater was forced to eat poisonous toads in order to bolster his 
master’s reputations for dispelling poisons, so the metaphoric toad-eater is asked to withstand 
poor hospitality in order to improve the host’s reputation for good hospitality. In this telling, the 
term toad-eater should reprove a host who keeps her guest captive and submissive through 
conscious acts of hospitality but, as Cynthia points out, the term is applied as a slander to guests 
like Cynthia in order to ridicule their state of dependence.    
 Cynthia’s uncomfortable position as toad-eater raises several points of concern about the 
eighteenth-century system of hospitality and the guest’s position within that system. First, 
Cynthia’s situation illustrates the problem of perception for the guest; the guest must judge the 
intentions of the host but can only evaluate actions. Cynthia originally believed her relationship 
with her host to be mutually rewarding; she interpreted her host’s invitation and early signs of 
welcome as motivated by friendship but later learns of her host’s more selfish motives. From her 
original position within the exchange, however, Cynthia has difficulty determining whether she 
is a toad-eater or an honored guest. Second, even with her gained knowledge of the host’s 
intentions, Cynthia is unable to extract herself from the exchange. She is dependent and as such 
must remain a guest and be labeled a toad-eater. Cynthia’s situation thus highlights the 
vulnerabilities of the guest: guests cannot see the completion of hospitality from within the 
exchange nor, when they chance upon a clear and objective view, can they act on their new 
knowledge.  
 Emphasizing the anxieties and vulnerabilities of the guest position, eighteenth-century 
authors describe exchanges of hospitality wherein hosts prey on the guest’s weaknesses. Many of 
these hosts see hospitality as an economic exchange, either literally as a form of a financial gain 
or, like Cynthia’s host, as a metaphorical gain of prestige and social placement. Because a 
hospitality exchange was still marked by external signs of welcome, such as the offering of food 
or housing, these self-interested exchanges were called hospitality without regard to new ethical 
distinctions. I will argue that these self-serving approaches fail to follow an ethics of hospitality 
that demands the creation of a mutually dependent relationship between the host and guest. The 
traditional hospitable relationships of mutual trust, reciprocal service, and shared need were 





scenario explored below, the hosts seek to gain from their hospitality without returning these 
gains by fulfilling their responsibilities to their guests. Because of the selfish intentions behind 
bad hospitality, these exchanges share much with economic relationships where one party seeks 
to gain from another. These selfish exchanges result in guests feeling anxious not only about 
their hosts’ intentions but also in questioning the very nature of hospitality itself. This chapter 
will argue that, although bad hosts are not new to literature, the eighteenth-century host is 
particularly threatening to both the larger social order and individual psyches. By revealing the 
motivation behind hospitality and exposing bad intentions, eighteenth-century novels illuminate 
problems not just in the character of particular hosts but also in the very system of hospitality.
70
 
Indeed, as I will argue, the very questioning of host motive and awareness of guest vulnerability 
is necessitated by an intentional ethic and complicates the relationship between host and guest. In 
particular, I will show how eighteenth-century novels use concepts of credit and reputation and 
their relationship with hospitality to build a distrust of hospitality and the power dynamics in the 
relationships it creates.  
 
Traditional Threats to Hospitality 
Vestiges of older critiques of hospitality remain in eighteenth-century novels; indeed, not 
every representation of bad hosting undermines the larger system. In fact, bad hosts who fail to 
upset the order of exchange abound in many eighteenth-century novels. These hosts misuse the 
hospitality system but their failures do not upset a sense of hospitality as a system but rather 
suggest misunderstandings concerning how hospitality should be offered. Their failures are 
generally not of cunning but of personality; selfish rather than malevolent, these hosts simply fail 
to consider the needs of their guests alongside their own. Their selfishness, however, often leads 
to guests being held as hostages or left unprotected. Generally seeking financial gain or social 
prestige, these hosts see hospitality as a way to fulfill these desires rather than as a social 
responsibility to accommodate others. These forms of negative hospitality have been 
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 Virginia Kenning notes a similar transition between the seventeenth-century country-house poem and how its 
conventions are used in the eighteenth century; she attributes this change to both a “widespread consciousness of the 
fragility of social constructs” that led to a “reassertion or adjustment of the idea of the good society” and to new 





traditionally denounced in literature,
71
 and eighteenth-century novels treat them as conventional 
objects of satire. These hospitality missteps thus fail to create hospitable relationships but also do 
not disrupt the system and thus do not produce moral anxiety in the guest.  
Among these satirized forms of hospitality are misuses of personal economics or 
traditional social hierarchy. Both forces were linked to negative virtues in the eighteenth century. 
In fact, economics and ethics were discussed in the same texts. While Smith sectioned his moral 
treatise from his work on commerce to some degree, many other philosophers did not. Among 
the more popular texts, David Fordyce included a chapter on “social duties of the commercial 
kind” in his Elements of Moral Philosophy, and Samuel Pufendorf discusses ownership, 
contracts and financial authority in his On the Duty of Man and Citizen. Hutcheson’s A System of 
Moral Philosophy also included commerce as an important part of a moral life, and George 
Blewitt wrote an entire thesis on the overlap of morals and economics entitled, An Enquiry 
Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage 
of a People. These texts, among others, establish commerce, economics, and capitalism as well 
as the social hierarchies these systems disrupted as part of the moral practice of daily life.  
Literary and historical scholars have noted how these changing commercial interests and 
structures redefined ethics in the eighteenth century. J.G.A. Pocock’s work links capitalism and 
corresponding changes in power structures to a new sense of private virtue. Michael McKeon 
finds the origins of the novel lie in “questions of virtue” that “internalize the emergence of the 
middle class and the concerns that it exists to mediate” (22). Liz Bellamy contends that a 
commercial pursuit of self-interest “began to be presented as the duty of the individual” in a new 
capitalist system and thus become incorporated into moral codes (3). Deidre Lynch argues that 
fictional characters helped bridge the gap between the new commercial system and ethics, 
offering characters as a way to explore new “social relations in their changed, commercialized 
world” (4) but also as a way to receive “moral training and self-culture” through reading 
character (10). These critics and others find that new economic systems of exchange disrupted 
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 Examples fill the western tradition of literature and its sources. The Gospel of Luke alone, for example, includes 
parables against miserly behavior—the Parable of the Unjust Steward (16:1-13) and of the Rich Fool (12:13-21)—as 





the older moral code;
72
 novels integrated these codes and offered moral judgment on capitalism 
and new ethics.    
 In many cases, these cultural changes are addressed as having negative impacts on the 
hospitable exchange in the novel, disrupting old systems of hospitality that depended on noblesse 
oblige and the social hierarchy from which it derived.
73
 Yet, in the novels explored here, these 
negative impacts are generally the source of satirical lampooning rather than complications to 
character or integral movements in plot. As such, they are easy to see as negative forms of 
hospitality and also easier for the characters to set aside. Clearly immoral, these representations 
of hospitality rarely cause the characters more than a moment’s discomfort and are easily 
laughed away by the reader. Indeed, the threats these behaviors pose to hospitality are fairly 
traditional. Self-interest in the form of miserliness, luxury or snobbery has always hindered the 
delivery of hospitality. These negative forms of hospitality are included in the eighteenth-century 
novel but do not cause a large philosophical restructuring of ethical standards.
74
 Easily identified, 
though not easily combated, these forms of hospitality create uncomfortable situations for the 
guest but do not ask them to reevaluate their conceptions of what hospitality looks like. Primarily 
the source of satire and direct criticism, these traditional forms of negative hospitality are used 
only to introduce the larger problems hospitality was facing in the eighteenth-century: namely 
the unstable relationship between the host and guest and the increasing demands on the guest in 
the hospitable exchange.  
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 Two collections of economic texts from the eighteenth century include discussions of morality and virtue. Stephen 
Copley introduces the economy section of his Literature and the Social Order in Eighteenth-Century England with 
the claim that “In the humanist tradition, discussion of political and economic affairs is conducted in explicitly 
moral terms” (3). Henry Clark lists among the topic discussed in his Commerce, Culture, and Liberty: Readings on 
Capitalism before Adam Smith, “the role of commerce in fostering civility and sociability, the effects of commerce 
on the fabric of community life, [and] the dangers to moral virtue posed by increasing prosperity” (ix). 
73
 This sense of loss is perhaps the cause for the nostalgia for older orders of hospitality. Many novels of the earlier 
eighteenth century certainly contain this nostalgia. Eliza Haywood’s Fortunate Foundlings includes praise of the 
hospitality found in the French nobility in what is presented as a more stable social hierarchy; Smollett’s first novel, 
The Adventures of Roderick Random, also looks nostalgically back on older forms of hospitality as the hero ends the 
novel returning to his place as head of a country estate.   
74
 Barbara Zonitch sees the critique of both luxury and aristocratic snobbery as promoting a new middle-class 
culture, defined by “emotional self-regulation and economic frugality.” Such a culture, she argues changes the 
nature of the country estate and its hospitality from one that “paraded the signs of aristocratic patrimony” to one that 
“modestly displayed…regulation and charity” (27-8). Virginia Kenning agrees, exploring a tradition in the country 
house poem that investigates luxury only to contrast it to a more proper hosting in the virtues of “good stewardship, 
simplicity, right use, frugality” (6-7). While I agree that hospitality shifted in this way in the eighteenth century, I 






 In many novels, the miserly host is easily dismissed by the guest and rejected for his lack 
of hospitality. The easy target of satire, this host is often introduced and dismissed with the 
language of ridicule. For example, Tobias Smollett spends little of his considerable satiric power 
on Mr. Pimpernel in Humphry Clinker, where he is dismissed by Matthew Bramble as “a sordid 
miser” whose despotism is “truly diabolical.” Bramble finds Pimpernel’s inhospitality influences 
all other areas of his life and lists his evils, marking him a “brutal husband, an unnatural parent, a 
harsh master, an oppressive landlord, a litigious neighbour, and a partial magistrate” (161).
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This list of invectives is hardly witty but does offer a clear signal to the reader that the treatment 
Bramble received as a guest was not ideal. The guests enter Pimpernel’s home, only to leave 
quickly with a negative judgment and a desire not to return. The narrative follows this desire and 
neither Pimpernel nor his particular brand of miserliness is heard from again. Frances Burney 
similarly dismisses miserliness as opposing basic needs of hospitality. In Cecilia, Mr. Briggs is 
the only guardian of the three her uncle appointed that Cecilia absolutely refuses to live with. 
Finding his house dirty and unwelcoming, Cecilia, who could laugh at how Briggs’s miserliness 
leads him to make a spectacle of himself, ultimately judges him to be filled with “parsimony, 
vulgarity, and meanness” and labels him the “lowest and most wretched of misers in a city 
abounding with opulence, hospitality, and splendor” (374). Though Cecilia should live with him 
as his ward, she rejects his house because of its miserly inhospitality.
76
 Briggs is certainly more 
involved in the narrative and plot than Smollett’s Pimpernel but his miserly behavior effectively 
negates him from becoming a host or playing a larger part in the narrative.  
 In these same novels, Smollett and Burney also explore the opposite of miserliness, 
luxury. Though luxury causes more discomfort to the guest characters than miserliness, it is also 
easily identified as a marker of inhospitable behavior. Smollett and Burney each relate luxury to 
a distant, irresponsible host. Smollett creates the character of Mr. Burdock, Mr. Pimpernel’s 
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 David Punter notes that Pimpernel is not just a member of the influential landed gentry but also a justice of the 
peace. Punter points out that not only is Pimpernel deficient as a responsible host but also as a J.P. because of his 
previous work as an attorney and consequent “association with the other side of the legal profession, his 
acquaintance with the recesses of legal ideology, which stains his judgments” (55).  
76
 Though rejected as a suitable host, Margaret Doody points out that Briggs is an unconventional miser because his 






cousin, and describes his house as “a great inn, crowded with travelers” (153).
77
  Mr. Burdock’s 
hospitality is generous and welcoming but, because it insists on displaying his wealth, fails to 
form the proper relationships between guest and host. Thus, Burdock’s home is little more than 
an “inn” or “ordinary” where “mine host seems to be misplaced.” Bramble critiques Burdock’s 
absence, claiming “I would rather dine on filberts with a hermit, than feed upon venison with a 
hog” (153). Such a claim emphasizes the importance of the relationship created through 
hospitable exchanges and criticizes Burdock for his distance from his guests.
78
 The same 
sentiment is repeated by Burney; Mr. Harrel, Cecilia’s guardian consistently in the pursuit of 
luxury, “seemed to consider his own house merely as an Hôtel” where Mr. Harrel himself was to 
be served and accommodated rather than fulfill his own obligations to serve and accommodate 
his guest. Mr. Harrel and his wife may keep an “acquaintance [that] were numerous, expensive 
and idle” but their relationships with these acquaintance are pursued to fulfill their own needs 
and the duties of the host are ignored for the pursuit of wealth and prestige (53). Rarely present 
in their own home, the Harrels fail to accommodate Cecilia’s needs.
79
 Luxury, in both instances, 
is denounced as too economically hospitable; comparing these houses to inns or hotels, Burney 
and Smollett suggest that the estate owners are not true hosts but commercial venturists. Thus, 
luxury, like miserliness, is exposed as a hindrance to proper hospitality.  
Yet, unlike miserliness, luxury is not easy to escape. Smollett revisits the coldness that 
luxury creates in the hospitality cycle in his description of the Baynards, and Burney complicates 
the Harrels’ characters to illustrate the temptation that luxury creates for a host. In particular, the 
problem the Baynards and the Harrels face is that they cannot afford the luxury they live in. Both 
families face stifling debt yet continue to pursue luxury to gain prestige among their neighbors. 
Such competition hints at difficulty forming relationships of respect and common pursuit. 
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 I.C. Ross claims Burdock and Pimpernel are the “counterparts” of Bramble and Dennison, a farmer who manages 
his estate without luxury or miserliness (187-188).  
78
 Michael Rosenblum sees this irresponsible hosting as a theme in Smollett’s work. Studying all five of Smollett’s 
novels, he concludes that Smollett’s image of a bad society is “one which recognizes no values and has lost the 
sense of obligations and distinctions upon which social class depends” (560). Taken together, these confluent 
displays of bad hospitality suggest Smollett sees financial constructs as a threat to social order; his characters, 
however, maintain the power and foresight to combat these flaws.  
79
 As this luxurious lifestyle entraps Cecilia, it also entraps the Harrels. D. Grant Campbell notes that the luxurious 
lifestyle seems similar to “intoxication and addiction” in the novel, “a mental dependency upon an alluring lifestyle 
that ruins the finances, wastes the physique, and overwhelms the intellect” (136). The luxurious lifestyle, and its 





Indeed, this competition among neighbors affects their behavior towards guests: the Baynards 
leave Bramble and his travelling companions waiting in a “temple of cold reception” for “above 
half an hour,” and the Harrels repeatedly expose Cecilia to company and parties of pleasure that 
she would rather avoid. Both situations leave the guests uncomfortable in their hosts’ homes. 
Yet, Cecilia and Bramble are insistent in upholding their duties as guests to these hosts; unlike 
the misers, the host of luxury is an object to reform in the novels, and the guests attempt to 
rearrange the hosts’ approach to hospitality by stifling the pursuit of luxury. Though Bramble is 
successful where Cecilia is not,
80
 the discomfort felt by these guests is caused by their easy 
identification of the flaw in the hospitable exchange and their attempt to rectify that problem 
from a position that demands subservience to the host’s ways of living. Luxury, then, might be a 
larger threat to hospitality than miserliness but also one that the guest can attempt to revise.  
As easily identified but less easily combated is the behavior of the old nobility. A 
traditional giver of hospitality, this social class was redefining its role in the hospitable exchange 
in the eighteenth century and a traditional emphasis on social hierarchy produced its own form of 
negative hospitality. Smollett and Burney also turn their satiric critique here and detail how the 
reserve of the nobility made the relationships that hospitality requires more difficult. Both 
Smollett and Burney ridicule the snobbery of the elite and the resulting demand for respect from 
the guest as both unnerving and unproductive. Bramble complains of his treatment at the hands 
of Lord Oxmington, where he attended a “fashionable meal served up with much ostentation to a 
company of about a dozen persons, none of whom we had ever seen before.” These 
circumstances are not mediated by the host who, Bramble complains, “is more remarkable for his 
pride and caprice, than for his hospitality and understanding” and who “considered his guests 
merely as objects to shine upon, so as to reflect the luster of his own magnificence” (260). 
Bramble’s chief complaint, then, is that the host’s attitude of superiority effectively turned his 
guests into objects rather than welcomed guests. Bramble finds this behavior most threatening 
and so refuses to maintain his role as grateful guest; he attempts to pay the servants for his meal 
and offers to duel Oxmington, an offer that would force the lord to see Bramble as his social 
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 Interestingly, neither Bramble or Cecilia sees any real hope in reforming their luxurious hosts until one of the 
spouses dies. These texts then suggest that luxury is in part connected to the morality of the married state and the 







 The situation quickly becomes more absurd when Bramble sends his friend, the ex-
soldier Lismahago, to offer his challenge but even Lismahago’s abuse at the hands of 
Oxmington’s servants underscores the inhospitality and violence that a reliance on noble 
superiority causes for the guest. Bramble is, however, unable to gain his desired retribution for 
Oxmington’s inhospitality; instead, Oxmington remains distant and Bramble and his companions 
are further ridiculed. Though able to read the problem in the exchange, Bramble is left powerless 
to respond.  
Burney also uses the last of Cecilia’s three guardians to depict a similar version of noble 
snobbery. Mr. Delvile takes great pride in his family history and insists on being treated with 
respect by his guests though he fails to return that respect. He, like Oxmington, has all the 
external trappings of a good host but lacks the proper demeanor; his house is “grand and 
spacious” if outdated and his servants are “profoundly respectful.” Yet Cecilia complains that the 
house was too “gloomy” and “while it inspired awe, it repressed pleasure” (97). Of larger 
complaint is Mr. Delvile’s behavior; he makes his guests wait and remains so focused on the 
running of his daily life that he fails to take any interest in his guest Cecilia (98). Even at his 
castle in the country, Mr. Delvile insists upon distancing himself from his neighbors in order to 
display his superiority; the castle has few guests because Mr. Delvile had “offended all the 
neighbouring gentry, who could easily be better entertained than by receiving instructions of 
their own inferiority” (460). Mr. Delvile’s snobbery thus makes any relationship—even the 
traditional relationship between host and guest—impossible.
82
 His care to distance himself from 
all others around him results in his failure to uphold the traditional responsibility of the nobility 
to offer hospitality. Cecilia, like Bramble, remains unable to respond to Delvile’s inhospitality, 
and the narrative ultimately exaggerates Delvile’s distance by placing him outside of Cecilia’s 
marriage negotiations with his son.  
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 I.C. Ross views Oxmington as Smollett’s commentary on the nobility at large, who have “lost not only virtue but 
even civility” by being influenced by the middle class’s “rage for luxury” and “imitation the nobility’s dereliction of 
their social duty” (187).  
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 Delvile’s snobbery leads to a closed hospitality; so concerned with his own prestige and how he is stationed in a 
hospitality exchange, Delvile fails to welcome others. Indeed, Doody notes that Delvile’s obsession with 
“maintaining a position” is literalized in his hosting “as he literally maintains a position in ungallantly refusing to 





These versions of hospitality are clearly marked as improper exchanges in these novels, 
but these types of exchanges have been marked as improper throughout literary history. Midas’s 
pursuit of luxury resulted in his loneliness as he turned all those around him into gold; 
Shakespeare’s Shylock and Ben Jonson’s Volpone, who rivaled one another as most reviled 
miser on the Renaissance stage, both died alone; Chaucer’s Prioress is so concerned with 
maintaining the laws of good manners that she fails to create relationships with people and 
instead dotes on animals. Though the critiques by Smollett, Burney and their contemporaries 
modernized the manifestations of these traits, the behaviors they ridicule are traditional threats to 
hospitality. As such, they certainly make the guest uncomfortable but it is physical, not 
psychological or philosophical, discomfort. These clear and immediate threats to hospitality are 
thus more easily set aside as representations of immoral behavior. However, these critiques do 
indicate an awareness of the exchange implicit in hospitality and how that exchange must be 
carefully navigated as a set of relationships and not just the flow of goods and services. In other 
words, these authors acknowledged hospitality as an exchange but insist on an ethical and 
relational component in the exchange.  
 
An Exposed Economy 
Indeed, when a hospitality relationship is not honored, not only that exchange fails but 
the system of hospitality falters. As the potential for selfish motives becomes uncovered in the 
eighteenth century through intentional ethics, the guest begins to distrust the giving of 
hospitality. Uncovering selfish motives for the host’s behavior, the guest starts to doubt signs of 
hospitality. The position of the “toad-eater” that started the chapter illustrates this loss of trust in 
the system. Noticing the host’s selfish intentions, the toad-eater, unlike the guest of the miser or 
snob, does feel psychological and philosophical disorder. Such is certainly the position of 
Cynthia in Fielding’s David Simple. When she perceives her host’s deception, she becomes 
disenchanted with her host, her own position, and the possibility of good hospitality. Still 
ensnared within the exchange system, she feels anxiety over how to act now that the system and 
the self-interest it sought to hide is exposed. Cynthia’s inferior position in the exchange, though 
always present, becomes a threat to the exchange when it is made apparent through her host’s 





two or three Months, she began to treat me as a Creature born to be her Slave” (105). Cynthia’s 
description here clearly identifies her disenchantment with her hospitality exchange; she styles 
her placement not as a guest but as a slave compelled to remain in the service of her host, 
respond to her demands, and receive no compensation in return. Relegated to an object or 
commodity for exchange, Cynthia is unable to embrace her role in the hospitable exchange. The 
ideal of hospitality interrupted, the toad-eater too must rewrite her understanding of the exchange 
cycle.  
Cynthia certainly did not expect to be treated as an inferior member of the hospitable 
exchange when she entered into it. Rather, Cynthia expected a more ideal exchange of shelter 
and protection from her host in exchange for her gratitude and friendship; though financially 
dependent on her host, Cynthia believes that her host is dependent upon her for the opportunity 
to fulfill her civic duty and the gratitude Cynthia supplies. In fact, Cynthia did not initially resent 
being dependent on her sponsor nor did she desire hospitality without some sort of exchange. 
When Cynthia entered the agreement, she hoped only to deserve the offered hospitality:  
 The Lady I went with, had something very amiable in her Manner, and at first behaved to 
me with so much Good-nature, that I loved her with the utmost Sincerity, I dwelt with 
pleasure on the Thoughts of the Obligation I owed her, as I fancied she was generous 
enough to delight in conferring them; and I had none of that sort of Pride, by Fools 
mistaken for Greatness of Mind, which makes People disdain the receiving Obligations: 
for I think the only Meanness consists in accepting, and not gratefully acknowledging 
them. (102-3)  
Here, Cynthia is clearly expecting an exchange of good nature and manners for obligation and 
gratitude in her role as the guest. Willing to pay the price by incurring these obligations and 
feeling grateful, Cynthia hopes her host will in part be paid for the pleasure she feels in aiding a 
woman in distress. This anticipated exchange consisted not just of exchanged goods but also of 
exchanged behaviors that would work to create a bond between host and guest. Cynthia begins 
her toad-eater life, then, feeling a sense of closeness and attachment to her host and believing her 
host felt a similar sentiment. In Cynthia’s imagined exchange, the gain that each party hopes to 
acquire is not economic but social. Had both participants shared a value for this trait, their 





host, however, ruins such benevolence by her selfish behavior and lack of respect for her guest; 
she accuses Cynthia of selfishly using their relationship for her own gain, while at the same time 
claiming her continued hosting as a sign of her own benevolence.  
Cynthia’s early idealism, however, suggests that there is some room for self-interest in a 
hospitality exchange. If each party is able to gain from the relationship, the exchange would still 
be successful. In the way this potential exchange includes both goods and services circulated 
between individuals for mutual gain, it begins to resemble an economy but not a barter or 
moneyed economy. Rather, hospitality in practice, if not ideal, is most easily likened to its close 
cousin, the gift economy.
83
 A gift economy exchanges tangible items but these items represent 
and build a relationship between giver and receiver.
84
 Because these exchanges involve complex 
social navigations that are intricately interwoven with the gifts exchanged, they function 
according to cultural norms often hard to define. As such, gift economies, like hospitality, are 
both a theory of ideal interactions and a practice contingent on its human players. These players 
exchange goods or services but also gain and give social stability, prestige, and community 
through the more material exchange. The relationships built through gift economies, and 
hospitality as well, are the most valuable pieces of the exchange and also are what separates 
these economies from market economies. By absenting the relationship that hospitality is meant 
to build, Cynthia’s host fails to address the ethical obligations inherent in the exchange.  
Gift economies build these obligations by building relationships through what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls “symbolic capital.”
85
 Unlike the goods found in a money or barter economy, 
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 Gift giving practices were noted on many eighteenth-century accounts of encounters with new cultures but seems 
to have declined as an interest following the Napoleonic Wars, when (unlike hospitality) mention of gift-giving 
practices in other cultures became rare. See Harry Liebersohn, The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global 
Idea: 3.  
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 According to Linda Zionkowski and Cynthia Klekar, the gift “must remain distinct from commodities and 
wages…[and] this required direct involvement in the lives of dependants” in order to turn dominant social relations 
into ones of attachment (3-4).  
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 Unlike many anthropological studies, Bourdieu’s theories remain detached from a specific culture or time and 
instead dwell on the basics behind gift economies in general. Certainly anthropological studies make larger claims 
about the functioning of gift economies in general. Indeed, Marcel Mauss’s The Gift is an important text for both 
philosophers and anthropologists. However, because his conceptions originate from a tribal culture, as do the works 
of many of his predecessors, it is more difficult to draw parallels between his findings and the world of eighteenth-
century Britain. Unlike many philosophical studies, his work insists on exploring how worldly contexts affect this 
system of exchange. Likewise, many of these philosophical works also discuss real-world situations. Jacques 
Derrida’s work, for example, includes discussions of the current immigration debate in France. However, these 





symbolic capital includes a shared value system for specific cultural traits such as “recognition, 
honor, [or] nobility” (“Marginalia” 234). In order for exchanges of gifts or hospitality to work, 
the participant must acknowledge this value system; indeed, the potential for exchange is “only 
available to agents endowed with dispositions adjusted to the logic of ‘disinterestedness’” who 
are willing to sacrifice in order to obtain these traits (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 235). The exchange 
of such symbolic capital relies on the shared perspective of the exchange participants.
86
 This 
dependency manifests itself in a relationship between the participants; because each relies on the 
other for recognition of the desired traits, both participants, regardless of more tangible states of 
dependency, require the other’s participation. When Cynthia’s host fails to sacrifice yet 
continues to expect to gain symbolic capital, the hospitality relationship suffers. Her selfish 
behaviors fail to note her dependency on Cynthia’s acknowledgement of her hospitable actions; 
instead, the host demands social recognition for only the mere act of housing and feeding 
Cynthia devoid of any intention of making Cynthia comfortable.  
Thus, the relationship between Cynthia and her host is injured by the bad intentions of the 
host but also in the ways these selfish intentions are manifested in practice. Not only does the 
host abandon any attempts to serve Cynthia but she also fails to consider practices of welcoming 
that adjust to the specific contexts of each exchange and the common ground that helps 
individuals determine how to behave. Performing only literal actions of hospitality—housing and 
feeding a guest—Cynthia’s host does not perform any additional acts to increase her guest’s 
comfort that are less easily prescribed. Indeed, hospitality requires a balance of rules of conduct 
and flexible negotiations between guest and host that Bourdieu calls “practical logic.” He claims 
that this balance amounts to a “stylistic unity which, though immediately perceptible, has none of 
the strict, regular coherence of the concerted products of a plan” (“Practical Logic” 194). 
Exchanges of hospitality, then, depend on a system of norms but not rules. These norms involve 
                                                                                                                                                             
the eighteenth century. Thus, Derrida’s conception that the gift cannot be recognized by either host or guest in order 
to be a gift; rather it exists as the idea of the impossible. This approach to gift-giving, as I hope will become 
apparent in this chapter, is not part of the eighteenth-century mindset.  
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 Mireille Rosello notes that, in practice, hospitality works best when based on similarities between the agents. If 
the host and guest share at least “the impression that they share the same assumptions about what it means to be 
hospitable, they both have agency: they can share the responsibility for formulating an objection to a given rule, 
their strong dislike of another, their attachment to a different principle” (171). Under these conditions, the host and 
guest can reshape or debate the laws of hospitality; without such similarity, however, such compromise or 





strategic handling of methods of exchange, including time between exchanges, displays of 
gratitude, and returns adjusted to personal position. These methods of exchange, as practical 
logic, are flexible but are also easy to misinterpret or handle improperly; each participant must 
properly judge how, what, and when to return or offer an exchange. Yet when completed, this 
cycle of exchange can create “durable relations of dependence” that allow a society to function 
smoothly (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 239). While Cynthia has attempted to respond to this logic by 
returning gratitude for hospitality, her host breaks the cycle of exchange by refusing to accept her 
gratitude or offer continued welcome and thus revealing the fragile nature of hospitality.
87
 
Bourdieu’s system implies, however, that had Cynthia received a timely and well-mannered 
return to her gratitude from her host, it is possible their relationship could have continued to 
thrive and offer both participants pleasure.  
Unhappy, yet still dependent on her host, Cynthia is unable to escape her negative 
relationship. Because a dependent guest, Cynthia remains not only vulnerable and inactive, but 
also uncomfortably aware of her vulnerability now that her host’s intentions have been exposed. 
Thinking of her host’s future reactions rather than what she is obligated to return in the 
exchange, Cynthia complains that she cannot speak or be silent or complain about her treatment 
without risking her host’s displeasure and the potential end of the exchange. Yet, despite this 
treatment, Cynthia must remain a guest and her ethical choices are all unappealing. She tells 
David, “I think it impossible to be in a worse Situation. She had raised my Love, by the 
Obligations she had confer’d on me, and yet continually provoked my Rage by her Ill-nature: I 
could not for a great while, any account for this conduct [sic]: I thought if she did not love me, 
she had no Reason to have given herself any trouble about me, and yet I could not think she 
could have used me in that manner, if she had had the least Regard for me” (105). The 
relationship Cynthia relates to David still maintains vestiges of the symbolic system, and Cynthia 
feels responsible for the obligations she has accrued. However, the assumptions about intention 
the symbolic capital relied on are exposed, and Cynthia is made aware of the intentional ethics to 
be judged—the “Reasons” her host would “give herself any trouble” about her. Despite this 
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 Elliot argues that gifts naturally combine self-interested and disinterested motives. However, within any gift 
exchange is “a necessary escape hatch” which insists that “obligations may be refused and the gift may be used for 
purposes entirely beyond the giver’s intent.” For Elliot, this very “unpredictability” is “what makes a gift exchange 





objective contemplation of her uncomfortable situation, Cynthia is unable to act in the exchange 
but instead feels anxiety about her position.
88
  
This anxiety is rooted in the fact that, as a guest, Cynthia still has ethical responsibilities 
to her host but is also charged with judging the host’s actions and intentions. As such, Cynthia is 
both an active participant in her own hospitality exchange as well as an observer of it. This dual 
position insists on remaining involved in the exchange of hospitality but also observing from 
outside the hospitality exchange. However, because the hospitable exchange is not available to 
its participants as an observational ethics, it fails to fit in with the eighteenth-century’s popular 
moral standards for spectatorship and sympathy. Lauded in both natural law and moral sense 
philosophies, observational ethics promised to regulate behavior and instill a disposition of 
disinterestedness necessary for hospitality. However, as the century progressed, this 
observational lesson designed to train for in-the-moment behavior was applied to the actor as 
well. Adam Smith famously encouraged his readers to listen to “the inhabitant of the breast, the 
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (137) that could evaluate one’s own 
behavior from an objective position. Smith calls on his readers to absent themselves from 
exchange altogether and judge their relationships with others “neither from our own place nor yet 
from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a 
third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality 
between us” (135). Taking a perspective of an outsider, Smith proposed, will help the actors 
choose ethically. The problem for the guests and hosts involved in exchanges, however, is that 
the very nature of the exchange insists that they do not have an objective perspective and cannot 
know what to expect but must act all the same.  
Moreover, by absenting oneself from the exchange, the guest makes apparent the 
mechanics of hospitality and the symbolic capital on which it functions. The enactment of 
hospitality, however, depends on these mechanisms remaining hidden. Bourdieu insists that the 
gift exchange must remain a “collective self-deception” among those in the exchange and cannot 
“become public knowledge” or be “publicly proclaimed”; to attempt to look “through the eyes of 
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 Bourdieu marks this as a sign of what would occur if the mechanics of the gift economy were exposed; then, “the 
uncertainty, even anxiety, linked to anticipation” of the future effects of the exchange would strengthen and 





a third person” threatens to reveal the self-interest in a hospitable exchange in the drive to gain 
symbolic capital (“Marginalia” 232). Though Bourdieu certainly does not believe in the 
possibility of disinterested benevolence that eighteenth-century philosophers proposed, his 
notion of collective self-deception marks a paradox in the eighteenth-century hospitality 
construction. Because intention was so important to the exchange, the guest was required to be 
suspicious of the host’s behaviors, and this suspicion threatened to uncover any pursuit of 
symbolic capital in the exchange. At the same time, the detached observer also threatens to 




Indeed, Cynthia entered her hospitality exchange without worries of deception, concerns 
about the hospitality system, or beliefs that she could not fulfill her obligations. Her behavior 
early in the hospitality relationship was based only on the assumption that her host was 
benevolent and the hospitality system would create a cycle of reciprocity. Her ease in misreading 
her host’s disposition, however, is part of the practical logic of hospitality. Because the 
hospitality exchange is temporal and particular, it is impossible for the participants to predict or 
see their exchange objectively. Referring to the continued gift exchange as a “cycle of 
reciprocity,” Bourdieu argues that the obligations that drive this cycle “exist only for the absolute 
gaze of the omniscient, omnipresent spectator, who, thanks to his knowledge of the social 
mechanics, is able to be present at the different stages of the “’cycle.’” Within the exchange, 
participants are offered the chance to refuse a gift or not return one (“Practical Logic” 190). Only 
retrospectively is Cynthia able to see the flawed exchange for what it is; when her host’s 
behavior halts the cycle by failing to offer a return for Cynthia’s gratitude, Cynthia begins to 
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 Liz Bellamy reads this passivity as a response to the more economic lifestyle available in Britain. She argues that 
“while the sphere of virtue is clearly recognized as private, the scope for private virtue is limited by the growing 
acceptance of self-interest as a legitimate code of behavior” and characterized a resulting moral distrust as a 
“conflict between a masculine, competitive economic ethos and a more feminized private code, which recognized 
the limited role of the individual within a complex community, but sought to stress the importance of affective 
values of sympathy and generosity” (132).  
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 As the century progressed, it seems that the practice of gift-giving was questioned more widely. Harry Liebersohn 
cites the 1788-1795 court case of Warren Hastings, former East India Company governor of Bengal, as a marker of a 





Bad hosts thus reveal the fragility of the hospitality cycle. By exposing hospitality’s 
dependence on a shared value system and a hidden cycle, bad hosts threaten more than just one 
particular exchange of hospitality but the whole institution and the social system it perpetuates.  
Moreover, the exposure of hospitality’s potential for self-interest alters the guest position. 
Seeking host intentions, the guest is tasked with more moral responsibility; no longer only 
responsible for her own actions in an exchange, the guest must also serve as arbitrator of the 
system; such additional responsibility, coupled with an inability to act, produce the problems of 
perception that make the guest so anxious. Eighteenth-century narratives explore the fragility of 
hospitality and the vulnerability of the guest by continually exposing the self-interest of hosts 
and thus the machinations of hospitality. This chapter will turn to two ways the cycle and self-
interested motives are revealed in literature but potentially hidden in hospitality: through the 
pursuit of credit and reputation.  
 
Delayed Credit 
 Indeed, eighteenth-century novels repeatedly depict the hidden deceits of bad hospitality 
as the cause of more internal discomfort for the guest. One such deceptive form of hospitality is a 
relationship based on credit;
91
 like the economic sense of hospitality discussed above, the hosts 
in these relationships seek some sort of financial gain from their guests.
92
 Unlike the miser or 
luxury seeker, however, these hosts seek economic gain based on a credit system that includes 
delayed gratification. Because the hospitality system includes delay, the credit-seeking host is 
more difficult to identify than miserly or luxurious hosts. Hospitality includes norms that ask 
                                                                                                                                                             
bribes that Hastings defined as gifts necessary to be accepted for orderly rule. Liebersohn marks this time period as 
one in which gift exchange went from being “taken for granted in European society” to one in which it had become 
“so contrary to rational administration that its legitimacy in the Hastings controversy was hard to reconstruct. Once 
intrinsic to European society, the language of the gift had become submerged and problematic” (26). See 
Liebersohn, 9-26. 
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 According to Miranda J. Burgess, credit had both economic and moral connotations in the eighteenth century, 
particularly for women. A woman could be valued both for the financial gains she could bring to a match as well as 
the moral credentials she displayed in her character. Burgess argues then that “financial theorists and conduct writers 
share responsibility not only for the co-existence of moral and financial registers in the concept of credit, but for 
their mutual contamination as well: as a woman’s reputation for sensibility tends to be seen by moralists as an 
economic matter, so economic theorists tend to view financial credit as a moral issue” (137).  
92
 D. Grant Campbell finds a larger eighteenth-century concern with credit and the ways in which it created a “false 
appearance of prosperity” that was ultimately unrealizable. Reading the sermons of the day, he claims that credit is 
represented as “a sinful dream, from which the sinner must awake to a ruin which suggest both a personal 





participants to remain obligated to the initial giver in order to build a relationship; to remain in 
debt is to allow the other participant a time as the dominant member in the exchange, and the 
returned gift was designed with its recipient in mind and to inspire a cycle of exchange. The 
financial credit system followed the same time lag but without the relationship or the cyclic 
nature; the lender gave money and sought interest in return. While the borrowing member was 
subservient to the lender, the potential for a reversed exchange does not exist and the only way to 
perpetuate the relationship was for one member to become further and further indebted. Because 
acting within the moment of exchange, the guest can easily read a credit exchange for one of 
hospitality; while they believe they are building a relationship and entering a cycle of exchange, 
their host hopes either to gain interest or use their guest as collateral. As a result of these 
mismatched interests, these situations are filled with anxiety for the guest as he questions his role 
in the hospitality exchange.  
 The most notorious depiction of these credit relations is found in the character of Mr. 
Harrel in Cecilia. He uses Cecilia, his ward, for collateral on his loans. In debt for gambling and 
maintaining a luxurious lifestyle, Mr. Harrel sees Cecilia’s fortune and person as a way to pay 
back his financial obligations. Cecilia, however, enters his house believing she is viewed as a 
friend by Mrs. Harrel and a moral obligation by Mr. Harrel. Cecilia does not become aware of 
Mr. Harrel’s intentions until after his death, when she meets his creditors. Then, Cecilia 
discovers that her guardian had promised her as a “prize” to both Sir Robert Floyer and Mr. 
Marriot in exchange for the cancellation of his debt to each of them (433).  He had likewise 
placated his creditors with assurances that Cecilia would repay them when she came of age. 
Upon learning of Mr. Harrel’s plots, Cecilia “saw now but too clearly the reason” for Mr. 
Harrel’s odd treatment of her (435) that had before been unclear because interpreted according to 
a hospitality rather than a credit relationship. Because Mr. Harrel was always able to postpone 
his obligations, Cecilia remained unaware of her position as collateral. She continued to perceive 
herself as a guest and thus acted as a member of an ordinary hospitality exchange and made her 
decisions based on these assumptions.  
 Though certainly Cecilia had some indications of Mr. Harrel’s mistreatment of her, she 
continually attributed this mistreatment to his pursuit of luxury alone and not to the credit he was 





on his guest and the reversal of their positions in the hospitality exchange. In these moments, 
Cecilia feels her greatest discomfort in the Harrels’ house. Particularly unnerving is Mr. Harrel’s 
dependence on Cecilia’s to pay his debts in private and then require her presence in public. In 
one instance, he forces Cecilia to go to the Pantheon after she had paid his debt to a group of 
tradesmen. He insists that if Cecilia is not in attendance, “every dirty tradesman in town to whom 
I owe a shilling, will be forming the same cursed combination those scoundrels formed this 
morning, of coming in a body, and waiting for their money, or else bringing an execution into 
my house”; Cecilia’s unwilling presence is, according to Mr. Harrel, “the only way to silence 
report” and keep him from financial ruin (273). Cecilia recognizes an element of captivity in this 
moment and resents having to protect her host from his debts. However, she still reads her 
captivity as being caught in a life of luxury rather than a relationship based on credit. Cecilia 
hopes her loan will inspire a reformation in the Harrels’ lifestyle and lead them to attend fewer 
parties of pleasure and commission no more projects which they cannot afford. In her belief in 
the hospitality exchange, Cecilia hopes for a return of her sign of friendship but, of course, waits 
in vain.  
Cecilia, exacerbated by being forced to immediately return to luxury in a public outing, 
agrees to attend her host but also begins to more seriously pursue other options for hospitality. 
Her resulting resolution to move to the Delviles, however, further reveals Mr. Harrel’s 
dependence on his guest.
93
 Mr. Harrel needs Cecilia to remain in his house to subdue his 
creditors; Cecilia, believing she is merely a guest, is surprised and confused by the panic her 
announcement to move causes. Both Mr. and Mrs. Harrel beg Cecilia to remain, and their 
supplications make Cecilia feel both “ashamed and shocked” and disrupt her notions of morality; 
she tells her friend “it is painful to me to refuse, but to comply is for ever in defiance of my 
judgment—Oh, Mrs. Harrel, I know no longer what is kind or what is cruel, nor have I known 
for some time past right from wrong, nor good from evil!”(396). Placed in a position of 
collateral, Cecilia loses her ability to distinguish moral value; as the hospitality cycle is 
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 D. Grant Campbell reads Cecilia’s discomfort in the Harrel’s and her desire to leave as a result of her different 
economic approach to her wealth. Because she “practices economic restraint in a society whose pattern of expansion 
depends on the abandonment of such restraint,” Cecilia is unable to understand how her actions fail to complete their 
intended results. As Campbell notes, “her caution at a time of risk causes fear; her payments at a time of unstable 





disrupted, so too is Cecilia’s capacity to judge it. Aware that something is wrong with her 
presence in the house, her full understanding is delayed until the extent of the Harrels’ 
dependency is revealed. The hospitality cycle is broken, but Cecilia as the guest, because of the 
delayed demands on her and her polite patience for a return, is unable to choose her actions from 
the objective position she gains after the fact. As a result, she loses the portion of her inheritance 
from her parents to the debts of Mr. Harrel. Ultimately, her status as collateral for the loan makes 
her a hostage in the house of her hosts and compromises the morality of the exchange of 
hospitality. As Mr. Harrel converts his hosting into a financial investment, he threatens Cecilia’s 
status as a guest and thus the morality of the entire exchange of hospitality.   
 Indeed, these exchanges are distressing in part because Cecilia is forced to take on the 
traditional roles of the host. She, as guest, should be the member in debt to her host; however, 
Mr. Harrel’s borrowing places him in debt to her while he also maintains his control as host over 
her behavior. Thus, Cecilia feels moral uncertainty as she allows her host to extract money and 
her attendance from her. Unlike the delay of return in a hospitality system which builds 
relationships between host and guest, the delay in the credit system seeks only financial gain and 
specifically designs not to build relationships. D. Grant Campbell explores the implications of 
the credit system in Cecilia and notes that credit creates “a false appearance of prosperity, an 
appearance which is highly unstable, and whose inevitable termination in ruin advances and 
recedes according to the fluctuation of rumor and financial confidence” (136). The relationships 
they build, I would argue, have the same characteristics: unstable, based on rumor, and always 
on the cusp of ruin. Because credit is designed to financially improve the position of one of the 
participants and no symbolic capital is included in the exchange, credit relationships can never 
create the cycle of reciprocity that hospitality relationships do. Cecilia’s discomfort, then, arises 
not just from her different economic habits and dislike of luxury but also from her belief that she 
is functioning in a different system. Unaware of the creditory behavior surrounding her, Cecilia 
continues to act on the assumption of a hospitable relationship.   
Burney relates the relationship between Cecilia and Mr. Harrel to the reader from 
Cecilia’s own limited perspective. The reader experiences with Cecilia the doubts concerning 
Mr. Harrel’s motives and the discomfort of his quests for money. Like Cecilia, the reader is 





Burney creates an additional credit relationship—that between Cecilia and Mr. Monckton—in 
the novel that allows the reader a more objective view of the relationship throughout the story. 
Whereas the reader remains close to Cecilia’s position as participant in her relationship with Mr. 
Harrel, Mr. Monckton’s interested motives are immediately revealed. In fact, Cecilia’s 
relationship with Mr. Monckton is introduced as one of credit: “Pleasure given in society, like 
money lent in usury, returns with interest to those who dispense it: and the discourse of Mr. 
Monckton conferred not a greater favour upon Cecilia than her attention to it repaid” (9). Cecilia 
thus sees their relationship as one in which both participants are “mutually gratified” (9). 
Foreshadowing the disparities between usury and hospitality the relationship exposes, Cecilia 
here believes that each party gives and repays in a cycle like that of a hospitality exchange. 
However, Cecilia’s misinterpretation is immediately revealed by the narrator, who informs the 
reader that Mr. Monckton “had long looked upon her as his future property; as such he had 
indulged his admiration, and as such he had already appropriated her estate, though he had not 
more vigilantly inspected into her sentiments, then he had guarded his own from a similar 
scrutiny” (9). Mr. Monckton sees the relationship differently than Cecilia, viewing her not as the 
pupil for his guidance but as an object of interest to be obtained through his investment of 
admiration and hospitality. Indeed, though Mr. Monckton does not think of Cecilia as collateral 
as Mr. Harrel does, Mr. Monckton does expect to gain her person and her fortune through his 
investment of the symbolic capital of hospitality. In doing so, however, he fails to “inspect” 
Cecilia’s feelings and interests and consequently sets up a shallow relationship much like that 
between Mr. Harrel and Cecilia.  
 Because she sees their relationship as one of hospitable exchange, Cecilia continues to 
misread Mr. Monckton’s intention throughout the novel. She repeatedly feels a sense of gratitude 
and obligation to him for his advice, particularly when it concerns money matters. She borrows 
money from Mr. Monckton in order to repay the loans she incurred to pay off Mr. Harrel’s debts. 
Cecilia reads this act as one of “kindness [that], as she suspected not his motives, seemed to 
spring from the most disinterested generosity” (437). The reader, however, is made aware of Mr. 
Monckton’s calculations for his own interest. He hoped that “by giving her pleasure,” he could 
gain the additional “gratification” of her fortune (437-8). While Cecilia received hints of Mr. 





Monckton’s desires because she remains in the guest position as the person who is obligated and 
in debt. Though Monckton does all he can to maintain the appearance of a hospitable exchange, 
his ulterior motives ultimately destroy the exchange and Cecilia’s vision of their ideal hospitality 
exchange. Mr. Monckton continually acts to preserve his interest in Cecilia and is eventually 
caught in his plot to stop Cecilia from marrying young Delvile. Exposed as a creditor rather than 
a host, Mr. Monckton loses Cecilia’s trust, along with all the debts of obligation he had inspired. 
Like Mr. Harrel’s creditory relationship, Mr. Monckton’s pursuit of Cecilia as an object negates 
the relationship that hospitality is designed to inspire. Thus, Cecilia misconstrues the intentions 
of her hosts in two very different credit relations. Her confusion about their inhospitable 
treatment marks the moments in the text when Cecilia feels moral discomfort; following her 
understanding of their ulterior motives, Cecilia questions not only her ability to practice 
hospitality but also her understanding of the very nature of hospitality exchange.  
 Other eighteenth-century protagonists are also duped by credit relationships as hosts 
attempt to gain their money as interest for their hospitality. David Simple, the protagonist of 
Sarah Fielding’s work, offers a masculine version of a guest used as a source of income.
94
 David 
is treated as an investment by his brother, Daniel, who fakes their father’s will to exclude David. 
Like Mr. Monckton, Daniel pretends great love and respect in order to earn David’s trust. Like 
Cecilia, David believes their relationship is one of hospitality and imagines they are so closely 
connected that their personal possessions cannot be distinguished. The narrator, however, 
quickly lets the audience know that Daniel merely put on the “Appearance of Friendship” and 
“was in reality one of those Wretches, whose only Happiness centers in themselves; and that his 
Conversation with his Companions had never any other View, but in some shape or other to 
promote his own Interest” (9). Daniel’s kindness towards his brother, then, is merely designed to 
win the entirety, rather than his half, of the family inheritance. Once this goal is obtained 
(through the forgery of his father’s will), Daniel “threw off the Mask” and begins to treat his 
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 James Kim argues that David Simple as a narrative is structured around market concerns. He reads David’s travel 
as one of “affirming the citational logic of market value,” noting in particular how David learns the values of his 
acquaintances by hearing their characters “discredited” and exposed by a later potential friend (485). Such a cyclic 
way or revealing worth suggest that “in the fallen world of modernity, value depends not on the putatively intrinsic 
worth of things, but rather on an all too corruptible system of competing citations” (484). Gary Gautier, however, 
reads this same cycle of replaced value as a sign of subjectivity without closure; because each subsequent character 





brother poorly. Seeing his kindness to David as an investment for his future acquisition of the 
family fortune, Daniel fails to follow proper protocol of hospitality towards David once his 
objective is complete. As such, his position resembles Mr. Monckton’s approach to Cecilia: he 
too sees an investment of symbolic capital as the means to obtain a financial gain.  
 Indeed, David and Daniel’s relationship, though brotherly, is closely connected to that of 
hospitality in Fielding’s novel. David searches for a true friend, whom he defines by a 
relationship of equal reciprocity. This friend would be perfectly disinterested, one “whose every 
Action proceeded either from Obedience to the Divine Will, or from the Delight he took in doing 
good; who could not see another’s Sufferings without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing 
them” (68-69). David envisions this friend as a member of his household, wherein the friends 
would return favors of host and guest to one another in an idealized, perfectly reciprocal, 
exchange of hospitality. David had seen his brother as a friend of this sort, imagining that they 
shared interests and goods to be exchanged in a cycle of mutuality. When David becomes a 
literal guest of Daniel’s house, however, he discovers that this mutual exchange does not exist. 
David had believed his brother, like himself, would be “extremely happy…in continually sharing 
with his best Friend the Fortune his Father had left him” (12). Daniel, however, makes it his 
objective to make David uncomfortable in his house in order to further secure the family fortune 
from his brother. He “resolved it should not be long before [David] felt that Dependance” that 
Daniel had tricked him into (13) and sets to work treating him as an unequal member in their 
relationship. But Daniel delays his behavior here as well, gradually slackening his attentions and 
encouraging his servants to do likewise. David, assuming he and his brother are still functioning 
in a system of equal exchange, fails to see the ulterior objective of his brother, and continues to 
act according to a system of hospitality.  
As a result, Daniel’s behavior, when finally revealed as inhospitable, causes David much 
mental anguish. David becomes impassioned by his mistreatment, and Daniel uses this 
passionate response to justify his inhospitable behavior. Meeting with no compassion from his 
brother, David “could not account for such a Difference in one Man’s Conduct” (15) and flees 
the house “as fast as he was able, without considering where he was going or what he should do 
(for his Mind was so taken up, and tortured with his Brother’s Brutality, that all other Thoughts 





where to direct his Steps” (16). Though he left home without his possessions or money, “his 
Mind was in so much anxiety, it was impossible for him to spend one Thought on any thing but 
the Cause of his Grief” (16). This mental anguish and the difficulty David finds in providing for 
his basic needs in such a state indicates the extent to which Daniel’s creditory relationship has 
upset David’s basic perception of the world.
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  Like Cecilia, David is also made the target of credit scheme involving marriage. Having 
regained his fortune, he is taken into the home of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson extends hospitality 
to David in order to encourage him to marry his daughter; he considers making David a guest in 
his home “the wisest way to engage David to Affection” (27). He likewise instructs his daughter 
to treat him with hospitality, and she complies “with cheerful Smiles, and Good Humour” (27). 
But David discovers this scheme to win his fortune through marriage when he overhears Miss 
Nanny Johnson debating whether to marry David or a wealthy Jewish merchant. Shocked at the 
father’s encouragement of his daughter to accept the wealthier suitor and at Miss Nanny’s lack of 
feeling, David is once again in mental anguish. He discovers that his money has been the cause 
of his host’s warmness and his daughter’s welcome. Yet rather than feel angry, David finds 
himself torn on how to react; feeling “Amazement” instead, David “could hardly persuade 
himself that he was in a Dream. He was going to burst open the Door, and tell her he had been 
witness to the Delicacy of her Sentiments; but his Tenderness for her, even in the midst of his 
Passion, restrained him” (34). Faced with the revelation of the terms of exchange, David is 
unable to act and instead remains passively outside the door. Unsure what to think of Miss 
Nanny’s conversation, he determines to allow her to break their engagement. Yet even as David 
once again resolves to leave an inhospitable house, he has difficulty understanding or believing 
his situation. He admits he was “several times tempted by her Behaviour to think he was not in 
his Senses, when he fancied he over-heard her say any thing that could be construed to her 
Disadvantage” (36). Faced directly with his host’s selfish motives, David has difficulty 
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 David is made homeless through improper hospitality but he is not made captive. Likewise his perceptions of his 
host are injured but his unwavering belief in his own morality and ability to make ethical decisions remains 
unscathed. As such, his discomfort is continuously overcome; unlike Cecilia who was tied to a guardian and unable 
to act, David repeatedly resorts to the only strength a captive has—he leaves the bad hosts he meets and searches for 
a more suitable one. David, as a male and later as a male with money, continues to hold some ability to choose to 
whom to offer hospitality and often thinks of himself as a host, often acts in the position of host, and, even as a 





rearranging his understanding of their relationship. His response is to flee the house of his host, 
escaping the credit relationship but also failing to address the problems there.   
 These novels show that, because credit uses the trappings of hospitality and offers the 
appearance of symbolic exchange, the guest believes himself to be functioning in a hospitality 
exchange. The host’s selfish intentions attempt to turn a relationship based on symbolic capital 
into one based on the literal exchange of capital.
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 As such, their behavior fails to take into 
consideration the needs of the guest. Instead, the host delays as a means to invest in the financial 
gains the guest might offer. Thus, in the moment of the exchange, guests are often unaware of 
their ill-usage. Unable to depend on the hospitality system to produce reciprocal relationships, 
the guest is faced with questioning every interaction with a host or risking his well-being with a 
bad host.  
 
The Capital of Reputation  
Each of the scenarios discussed above involved guests with some amount of power; both 
Cecilia and David are susceptible to credit relationships because they have the fortune to be 
gained from an exchange. This fortune, however, does offer them ways to eventually improve 
their situation: David eventually finds a circle of friends whom he supports financially and 
Cecilia does manage to choose her own company when she comes of age and can manage her 
own property.
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 Cynthia’s situation as toad-eater with which the chapter opens offers a different 
view. As a dependent, Cynthia is not useful for creditory financial gains but her vulnerability 
makes her a more viable means of gaining symbolic capital. Thus, while credit relationships use 
social capital for financial gain, some hosts use financial entrapments for symbolic capital gains. 
These hosts make a display of their hospitality, highlighting their material generosity, while 
failing to take into consideration their guest’s comfort and happiness. Guests in this position, like 
Cynthia as toad-eater, find themselves confined in a broken hospitality system that consistently 
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 Gautier claims that the issues Fielding deals with in her novels are not ones of old versus new hospitality but one 
that “expose[s] contradictions within the emerging bourgeois ideology” (196). Indeed, Fielding, Burney and other 
novelists are less concerned with how a new ethic is replacing an old, but with how the new ethic is creating new 
paradoxes in moral behavior.  
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 Though Burney’s Cecilia is saved from the particular misuse of being a toad-eater because of her fortune, Sharon 
Long Damoff notes that her final book, The Wanderer, features a dependent guest who is made more vulnerable by 
the “the way in which reputation becomes reality” and leads several female characters to refuse to host Juliet for fear 





requires them to “pay” more into the exchange than they receive; yet, still in need and dependent, 
these guests can only continue this loan of symbolic capital without real hope of a return. This 
relationship thus includes a reversal of roles: the guest must cater to her host’s needs while the 
host is dependent on the guest for symbolic gain. Tasked with more responsibility in the 
exchange, the guest becomes anxious and struggles to return the hospitality act to its ethical 
function.   
 In many representations, this situation is exacerbated by the host’s unawareness of her 
misuse of the exchange. While the bad host in a creditory situation is always consciously 
scheming for his own gain, the bad host building a reputation is often unaware of her own 
intentions. Such unconscious intentions undermine ethical situations wherein motive is used to 
determine the rectitude of actions. This, Adam Smith argues, is a problem for any ethical 
situation, like that of hospitality, wherein judgment and ethical positions require a detached 
perspective. The host may be influenced by a real desire to help the guest and by a desire for the 
praise such an act will elicit. While both motives help produce the action, “how far his conduct 
may have been influenced by the one [motive] and how far by the other, may frequently be 
unknown even to himself” (126). How one interprets these actions, Smith argues, depends on the 
disposition of the observer: those “disposed to lessen the merit” will attribute the action to love 
of praise, while those “disposed to think more favourably” will see good intentions as the chief 
motivator (126-7). But here Smith speaks of the external observer. Within the exchange, such 
judgment becomes more difficult. The host, believing her intentions are good, fails to understand 
the guest’s dissatisfaction and believes that the deteriorating relationship is caused by the lack of 
gratitude. Because focused on the public interpretation of the exchange, these hosts fail to adapt 
their behavior to ease their guests. Instead, the guest becomes a placeholder in the exchange 
rather than an acting member. Somewhere between friend and possession, the guest experiences 
anxiety about her place in society and value in the household.  
 Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia, in many cases a conventional text following genre norms, 
includes representations of negative hospitality that cuts the guest out of the relationship. 
Following the financial hardships and social threats that plague Sophia, the narrative builds a 





Howard, who treats Sophia as a toad-eater and preys on her financial dependency.
98
 Mrs. 
Howard, a member of the new upper class, seeks social prestige and has worked hard to cultivate 
a reputation for benevolence through a “few ostentatious benefactions” and subscriptions to 
“some fashionable charities” (162). These public behaviors are contrasted by her private ones: 
she serves her guests with “parsimony,” collects her rents “with the most unrelenting rigor,” and 
turns the poor away “sighing from her gate” (162). She takes in Sophia, then, to improve her 
reputation for charity while also taking advantage of Sophia’s “economical talents” by putting 
her to work on embroidery (162). The narrator thus characterizes Mrs. Howard as one of “those 
who are most celebrated for their charity, [but] are in reality least sensible to the feelings of 
humanity” (162-3).
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 Mrs. Howard’s own lack of moral questioning perpetuates this 
contradiction. She, like Smith’s imperfect agent, does not thoroughly analyze her own 
hospitality. Choosing only to broadcast her benevolent actions, she fails to consider the effect of 
all of her actions or to evaluate the consistency of her intentions.  
However, Mrs. Howard soon extends her lack of consideration to viciousness when she 
finds her interests challenged in the hospitality exchange. Only interested in her gain in 
reputation by hosting Sophia, Mrs. Howard fails her duties to protect her guest and ultimately 
actively plots to hurt Sophia when hosting Sophia no longer serves her interests. When her 
young, rich nephew falls in love with Sophia and expresses an interest in marrying her, Mrs. 
Howard no longer wishes to host Sophia but does not wish to lose the social capital she has 
gained. Because this marriage would hurt Mrs. Howard’s fortune, she resolves to send Sophia 
from her house despite Sophia’s lack of interest in the boy or of place to go. Thinking only of her 
own desires, Mrs. Howard convinces herself that Sophia has abused her position as a guest and 
deserves punishment; she schemes “to destroy Sophia’s reputation, and to secure her own” and 
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 Charles Hinnant, studying gift exchange in the eighteenth century, claims that gift-givers are “likely to expect, 
even demand, some form of reciprocation” and these demands only increase “the greater the social distance between 
the donor and recipient.” In such cases, the gift was specifically used as “part of a campaign of conquest and 
possession” (147). Such is certainly the case for Sophia as she escapes from the care of a man seeking a sexual 
return to Mrs. Howard’s home where financial returns are expected.  
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 According to Eve Tavor Bannet, a discomfort with nobility and the newly rich, such as Mrs. Howard, is pervasive 
in Lennox’s work. Aristocrats and “pseudo-aristocrats” are shown “to use politeness to control and mitigate conflicts 
arising from local competition for power, spouses, and markets” (78). While Bannet reads this narrative trend as 
Lennox using capitalism to create or restore relationships, Sophia suggests that such economic structures fail to 





decides that, rather than dismiss Sophia “with contempt,” she will “ruin her with all possible 
gentleness” (166). Continuing to barter in symbolic capital, Mrs. Howard seeks to build her own 
reputation at the cost of her guest’s. As such, Mrs. Howard begins to spread rumors that Sophia 
seduced her nephew in order to gain his fortune. Thus, rather than protect her guest, Mrs. 
Howard actively works against Sophia’s interests in order to further display her generosity and 
capacity for forgiveness. So concerned with her own interests, Mrs. Howard becomes a vicious 
host and reveals the shallowness of her affection for Sophia.  
Sarah Fielding continues to pursue this idea of selfish building of reputation through 
hospitality in her sequel to David Simple, Volume the Last. Whereas Cynthia’s host remains 
fairly hidden in the original narrative, Fielding spends a great deal of time discussing host 
motivation in her sequel. Here, she returns to the character of Mr. Orgueil and adds the character 
of Mrs. Orguiel to explore the limits and consequences of hosts who hope to build their 
reputation for hospitality without creating deep relationships with their guests. Mrs. Orguiel and 
her husband hold the traditional position of hosts as the wealthiest family in the neighborhood; 
the extended Simple family, as both old friends and as a family of quality, are often made guests 
at the Orguiel household. As the Simple family’s fortune diminishes, however, they fail to 
receive more than the promises of hospitality from the Orguiels. Mrs. Orguiel, continuously 
depicted as selfish, finds these misfortunes to be opportunities for displaying her generosity but 
also for acting on her jealousies of Cynthia. Her selfish behavior involves attempts to disrupt 
Cynthia and Camilla’s friendship, abuse Cynthia’s child, and keep her husband from helping 
either David’s or Cynthia’s families. For example, she takes in Cynthia’s daughter, little Cynthia, 
as an act of generosity. Yet, when the young girl is a guest in Orgueil’s care, Mrs. Orgueil 
repeatedly gives preference to her own daughter, Henrietta. Forced to sleep in a damp room 
rather than share with Henrietta, Cynthia falls ill and dies. Mrs. Orgueil’s jealousies of the 
mother thus inspire poor hospitality and expose Cynthia’s daughter to harm. Though she acts 
generously in order to maintain a reputation for generosity, her behaviors are always motivated 
by her own desires.  
 But Mrs. Orguiel herself lacks awareness of her own inhospitable desires, a lack that 
makes it difficult for her to understand hospitable relationships and moral behavior at all. She 





behavior—and the jealous intentions that inspired it—might have caused the girl’s death. 
Instead, she continues to offer ‘benevolent’ acts for insincere motives. Indeed, Mrs. Orgueil 
encourages her husband to help Cynthia and her husband find a place in Jamaica that results in 
the opportunity to take in young Cynthia. Mrs. Orgueil secretly hopes that Cynthia would fall 
prey to the “Violent Heat of that Climate, as nothing was more apt to weaken her Constitution.” 
Yet, Mrs. Orgueil remains unaware of this desire because “this Motive lay too deep in Mrs. 
Orgueil’s Breast even for her own Discovery of it; and she would have started as strongly at the 
most distant step towards Murder, as the most tender-hearted Creature upon Earth” (340). Mrs. 
Orgueil remains convinced of her own benevolent intentions and, because of this self-deception, 
is unable to see the consequences of her actions. Instead, she blames Cynthia and her family for 
all of their own downfalls and uses their misfortunes as reasons to not offer further hospitality.    
 Her husband also lacks awareness of his inhospitality; yet he prides himself on his ethical 
behavior and builds his identity and reputation on a specific set of rules.
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 First introduced in 
David Simple before his marriage, Mr. Orgueil there was faulted for failing to “make any 
allowance for the Frailties of Human Nature” (52) and viewing compassion as “a very great 
Weakness” that detracts from moral behavior determined by “the real Love of Rectitude” (64-5). 
Mr. Orgueil’s insists that he only act when “the Laws of Society and right Reason” (65) and this 
determination dictates that his actions are ultimately routed in a desire for a virtuous reputation. 
He is revealed to be one of “a Set of Men in the World, who pass through Life with very good 
Reputations, whose Actions are in the general justly to be applauded, and yet upon a near 
Examination their Principles are all bad, and their Hearts hardened to all tender Sensations” (65). 
His actions go only so far as to fulfill his sense of pride that he gathers from following moral 
principles. Without a sense of compassion, however, Mr. Orgueil remains detached from those 
he is obligated to assist and thus fails to offer real aid or hospitality. Indeed, his philosophy often 
only justifies Orgueil in not offering assistance to those in need. When David suffers misfortune 
after misfortune, Orgueil convinces himself not to help because “David was voluntarily 
miserable, for he could not be unavoidably so whilst he had a God [--Human Reason--] at his 
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 Gerard A. Barker reads Orgueil’s character as a critique of Stoicism, which sought to detach emotion from moral 
decisions. Disinterest, this critique shows, is not the only quality necessary for a moral character (72). However, in 
Fielding’s sequel, Orgueil is shown to have a selfish motive in removing his emotion—namely, he gains a sense of 





Command” (332). Because David was unable to foresee the consequences of his choices, Orgueil 
contends, he is unworthy of receiving aid. While a truly hospitable host would seek to 
understand David’s situation and offer relief, Orgueil cannot feel compassion and so holds David 
accountable for each of his mistakes no matter how justified.  
 This lack of compassion derives from Mr. Orgueil’s rules that attempt to systematize 
hospitality and give him the objective positioning necessary to judge ethically. This positioning 
absents Mr. Orgueil from the hospitality cycle altogether and makes it difficult for him to create 
relationships. Attempting to codify the system, Mr. Orguiel fails to involve himself in the 
practical logic of hospitality exchange and, in the case of his wife’s mistreatment of Cynthia’s 
child, remains so distant from the exchange that he does not notice the child’s illness. Though the 
child is in his house, Mr. Orgueil spends his time “in his Study, contemplating on his Rule of 
Rectitude, and exulting in the Beauties of Human Reason” (328). These rules, codified to make 
exchanges more ethical, actually detract from Mr. Orgueil’s ability to offer hospitality because 
they distance him mentally and emotionally from his guests. Intent on knowing his duty, Mr. 
Orgueil fails to fulfill his duties to protect his guests and welcome them in his home. Mr. Orguiel 
remains oblivious to his failure to uphold his hospitable responsibilities and his motives also 
remain hidden to himself and further detract from his ability to host. Indeed, he believes that he 
offers hospitality to David and his family. When David seeks his help, Orgueil offers it in the 
form of Advice “which it was impossible for his Family to feed on…[and] what either his 
Disposition, or his Situation, rendered impracticable” (330-1). Mr. Orgueil believes that such 
advice and reasoning are the duties of the host. Yet, because advice cannot provide hospitality or 
aid, offering only advice leads to Orgueil’s failure to uphold his responsibilities to host.  
The Orgueils’ behavior exemplifies the most threatening form of hospitality. Seeking 
their generous reputations, they repeatedly draw the Simple family into exchanges that resemble 
hospitality but fail to create a relationship between the host and guest. Because they do not truly 
consider the needs of their neighbors or guests, the Orgueils wreak havoc on the Simples’ lives 
with false or vague promise of aid and hospitality that never comes. The hospitality that is 
offered manifests in forms that fail to connect with the Simples, denying their need and confining 
them to act against their inclinations. The Simple family, of course, is the party who suffers; 





protection. Offered only enough hospitality to continue their dependence and their hope, the 
family becomes toad-eaters. Thus, real hospitality is not exchanged when only the reputation 
built by dealing in the symbolic capital of hospitality is pursued.  
 
The prevalence of bad hosts threatens the individual guests but also leads to distrust of 
the entire system of hospitality. Guests, once subjected to the abuses of a host, worry about the 
intentions of any other hosts who offer hospitality. Hospitality is no longer the bastion of 
protection from a threatening world but a threat itself. Indeed, this threat is particularly imposing 
because of the ability for hosts to deceive guests, hiding their self-interest behind guises of 
benevolence. Following an encounter with a deceptive host, a guest is reluctant to accept any 
offer of welcome because unsure how to judge the benevolence of the offer. In such an 
inscrutable world, then, the guests turns to those most easy to understand because most like 








GUESTS AS HOSTS 
 
 Guests seek the company of other guests because the welcome they meet with from these 
guests is easier to scrutinize. In similar positions, guests have a greater sense of potential 
interests and feel more confident in reading other guest’s behavior. Though still cautious, guests 
find the sense of comfort and sympathy they expect from hospitality in one another. Such is the 
case for Cynthia and David in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple. The two characters share a series 
of conversations about Cynthia’s position as a toad-eater where both characters seek to 
accommodate the needs and desires of the other; Cynthia objects to troubling David with her 
situation, and David insists the telling will bring him pleasure. Each receives from the other the 
accommodation that they earlier sought from a host. This particular exchange, however, actively 
seeks to exclude a host and is instead enacted more ideally because between two guests. Indeed, 
David hopes to hear how Cynthia came to be in her position as a toad-eater and plots to visit 
Cynthia her when her host is gone (91). The guests thus take over the obligations of hosting one 
another in an environment that excludes host and their potential to distort hospitality. In the place 
of that guest-host relationship blossoms a more egalitarian guest-guest relationship. 
 The more equal relationship between guests stems from the benevolent motivations each 
guest expresses. Such benevolence is, however, connected to the contexts of being a guest in the 
novels discussed here. Because guests do not direct hospitality but react to the host, they take a 
more passive position. This passivity is closely linked to the disinterested behavior so idealized 
in hospitality. Cynthia and David’s exchange, for example, is disinterested as each passively 
approaches the other and act only because the other desires it. Cynthia repeatedly apologizes for 
speaking so much of herself, but she relates her story to David because of “the Sincerity which 
was visible in his Manner of expressing himself,” a manner expressed in his many 
encouragements to continue (92). For David’s part, he tells Cynthia that he want to hear her story 
because “nothing in this World was capable of giving him so much Pleasure” as relieving her 
distress (92). Their desire to please the other defines the passive guest position. As the guest 





outside force. This openness takes away self-control but encourages hospitable service. This 
passive guest is thus vulnerable to bad hosts but perfectly hospitable to a fellow guest.  
 The exchange between guests thus has the potential to be ideal but reveals a flaw of 
practice; the exchange can only be perpetuated by two similar characters. Seeking guests instead 
of hosts, the new positive form of hospitality reveals narcissism in the system. Cynthia and 
David are able to offer one another benevolence because they recognize elements of their own 
character and position in the other. David, for example, recognizes and sympathizes with 
Cynthia’s treatment. When she is accused of envy she did not feel, David “could easily 
comprehend the Reasonableness of what Cynthia said” because he, like Cynthia had never had 
“one envious Thought” (96). The hospitality between guests is made possible, then, because 
these characters share traits that make them vulnerable to other the self-interested hosting so 
common in the novels.  
 Because of this similarity, reciprocal hospitality remains confined to guests and cannot be 
transferred into the larger contexts of hospitality exchange. The exchange between guests is 
ultimately unsustainable because the guest lacks the space to entertain and ability to protect 
guests. Instead, the hospitable encounters must evolve to maintain the newfound benevolence in 
a stable relationship. Indeed, eighteenth-century novels generally extend a hospitable relationship 
into a filial one, as the guests involved in an exchange are more stably connected through 
marriage. David and Cynthia’s relationship ends when it cannot be perpetuated in marriage. 
Though David offers his hand, Cynthia refuses and the two guests return to their vulnerable 
positions as guests to bad hosts. Their hospitality alone cannot protect them form the returning to 
the less benevolent world. In other situations, however, novels show that hospitality makes way 
for more sustained relationships by converting those relationships between strangers into 
intimate family relationships. Although such a conversion or evolution results in more stable 
connections between partners of the exchange, it fails to solve hospitality’s ethical problems or, 
ultimately to protect the guests.   
 This chapter will explore the nature of the guest’s passivity, arguing that passivity 
became increasingly defined by disinterested behavior. I will show how the definition of 
passivity became more closely associated with benevolence as eighteenth-century novels 





counters other definitions of passivity that saw human desires as an uncontrollable, external force 
capable of inspiring action. To combat this competing definition, the novels discussed here 
allowed a means to control personal passions; reason offered a way to ensure the repression of 
passions, even as reason itself is shown to have self-interested connections to self-preservation. 
This chapter will discuss how the balance between benevolence and reason become associated 
with gender in the novels. Female guests, because of the elevated consequences of their 
vulnerability are depicted as emblems not just of passivity but also of reason; conversely, male 
guests reject the protection that reason might offer to embrace the disinterested state and the 
vulnerabilities it creates.
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 Ultimately, I will argue, both men and women characters escape the 
problems of these imbalances in relationships with other guests, who share the same need for 
reason and impulse towards disinterestedness.  
 
Passive Relationships 
 The guest position, unlike that of the host, is predicated on passive behaviors. The 
passive state is defined by its openness to outside influences; passive individuals react to external 
motivations which are internalized to inspire action or, perhaps more accurately, reaction.
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 An 
ideal guest remains open to the host’s welcome and waits for accommodation; in fact, he 
accommodates the host by internalizing the host’s desires and using those desires to inform his 
own actions. Cynthia and David’s exchange illustrates such openness and accommodation: 
Cynthia, open to David’s requests, tells her story to accommodate David’s desire, a desire which 
soon can be attributed to Cynthia as she enjoys the sympathy she receives in response. Yet, even 
in less ideal exchanges, the nature of the guest encourages passivity. Even in positions of 
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 Travel literature also reveals interesting gender dynamics, as the traveler is often termed male and the foreign 
cites were identified as female. See Susan Lamb, Bringing Travel Home to England: Tourism, Gender, and 
Imaginative Literature in the Eighteenth Century, 12.  
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 In The Power of the Passive Self in English Literature, 1640-1770, Scott Paul Gordon argues that passivity 
“locates the agency for such behaviors outside the individual to eliminate any space in which individuals could 
calculate their interest or even consider their audience”  and blames any incendiary actions on an outside source; 
inspired by “another individual, …external nature or in God” (4-5), the actor can act without being an agent. Gordon 
describes this flaw as the “cost of defining oneself not as a freely choosing actor but as the passive agent of another 
force” (8). Such ideal passivity leads to disinterested intentions but it does not lead to control over oneself or the 
surrounding contexts and people. As such, the guest is certainly able to act morally, as defined by benevolent 





vulnerability and subject to abuse from the host, the guest responds to his host, attempting to 
mediate rather than control, reacting rather than acting.  
This less active position offers the guest a certain moral standing. His very passivity 
allows for the disinterested perspective so highly prized in the eighteenth century. Because the 
guest must react to the host, he approaches the hospitable exchange with little thought of 
personal gain.
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 Indeed, Cynthia does not tell her story to help her own position but to 
accommodate David’s requests, requests which she believes to be disinterested. The narrative 
does indicate that Cynthia’s willingness to respond to David’s request is based on his own 
disinterest. Had she suspected David of ulterior motives, Cynthia might have been less 
forthcoming with such personal information. Her position as a toad-eater has taught Cynthia this 
caution; she is wary of being too open to another and exposing herself to harm. However, the 
novel’s ideal relationships make clear that, though some self-interest is necessary to protect the 
guest, the passive state is more easily adapted to the demands of intentional ethics and 
benevolent hospitality. The guest’s passivity, then, encourages disinterest, an ideal intention, but 
this disinterest must be mediated if the guest is to be protected from bad hospitality.
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 This disinterested definition of passivity was opposed to an older definition of passivity 
that proclaimed the outside force motivating action was the passions. Gordon notes that this 
older definition of passivity, still used in the eighteenth century, connected the “passions” to the 
passive state, attributing the responsibility for action to uncontrollable desire. For example, 
blameworthy desires such as lust were considered passive and thus allowed the agent who acted 
on this passion to deny responsibility for his predatory actions. These passions, however, are far 
from disinterested and, as such, threaten the ethical value of passivity proposed in the competing 
definition. Philosophy, by promoting disinterested intentions, spends a considerable amount of 
time warning about the passions that misguide behavior. Bayle finds that “Passion and Prejudice 
do but too often obscure the Ideas of natural Equity” and calls for his reader to “raise his 
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 Scott Paul Gordon notes that this passive disinterest was often a trait attributed to women and has led scholars to 
claim “the first ‘modern’ subject was a woman.” I will follow Gordon in claiming that this trait was encouraged 
beyond women as “all subjects come to be defined—indeed, come to define themselves—by means of qualities of 
passivity and responsiveness rather than activity and responsibility” as well as his suspicions that passivity became 
the defining trait of modern subjects (Passive 8).  
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Contemplations above” such passions (69). But Bayle here defines these passions as “private 
Interests” and argues that seeing these passions in any other way is a corruption of the mind. 
Hutcheson similarly calls passions the “Springs of Vice” that are born of “a mistaken Self-Love, 
made so violent, as to overcome Benevolence” (121). Though passions may feel like the work of 
an outside force, they are considered the very essence of self-interest in intentional philosophy 
and turned into a source of evil.
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 For these philosophers, passion is not an external force but an 
internal vice capable of a violence that can overcome a person’s better motives.  
 The same distinction is made in the eighteenth-century novel; passivity is portrayed as 
virtuous when disinterested and as immoral when passionate. Here, however, the definitions 
come in conflict and vie for control over characters and plot.
106
 For example, in Charlotte 
Lennox’s Sophia, Sophia and her sister Harriot represent the two definitions of passive. Patricia 
Spacks, one of the few critics to comment on the work, reads the novel against its proposed 
moral message and argues that passivity is revealed as a form of cultural oppression for women 
in the novel.
107
 Harriot, the more sexually available sister, is condemned for her freedom in the 
text; Spacks sees Harriot as the more active sister because she “slams doors, storms at those who 
displease her, often controls her mother’s actions; she openly expresses her rage at her sister; she 
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 Christine Roulston sees the repression of the passions as part of the work of sentimental fiction, particularly for 
women. She argues that the “process of revelation and self-revelation that takes place in sentimental discourse works 
less to expose the subject—as scientific or moral experiment—than to reveal the subject’s control over, and 
domestication of, her desire” (xix).  
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 The problems of this conflict are escalated for women, whose virtue lay both in inactivity and activity in the 
eighteenth century. Sharon Long Damoff, among others, has defined this conflict of action as the central moral 
problem explored in Burney’s Cecilia. Relating the scenes of Cecilia’s charitable and hospitable attempts, Damoff 
argues that Burney’s heroines are often perplexed because a woman was instructed to “avert her eyes” and remain 
chaste while also extolled to follow Christian imperatives to aid the distressed (154). To do the latter, one must both 
see and act; this action, however, exposes a woman to claims of acting on passion, particularly if the host or gift 
recipient is a man. Indeed, Judith Frank also notes this catch 22 and argues that “Cecilia is taken to be unchaste 
precisely because of her benevolence: indeed, nothing could be more mutually exclusive than the claims of 
benevolence and the claims of feminine propriety” (154). If a woman acts on the Christian commandment to love 
your neighbor, she risks appearing unchaste. Feminists like Helene Cixous have tried to reclaim this position, giving 
power to the loss of self inherent in women’s benevolence. Though portrayed more positively, this celebration of 
women gift-giving does not solve the problem of women being made available. Though this “outpouring” can be 
“intoxicating,” it can do so only with the loss of reason that can protect a woman (163).  
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 Patricia Spacks expresses some discomfort with the emphasis on passivity as a moral state in the eighteenth 
century. Noting both eighteenth-century praise of action and that “only the self can experience happiness,” Spacks is 
surprised by the continued insistence to privilege self-denial. This passivity, Spacks argues, creates moral 
inconsistencies as “protagonists evade the moral problem of their titillation at the suffering of others by extravagant 
identification with victims” (“Sisters” 126). Passivity rather than action does create moral inconsistencies and 
paradoxes that the eighteenth-century novel struggled to overcome; yet, the emphasis on the passive guest position 





acquires fine clothes and jewelry and flaunts her acquisitions as well as her beauty” (141). 
Sophia, on the other hand, “follows the path of meekness, too ‘innocent’ to know any sexual 
feelings in herself, too docile to oppose her mother, always choosing restrictive courses, so eager 
for goodness that she allows herself little pleasure…she does not trust her intuitions and she 
considers physical response an index of danger” (141). However, when both definitions of 
passivity are employed, it is evident that both sisters are passive: Harriot is passive to her 
passions, letting them rule her actions, while Sophia is passive to desires of others, such as her 
mother. Though Spacks argues that Sophia’s disinterested passivity is oppressive while Harriot’s 
more passionate passivity is punished, Lennox’s novel of rewards for moral behavior is not 
privileging passivity so much as a specific kind of disinterested passivity. Sophia, monitoring her 
behavior with reason and maintaining benevolent intentions, is passive but also creates that 
passivity in her husband; as will be seen, their relationship thus exemplifies two equal parties—
two passive guests— in a hospitable exchange. Though neither Sophia or Harriet have the 
authority of the host position, the guest position—and the passivity it requires—holds a moral 
power and seeks new types of relationships that give the guest equal power to the host. 
 To address this dueling notion of passivity, many philosophers and literary texts promote 
the use of reason to regulate the passions and promote disinterest.
108
 In many ways, these novels 
again took their lead from works of philosophy which acknowledged that the passivity they 
encouraged needed a means to fight against the passions and avoid the violence of deception 
they caused. Most philosophies turned to reason as a vehicle to moderate these passions and 
leave the path open for a more benevolent form of passivity. For example, Bayle recommends 
judging behavior according to “a sober Inquiry” (69), while Cumberland claims that reason 
naturally “inclines Men…to assist one another mutually” (642). For both philosophers, reason is 
a means to regulate passions in order to allow man’s natural benevolence to shine. Reason 
continues to hold an important place in intentional ethics as the century progresses. In Theory of 
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 As Scott Paul Gordon notes in his study of eighteenth-century quixotic characters, The Practice of Quixotism: 
Postmodern Theory and Eighteenth-Century Women’s Writing, reason and benevolence are contradictory 
approaches to relationships. Gordon argues that, while quixotes were originally used to “reaffirm the stark 
distinction between reality and delusion,” eighteenth-century quixotes often “disrupt this project” of affirming the 
reader’s world view (6). This disruption is carried out by showing how reason and reality weaken the practice of 
benevolence. Drawing from Sarah Fielding’s work, Gordon argues that the quixote’s “unthinking goodness seems 





Moral Sentiments, Smith places much responsibility on reason listing it as the “principle, 
conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our 
conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls 
to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but 
one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it” (137). In Smith’s formulation, 
reason serves two functions: it suppresses the passions of self-interest and also returns us to our 
passive state as “one of the multitude” whose actions must respond to the needs of others. 
Passivity as an ideal thus needs reason to maintain the path of disinterested intentions.  
 The guest must balance reason and benevolence in order to be a responsible guest in the 
exchange of hospitality; he must follow the ideal but survive the practice of hospitality. Reason 
is necessary to control the exchange but, because it requires an awareness of potential harm, it 
also makes disinterested behavior more difficult. Julie Choi, however, notes that the eighteenth 
century was a time of “curious fluidity between the two traditionally discrete domains of head 
and heart, intellect and feeling, in this period” (642). Choi refers to this fluidity as “common 
sense” drawing on the dual meaning of the word sense as both rational thought and physical 
sense reception as well as the shared nature of the word common. Drawing from Enlightenment 
thinkers following Locke, Choi argues that “the reigning belief was that to be a fully reasoning 
being, one had first to be a fully sentient subject” (642). Comparing reason and the moral sense 
response that philosophers related to a natural human benevolence, Choi argues that the 
eighteenth century did not see the heart and head as an easy binary. Eighteenth-century novels 
use this fluidity, Choi argues, to create a new relationship with the reading public; the feminine 
but disembodied narrative voice “permits the technology of a seemingly seamless entry into the 
soul of another. Women who engineer this possibility have a stake in creating a view that 
presents itself as if from nowhere; in the spirit of a common enlightenment, a common reason, 
they take their share in construing that fiction of ultimate authority: objectivity” (659). What 
Choi’s work reveals is that the fluidity between reason and sensibility is best pursued from a 
passive position—here one of disembodiment—but also that this position lends itself the 
authority of objectivity. I see a similar fluidity in the representations of hospitality. Though these 
characters do not and cannot erase their bodies, they do work from a more passive state. This 





same time, the guests in the novels begin to regulate the exchange, choosing to create hospitable 
relationships with other guests able to sympathize with their position. The new exchange thus 
has two passive participants, each able to adhere to the guest position’s blend of reason and 
benevolence in order to fulfill the ideals and the means of practice for the guest.  
 
Feminine Reason 
The ideal balance between reason and passivity, however, manifests differently based on 
the gender of the guest. In eighteenth-century novels, female guests require more protection from 
the host, both physically and morally. Physically, women must guard against violence and 
particularly against sexual violence; if raped, assaulted or seduced, the female guest’s social 
status diminishes and she can become even more exposed to violence as their status as guest is 
compromised. A woman’s wealth is also at risk from the host; if this wealth is questioned or lost, 
a woman faces difficulty supporting herself and can be exposed to more violence. Morally a 
woman’s reputation was more fragile than a man’s and of more importance. In a society that 
demanded chastity, women had to guard not just against actual violence but also against slander 
and rumor of improper behavior. If her reputation was compromised, a woman might lose her 
social support and also be exposed to mistreatment. To combat this greater vulnerability, 
literature shows female protagonists making greater use of reason.
109
 Remaining detached from 
hospitality exchanges and reserved from the host, women attempt to foresee threats to their 
person and preserve both their body and virtue. At the same time, these women seek to 
accommodate those around them, passively reacting to the host’s desires. Indeed, as guests, these 
women had to prove their disinterested passivity to maintain their position in the exchange. Their 
disinterest, however, was tempered by a reason used to protect themselves, a self-interested 
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 Identifying women rather than men with rationality counters prevailing gender dynamics. As Helene Moglen 
notes in her work on gender in the eighteenth-century, “male interiority was identified with reason, female 
interiority with feeling” and argues that women’s feeling nature “required cultural embodiment and control” (3). It is 
this very association that perhaps reverses the gendered association of these traits in representations of hospitality. 
Though Moglen suggests that feminine feeling needed external regulation, these novels show female guests forced 





move in its very nature.
110
 With this conflict of self-interest and disinterest, women rarely 
actively combated violence but rather worked to preempt attacks.  
Upon entering a hospitality exchange, these female guests remain passive to their hosts, 
seeking only to fulfill the host’s desires. For many of the female protagonists, this passivity 
manifests itself in good conversation and good “nature.” When placed in social situations, these 
women strive to put others at ease, displaying how a guest repays the host for physical 
accommodation in social accommodation. In the novels discussed here, both Cecilia and Sophia 
require skill at reading others’ behavior and seeking to make those around them more 
comfortable. For example, Sophia first catches Sir Charles Stanley’s attention because of her 
skill at hospitality. The narrator places her social abilities in her “nature,” “a dignity which she 
derived from innate virtue, and exalted understanding” (62). Here, these qualities suggest the 
traits of an ideal guest: an “innate virtue” of passive accommodation and an “exalted 
understanding” of reason to control this accommodation. Indeed, Sophia consistently defers to 
the guest position and seeks to accommodate the needs of others. When she first meets Sir 
Charles, she and her sister are technically equal hosts; Sophia, however, attempts to divert 
attention from herself and let her sister shine as host. Yet in so doing, Sophia displays both her 
ability to control her own passions and her desire to fulfill others’ desires. This behavior, 
however, only makes Sophia more attractive and “displayed her whole power of charming” in 
her ability to converse (62-3). Sophia, by trying to accommodate her sister rather than their 
guest, displays her own ideal characteristics as a guest. Placing her sister in the host position, 
Sophia performs as an ideal guest who puts the host’s needs above any others. Sophia continues 
to perform as an ideal host and “inspire friendship” (163) throughout the novel. She wins over 
Mrs. Howard and the whole Lawson family and continues to act as the ideal guest in both 
households. Indeed, she is as accommodating to Mrs. Howard’s selfish demands as she is to the 
Lawsons’ “true politeness which is founded on good sense and good nature” (99). Sophia thus 
proves herself an ideal guest capable of disinterested intentions.   
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 Nancy Armstrong’s influential Desire and Domestic Fiction contends that the novel, and its female authors and 
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 Cecilia is also a benevolent guest and attempts to uphold the passive ideals of this 
position, though her situations certainly makes such behavior more difficult. Cecilia is 
introduced to the reader as a guest who strives to keep her own interests in check in order to 
better serve her hosts. Despite her grief over her uncle’s death, Cecilia seeks to act graciously to 
Mr. Harrel as he takes her into his protection and escorts her to his home. She represses her 
sorrow about leaving her old home and instead responds to Mr. Harrel’s desire to “dispel her 
melancholy”; putting aside her own distress, Cecilia “revived her spirits by plans of future 
happiness, dwelt upon the delight with which she should meet her young friend, and by 
accepting his consolation, amply rewarded his trouble” (7). Though Cecilia more clearly 
struggles to enact the ideal of distinterestedness than Sophia, she too seeks to “reward” her host 
by attending to his desire. Because his desire is to ease Cecilia’s grief, these two display a perfect 
exemplar of a hospitality exchange. Like Sophia, Cecilia responded passively to the host’s 
desires, neither starting nor pursuing the exchange but responding to the needs that arise in the 
situation. Thus, both women display the benevolent, disinterested nature prized in a guest.  
  As they seek to please their hosts, these guests must also protect themselves. Indeed, 
such protection is necessary as Sophia is threatened by Sir Charles and Cecilia by Mr. Harrel—
men they seek to accommodate as hosts in the texts. To combat the selfish intentions of these 
men and others in the novel, these guests use reason to detect bad intentions and evaluate the 
hospitality exchange.
111
 This reason thus helps preserve the women but also turns them from 
mere guests to both guests and moral observers.
112
 With these new duties, Cecilia and Sophia 
find themselves given more of the ethical responsibilities of the exchange. As guests, however, 
these protagonists find difficulty acting on their reasoned insights.  
Sophia’s reason is moderated by Mr. Herbert, her declared guardian. Herbert is not a 
guardian of Sophia’s property but of her “honour and reputation” (94). He acts as Sophia’s voice 
of reason and warns her to judge closely of Sir Charles’ motives and avoid “debasing the dignity 
of her sex and character” with too easy a trust (80). Herbert pushes Sophia to develop her own 
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 My discussion of reason here resembles Martha Brown’s definition of female reason as “prudence,” defining 
prudence as a particular use of reason to “order…passions” and protects oneself from fraud (32).  
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 Paula Backscheider notes that this detached perspective is one feminists have identified as part of the female 
perspective. Noting both American and French feminists, she finds that women are often encouraged to see 





sense of reason and praises her for its use. In one exemplary scene of this relationship, Herbert 
prompts Sophia to tell him “when was it that your heart, or rather your reason, gave you these 
secret admonitions you spoke of?” and then praises her answer that she “immediately” suspected 
Sir Charles of “some latent design [that] lay concealed under his specious offer” (87-88). Sophia 
here proclaims her ability to overcome her initial benevolent reaction of gratitude to Sir Charles 
for his generosity in order to reason through her need for preservation. Through this tutelage, 
Sophia is able to accurately interpret Sir Charles’s malevolent intentions and protect herself and 
her family from accepting his offers to take them in and make them his guests. In so doing, she 
protects herself from being the victim of Charles’s unmitigated lust and his designs to make her 
his mistress.
113
 Sophia’s need for a host, however, remains undiminished, and she ultimately 
changes one bad host for another as she moves away from Sir Charles and into the house of Mrs. 
Howard, one of the bad hosts discussed in the previous chapter.   
 Cecilia also asserts her own reason in an attempt to save herself from the malevolent 
intentions of her host, Mr. Harrel. Despite their happy start to hospitality, Mr. Harrel takes 
advantage of Cecilia’s fortune and seeks to ensnare her in a life of luxury. Though Cecilia is 
already Harrel’s guest and is unaware of the extent of his misuse of her fortune, she is able to see 
the flaws in his hosting and takes steps to preserve herself. She sees the flaws in luxuries that are 
“very shallow as sources of happiness” (163) and then seeks to take control of her own behavior, 
though a guest, and “arranged the occupation of her hours of solitude” to avoid as much of the 
luxury and the company of those who enjoyed it (55). Yet Cecilia finds such a resolution 
difficult to follow when living in the Harrel’s house and, after being disappointed in her ability to 
remove herself from such a life, determines to move in with another guardian. Cecilia’s attempts 
are only partially successful, however; she must remain a guest and Mr. Harrel’s house remains 
the place where she would be best protected. Less successful than Sophia in avoiding the self-
interest of her host, Cecilia does portray the guest’s need for reason. Though her reason helps her 
see her danger, Cecilia, as a guest, remains unable to act fully on her moral knowledge.  
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 Correctly judging Sir Charles’ motives is made more difficult by the irrational and passionate reactions of 
Sophia’s mother and sister. Patricia Spacks claims that Charlotte Lennox and other female authors of her age 
“convey more psychological complexity than they can afford to acknowledge.” Among these complexities are 
sibling rivalry and “the need to grow beyond parents” and “the freedom and pleasure as well as the superior 
importance of intelligence” (“Sisters” 150). Sophia, to use her reason, must contradict both sister and mother while 





 Cecilia’s relative lack of success, however, shows a downfall in the guest position and its 
passivity. By seeking to protect herself from the interested advances of others, the guest must 
herself be interested. Again and again, Cecilia must disappoint her own benevolence in order to 
protect herself. Her own interests ultimately must trump her benevolence. Her dissatisfaction 
with the Harrel household becomes coupled with her own attraction to Delvile. With her interests 
for preservation so coupled with her own amatory interests, Cecilia find that “neither exertion of 
the most active benevolence, nor the steady course of the most virtuous conduct, sufficed any 
longer to wholly engage her thought, or constitute her felicity; she had purposes that came nearer 
home, and cares that threatened to absorb in themselves that heart and those faculties which 
hitherto had only seemed animated for the service of others” (252). The demands of the passive 
position of guest also demand a rigor in maintaining control over oneself. The constant diligence, 
as well as its interruption, threatens to interrupt the easy flow of hospitality. The moral demands 
on the guest in this situation are complex. To remain passive requires a sense of benevolence 
easy for these moral characters to exhibit. However, when coupled with a need for protection or 
even one’s own desires, this passivity is difficult to maintain. The only way to avoid the pitfalls 
Cecilia encounters is to find a host who poses no threat and thus relieves the guest of her need to 
preserve herself. Such a host would need to share the ethical responsibilities that the guest has 
acquired; in other words, the necessary host would be another guest, equally benevolent and 
passive and, therefore, non-threatening to the creation of a disinterested relationship.  
 
Masculine Vulnerability 
The male protagonist’s ideal guest behavior is less straightforward. Men, because not 
kept passive by their gender, are often hosts in control of the hospitality exchange. David Simple 
and Matthew Bramble, the two male protagonists explored here, both serve as hosts on some 
level in the texts.
114
 David does not require the hospitality of others at all times and very often 
offers it; indeed, he does not begin the story as a guest in his brother’s house but as his equal. 
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 It is worth noting that the two male characters discussed here qualify as men of feeling. Barker notes two types of 
men of feeling. David Simple exhibits traits of the “naïve Man of Feeling” because “the goodness of his heart 
dramatically underlines the malevolence of those who abuse him, even though his own qualities make him more 
vulnerable to deception.” The “naïve Man of Feeling” is opposed to the “worldly Man of Feeling” whose is a more 
“idealized figure designed to be emulated and to expound traditional moral principles” (69-70). Matthew Bramble 





Matt Bramble runs a country estate and, before his travels, serves primarily as a host to his 
neighbors and dependents. On his journey, he often reverts to that position, taking old friends 
and strangers into his company. Though occasionally hosts, both men also take on the role of the 
ideal guest, expressing benevolent intentions and passively responding to the needs of others. 
Though often privileged with the authority of the host, these men consistently defer that 
authority and are uncomfortable with the host position. Rather, these men attempt to give up the 
host position and act as guests, taking on the traits of receptiveness and reciprocity.  
 David Simple, for example, finds it easier to follow his benevolent nature in the guest 
position.
115
 We are introduced to David through his relationship with his brother Daniel. Daniel 
acts solely on selfish desires, while David has only disinterested ones. David repeatedly hands 
over his ability to host—his money and his status as older brother—to Daniel. This impulse 
stems from benevolence: David “had no Ambition, nor any Delight in Grandeur. The only Use 
he had for Money, was to serve his Friends” (23). As a result of this desire to serve others, David 
repeatedly gives up his means to host. Though Daniel’s mistreatment shakes David’s belief in 
goodness, his own benevolence convinces him to continue to serve others; he reasons that “his 
own Mind was a Proof to him, that Generosity, Good-nature, and a Capacity for real Friendship, 
were to be found in the World” (41). David’s benevolent behavior is thus supported by his 
passive rejection of authority and his continued belief that he will find a worthy host.
116
 David 
thus takes up the guest position, traveling in search of a host—but a host who would be a version 
of himself. David thus begins to indicate what the new hospitality relationship would look like: 
two equal, passive guests attempting to accommodate the other without being driven by self-
interest.  
 Matthew Bramble also gives up his authority as a host but in a very different manner. 
Uncomfortable with the host position and his own benevolence, Bramble adopts a misanthropic 
persona. His nephew Jery reveals his character as he starts to understand his uncle’s 
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 Liz Bellamy also comments on David’s passive behaviors and claims that he is a “feminized hero” designed for a 
female audience which was “debarred from the field of public action but which was also seen as being under threat 
from the general dominance of materialistic and acquisitive values emanating from the commercial system” (132). 
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remains “ingenuous, benevolent, ready to be shocked anew by each instance of cruelty or injustice” (77). His static 







 He comes to believe that his uncle’s “peevishness arises partly from bodily pain, 
and partly from a natural excess of mental sensibility” (15-16). Jery suspects that Bramble feels 
too much of others’ pain and puts up a defense of irritability. At the same time, it seems that if 
Bramble is not focused on the needs of others, he is unhappy. Jery finds that his uncle “betrays 
no markes of disquiet” when he is in the company of others, and only “when his sprits are not 
exerted externally, they seem to recoil to prey upon himself” (46). Bramble thus requires a 
somewhat passive stance—responding to the needs of others—in order to meet his ideals of 
benevolence. He finds himself most happy when in the position of the guest responding to the 
host rather than the host who is required to serve another. This discomfort is perhaps best 
illustrated in Bramble’s awkward offer of charity to a widow in Bath; though certainly 
comfortable with the benevolent intentions, he cannot handle the widow’s gratitude, pacing the 
room when she faints and cursing at her to stay quiet when she expresses gratitude. Bramble 
wishes to give the gift but not to receive the gratitude the host deserves. Instead, he is much more 
comfortable secretly and passively helping those around him.  
The male protagonists face similar challenges maintaining the passive position and 
balancing their needs with their benevolence. Matthew Bramble, for example, must relinquish 
his benevolent intentions in order to protect himself. His protection, however, is not the reasoned 
work of Cecilia and thus does not have a specific host’s intentions to deflect. Instead, Bramble 
turns his misanthropy towards all. Jery again notes this behavior and explains that Bramble 
“affects misanthropy, in order to conceal the sensibility of a heart, which is tender, even to a 
degree of weakness. This delicacy of feeling or soreness of mind, makes him timorous and 
fearful; but then he is afraid of nothing so much as dishonor; and although he is exceedingly 
cautious of giving offence, he will fire at the least hint of insolence or ill-breeding” (26-27). 
Bramble here sets up two defenses: he creates a prickly exterior to save him from his sensitivity 
to others’ pain and he fights for honor as his own interest. Neither of these defenses are the 
product of reason, but each makes the exchange of hospitality more difficult. Indeed, Bramble’s 
defense creates a problem similar to Cecilia’s liminal position between action and passivity, 
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omniscience” in the epistolary novel who does not act but observes his uncle’s journey (54). In this novel, the 





interest and disinterest. Evan Gottlieb describes this problem as one of “physical and social 
distance” that disrupts Bramble’s ability to act on his benevolent intentions (93). Bramble needs 
protection from the demands he feels as a potential host; he finds some relief in the guest 
position but must now learn how to limit his response and benevolent impulses to his host in 
order to preserve himself and regain some ability to act on benevolence.  
 David Simple, on the other hand, refuses to protect himself or use reason to judge others; 
he strives to maintain the ideal of benevolence and so remains vulnerable to the interested plots 
of others. His solution, while virtuous, fails to preserve his own well-being and leaves him open 
to harm. David begins life protected by his brother Daniel, who perceives the interested motives 
of others because of his own selfish intentions. Indeed, Daniel’s own suspicions, as Gordon 
points out, are predicated on his own immorality. David, in contrast, is unable to see the signs of 
an interested act, having “never had any ill Designs on others, [had] never thought of their 
having any upon him” (8). Despite his efforts to gain experience and knowledge to judge the 
others’ interests himself, David never does learn to reason through this experience to protect 
himself. Instead, he argues against reason and associates it with self-interest. David agrees with a 
companion that “what is generally called Sense, has very little to do with what a Man thinks; 
where Self is at all concerned, Inclination steps in, and will not give the Judgement fair play, but 
forces it to wrest and torture the Meaning of every thing to its own purposes” (67). Reason is a 
source of self-preservation and, as such, cannot be entirely disconnected from self-interest; for 
David, this necessary connection makes reason immoral. David’s only hope for preservation, 
then, is to meet with a host who will treat him benevolently, understand his moral code, and 
replicate his behavior.  
 
Husbands as Hosts 
The positive portrayals of hospitality in these eighteenth-century novels are those exhibited 
between two guest characters. These portrayals involve an exchange with a character who shares, 
or comes to share, the protagonist’s perspective on benevolence and who also embraces the 
passive position. These two participants, then, create an exchange of hospitality that exemplifies 
the ideal of disinterested return. To reach this ideal, however, each actor must overcome his or 





many ways, this hospitable exchange resembles those with more active hosts, involving welcome 
and the sharing of food and resources. In many others, however, this exchange is more 
personalized and emphasizes conversation. Moreover, this exchange is limited by the guests’ 
status; these guests remain vulnerable because neither can protect against the influences of the 
outside world. Likewise, this positive hospitality exchange is unstable, as neither guest can offer 
a consistent place to enact the exchange. These weaknesses result in the hospitable relationship 
morphing into familial ones through marriage. In each of the novels discussed here, a guest 
becomes a husband—a position with authority to offer protection and with stability as the guests 
can build a home.
118
  
 In Lennox’s Sophia, this ideal exchange is ultimately enacted between Sir Charles and 
Sophia. Despite Charles’ early identification as a bad host, he is inspired to reform by Sophia’s 
example. Sir Charles must overcome his lust for Sophia and the self-interested intention to make 
her his mistress in order to become an ideal guest himself. To do so, he must abandon his 
previous efforts at hosting, which designed to hold Sophia captive. Indeed, Sir Charles original 
motives were to seduce Sophia’s sister, Harriot; attracted to Sophia’s virtues, he later turns his 
attentions to Sophia whom he hopes to convince to be his mistress. He uses a host position, 
introducing his intentions by showering gifts on the sisters and their mother and hoping that their 
gratitude will lead to sexual reciprocation. He particularly targets Mrs. Darnley, Sophia’s mother, 
for his gifts in the hope of hiding the real intentions behind his generosity. His indirection 
garners the admiration of Sophia, who “construed all this munificence into proofs of the sincerity 
of his affections for her” (82). His gifts escalate until he offers the family a house and thus 
extends his gift-giving to becoming a literal host. Kept in check by his technical status as a guest 
in the Darnley’s apartment, Sir Charles would gain more control over the family by having them 
stay in a house he owns. The magnitude of this gift gives Sophia pause, and she complains that 
“her notions of this manner [were] confused and uncertain” (87). Sophia then reasons through Sir 
Charles’ offer with the help of her mentor, Mr. Herbert; the two suspect Sir Charles’s motives 
and find a means to remove Sophia from his presence and turn down his gift. Sir Charles, 
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surprised and humiliated at his rebuff, spends the rest of the novel striving to rule his passions 
and reach a passive position himself. The very desire that led Charles to act as a bad host—his 
desire for Sophia—ultimately inspires him to reform; this reform includes denying this passion 
and seeking to act disinterestedly.  
 Sir Charles does eventually achieve some success overcoming his passions and acting on 
disinterested motives. He gives without expecting a return: he shows Mr. Herbert a will he drew 
up without Sophia’s knowledge that left much of his property to her. Indeed, Lennox reveals Sir 
Charles’ continued reformation and shows how Sophia’s benevolence inspires his own, while at 
the same time revealing the limits and difficulties of setting aside self-interest. In one scene, Sir 
Charles meets a woman who has received charity from Sophia and follows Sophia’s example, 
giving the woman two guineas. His motivations, though certainly more charitable than earlier in 
the narrative, were not entirely disinterested but derived from the “gratitude she expressed for 
her young benefactress” (190). Sir Charles aids this woman in her distress, but he is still thinking 
of his love for Sophia and not the woman’s need. Sir Charles is forced to confront this interested 
motivation when he believes Sophia is in love with the young farmer, William. Thinking Sophia 
only requires money to allow a marriage with William to go forward, Sir Charles resolves a 
“generous design of removing this obstacle to her union with the person whom she preferred to 
him, and, by making her happy, entitle himself to her esteem, since he had unfortunately lost her 
heart” (186). The narrator makes clear, however, that Sir Charles, “applaud[s] himself for the 
uncommon disinterestedness of his conduct” too soon; rather, “Sir Charles either did not or 
would not perceive the latent hope that lurked within his bosom, and which, perhaps, suggested 
the designs he had formed” to inspire Sophia to love him (187). Though still interested in Sophia, 
his motives are much less selfish than before and reveal a potential to act in response to others’ 
needs; thinking first of Sophia’s desires, Sir Charles begins to take on a passive position.  
 The novel concludes when Sir Charles again offers his home to Sophia, but now in the 
position of his wife rather than mistress, a position of more equality for Sophia. In pursuing this 
more equal relationship, Sir Charles takes on more passive qualities. Now vulnerable, he now 
worries that Sophia might be acting for selfish interests in accepting his hand: “he was afraid, 
that dazzled with the splendor of his fortune, she would sacrifice her inclination to her interest, 





should be deceived by her own generosity and nice sense of obligation, and imagine it was the 
lover she preferred, when the benefactor only touched her heart” (150). Sir Charles, now more 
passive, worries about protecting himself in that new position; at the same time, he remains true 
to his new intentions that require reading Sophia’s intentions. Because their passivity and desire 
to please one another is now equal, Sophia and Sir Charles create a new hospitable relationship. 
The two are married, creating a union wherein both are protected from their anxieties; Sir 
Charles is now assured of Sophia’s intentions, and Sophia is no longer vulnerable to Sir Charles’ 
lust. This more stable relationship is idealized as a supposed continuation of positive hospitality. 
Yet to allow this relationship to survive, Sir Charles is no longer a host or a guest but a husband 
working to build a version of marriage of two partners in similar passive positions.  
 Burney’s Cecilia also ends in an ideal marriage between two equal, passive partners. 
Mortimer, the only son of the Delviles, is introduced in the story as a hospitable host, able to 
protect Cecilia from unwanted advances at a masquerade. Dressed as a white domino, Mortimer 
rescues Cecilia from a “confinement” wherein her “mind seemed almost as little at liberty as my 
person” (112). Unlike her literal hosts, the Harrels, Mortimer offers Cecilia freedom from the 
interests of others, repeatedly offering her a means of protection from her many unwanted 
suitors. Mortimer appears himself so capable of protection because he acts the part of the guest. 
He lacks self-interest and exhibits passive receptivity to Cecilia’s needs.
119
 His motives are not 
entirely disinterested, however: Mortimer later reveals that his hospitality towards Cecilia is 
motivated by his admiration for her, coupled with his belief that she was engaged to Sir Robert 
Floyer. Mortimer is able to act receptively to Cecilia when he was “bound in honour to forbear 
all efforts at supplanting a man, to whom I though you almost united, I considered you already as 
married, and eagerly as I sought your society, I sought it not with more pleasure than innocence” 
(511). Imagining he cannot act on those self-interested motives, he is able to remain passive. 
Mortimer’s innocent intentions to serve Cecilia as she becomes the wife of another are disrupted 
only when his passions are given a vent by learning that Cecilia is not engaged. When faced with 
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to his parents (136). Unable to make decisions for himself or escape the care of his parents, Mortimer is certainly an 
odd choice for a masculine hero; however, his compromised position also makes him a guest, able to join Cecilia in 





the strength of his self-interest, Mortimer’s only recourse is bursts of passion followed by distant, 
cold behavior; so focused on keeping his passions in check, Mortimer is no longer hospitable.  
 Two interests thus disrupt this ideal exchange of disinterested benevolence. Mortimer’s 
love for Cecilia disrupts the passive exchange as does Cecilia’s attraction to Mortimer. Indeed, 
both parties’ love for the other creates strong passions that each party attempts to overcome; 
disinterest, however, becomes more difficult. An additional, and perhaps more complex, interest 
threatens their ideal exchange. Mortimer’s family pride also threatens to halt the turn towards 
familial connection similar to the turn taken in Sophia. Instead, Mortimer’s refusal to relinquish 
his family name and adhere to his parents’ wishes makes impossible any love relationship that 
could continue the exchange of hospitable intentions. Mortimer’s hospitality is only restored 
after he has set aside the latter passion and made himself a passive party, willing to take Cecilia’s 
name. Then his behavior once again becomes focused on serving Cecilia; both lovers, however, 
find that their desire to aid one another is necessarily in conflict with their desire to be guest 
figures to the elder Mr. and Mrs. Delvile. Cecilia, as guest to Mrs. Delvile, struggles to set aside 
her responsibility to such a skilled hostess; Mortimer, as their son, struggles to set aside his filial 
duties. Thus, Burney creates a scenario in which a perfect exchange of hospitality is impossible; 
unable to be passive to multiple hosts, and struggling to overcome self-interested passions, 
Mortimer and Cecilia’s own exchange is repeatedly thwarted, a conflict which will be discussed 
in chapter four. Ultimately, however, this couple is also united in marriage.  
 David Simple’s relationship with Valentine and Camilla, siblings he saves from 
destitution, creates a hospitality exchange that also ends in matrimony. In this relationship, 
however, there is no interest to be overcome, only a shared benevolence to be discovered. This 
relationship begins with David’s act of charity; David rescues Camilla and a sick Valentine from 
hunger and homelessness and receives the intense gratitude of Camilla for doing so (117). Taken 
into David’s home and nursed to health, the brother and sister have difficulty believing David’s 
benevolence and must overcome their own pride in order to accept his aid: originally from a 
place of privilege, the siblings are “ashamed to be such a Burthen to [David]” (120). David does 
not see the pair as a burden but instead hopes he has found fellow guests with a similar passivity 
and benevolence to himself. The narrator confirms Valentine and Camilla’s own benevolence, 





in their Love to each other, as would have made any one less credulous than Mr. Simple have a 
good Opinion of them; and they had both such a Strength of Understanding, as made them the 
most delightful Companions in the World” (120). The siblings thus possess the proper good will 
and the necessary reason to control their passions and so are portrayed as ideal guests. Their 
demeanor leads to good hospitality when coupled with David’s equal disinterestedness. Indeed, 
the only interest David is able to pursue in this relationship is his interest in helping others; he 
feels “Raptures” when he thinks “that he was the Cause” for Camilla’s happiness (155). Though 
in David’s home, his approach to hosting the siblings and their reaction to it allows for an equal 
exchange of hospitality as a passive interaction.  
 If anything disrupts this exchange and eventual matrimonial union, it is the disinterested 
passivity of both Camilla and David as they restrain their passions for one another. David is 
reluctant to mention his attraction for fear that Camilla and her brother would think he expected 
“a Compliance from them both, on account of the Obligations they owed him” (254). Camilla, on 
the other hand, fulfills expectations that a woman would not pursue a man and remains quietly 
worrying about David’s intentions. Their mutual passivity threatens to stall the relationship until 
Camilla and Valentine’s father arrives; a figure of authority, their father is able to easily settle 
two marriages among the friends, uniting Camilla and David as well as Cynthia and Valentine. 
The two couples proceed to create a perfectly mutual society. They fulfill the ideal and “exert 
their own Faculties for the common Good, neither envying those who in any respect have a 
Superiority over them, nor despising such as they think their Inferiors” and so live in “Harmony” 
(281). As Mika Suzuki describes it, this “society” creates “a world of perfect communication and 
familiarity where every moral value is shared. They do not feel the need to confess their 
emotions as they can correctly anticipate the others’ reactions. They only exchange ideas about 
the world seen from the spectator’s viewpoint, so as to confirm their moral ideas and beliefs” 
(211). These marriages, then, confirm the benevolence of hospitality and seal the relationships 
between them all.
120
 Moreover, they make the hospitality exchange permanent and, as the two 
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couples form a community together, seek to offer protection to its members from the outside 
world.  
 In a different format, Humphry Clinker presents a positive portrayal of hospitality that 
does not result in marriage for the protagonist but does for his immediate family. Matthew 
Bramble’s relationship with the Scottish ex-soldier Lismahago ends in a marriage between the 
Scotsman and Bramble’s sister Tabitha. The two men’s first exchange requires Bramble to 
readjust his hospitality; used to providing charity to those in need, Bramble attempts the same for 
Lismahago who appears to be in want. Lismahago, however, takes offense to this treatment and 
insists that he is not a dependent but an equal.
121
 He insists, “I am a gentleman; and entered the 
service as other gentlemen do, with such hopes and sentiments as honourable ambition 
inspires—If I have not been lucky in the lottery of life, so neither do I think myself unfortunate” 
(178). Declaring himself capable of taking care of his needs, Lismahago demands that Bramble 
not see him with sympathy and therefore not from a superior position. Bramble accepts this 
demand and the two men proceed to interact as equals in a balanced hospitable exchange. Jery 
observes that the two literally balance one another’s moods and passions, creating a passive 
exchange: in their conversation, “sometimes they were warmed into such altercation as seemed 
to threaten an abrupt dissolution of their society; but Mr. Bramble set guard over his own 
irascibility, the more vigilantly as the officer was his guest; and when, in spite of all his efforts, 
he began to wax warm, the other prudently cooled in the same proportion” (179). Though this 
exchange certainly differs from the previous examples of disinterested, passive exchange, these 
two men’s example does display ideal hospitality. As equals in the exchange, both men look to 
the needs of others; because they care about the other’s desires, their own passions are put in 




                                                 
121
 Charlotte Sussman argues that Lismahago is a symbol of an expanding world and a new sense of identity. This 
identity, however, is based on “adoptability” and “mobility” and exposes a greater need for hospitality in a world 
where “communities are no longer able to anchor” society and culture is less stable (604).  
122
 Evan Gottlieb considers this new relationship to be based on Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy. Contrasting 
this sympathy as more interested in self-preservation and requiring more “concerted efforts from the people 
involved” (98) than the earlier Humean model, Gottlieb finds that Lismahago  pushes to be “an active agent rather 
than merely…the passive object of another’s sympathies.” As such Lismahago “effectively alters the terms upon 
which sympathy can be utilized as a mode of social unification” (100). This more active position makes Lismahago 





 Marriage also stabilizes and lengthens this exchange. Bramble and Lismahago’s ideal 
relationship initially appears to be transitory; Lismahago joins the family on their journey briefly 
and then parts ways. However, when Lismahago again happens to become a member of their 
traveling party, he and Bramble’s sister, Tabitha, decide to marry. The strange and comical 
marriage of these two “originals” certainly adds to the humor of the story and contrasts the more 
conventional, youthful marriage of Lydia, Bramble’s niece, and Dennison, the son of the 
narrative’s most praised host. Lismahago and Tabitha’s wedding also serves to continue the 
hospitality exchange between Lismahago and Bramble. Lismahago joins the family back on their 
Welsh estate, thus adding a guest to the family rather than taking his bride away. This marriage, 
even if less ideal then the unions of the younger couples traditionally joined in narratives, still 
serves the same purpose of prolonging hospitality.
123
 Husbands, in these novels, are presented as 
the means to create and extend positive hospitality exchanges.  
 
 Positive representations of hospitality in eighteenth-century novels are thus stabilized into 
filial relationships as one member of the exchange becomes a husband. The hospitable 
disposition of disinterested passivity that helped form these filial relationships remains 
important. Indeed, the transfer of the hospitable relationship to one of family relation is not a 
simple shift to kinship bonds as a better or more ethical relation. Rather, hospitality remains an 
integral foundation to these relationships; as hospitality is based on intentional ethics, so too are 
these family connections determined by a shared sense of virtue and reciprocity. These ties are 
thus made according to choice and not to traditional family definitions. Yet, in changing its 
dynamics, hospitality between guests raises questions about the continued viability of hospitality 
as an ethical relationship between strangers. As the next chapter will discuss, the eighteenth-
century novel suggests that hospitality may not be able to escape the vulnerability and instability 
that marriage promises to eradicate.
124
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 Gottlieb argues that the new filial connection replaces not just a benevolent exchange of hospitality but also 
sympathetic national unity between Bramble’s Wales and Lismahago’s Scotland (105).  
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 Mireille Rosello argues that friction and discomfort are necessary to good hospitality and “might signify that 
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fear, and their willingness to live with that fear, and with their malaise” (176). In other words, if hospitality depends 









 Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia ends conventionally with the marriage of Sophia to Sir 
Charles, her social superior and now her moral equal. The ideal union of this hospitable pair is 
troubled only by Sophia’s continued relation to her self-interested sister. Clearly lacking the 
disinterested disposition necessary for hospitality, Harriot is banished not only from the Sophia’s 
household but also from the country. Sir Charles and Sophia offer a dowry of two thousand 
pounds to help Harriot, now a cast-off mistress, find a husband. This fortune encourages the 
courtship of an army captain and the two are soon wed. In a selfishly motivated action, Sir 
Charles “procured [Harriot’s] husband a better commission; but designedly in one of the 
colonies, whither he insisted upon his wife’s accompanying him” (198). Separated from “the 
delights of London” and thus any chance for fulfilling her greed (198), Harriot is thoroughly 
punished in this new life for her former behavior. Her banishment, however, helps preserve the 
happy union of Sophia and Charles; once her sister has been removed from the country, Sophia 
is no longer disturbed by Harriot’s “ill-conduct” and is capable of embracing her new life and 
“tast[ing] the good fortune which heaven had bestowed on her” now that “these domestic storms 
[had] blown over” (199). Sophia’s happy marriage is thus dependent on Harriot’s exclusion from 
Sophia’s circle of acquaintance.  
This exclusion, however, is not presented as a flaw in hospitality or as a problem in the 
new filial relationship. Rather, distance from Harriot is necessary to preserve the filial union and 
to allow for the disinterested intentions on which Sophia’s and Sir Charles’ union relies. Before 
the marriage, the greed and self-interest of Sophia’s family had consistently threatened any 
hospitality exchange. In fact, Sir Charles claims that the selfish intentions of Sophia’s mother 
and sister had directly led to his own inappropriate desires for Sophia; we learn from the narrator 
that Sir Charles “had always loved [Sophia] with the most ardent passion, and had not the light 
character of her mother and sister concurred with those prejudices of his youth, his fortune, and 





(149). Seeking to protect their ideal union, Sophia and Sir Charles must exclude Sophia’s sister 
and the lifestyle of immorality and luxury she represents. Such a limitation on their welcome 
contradicts the ideals of hospitality, which call for openness, benevolence, and passivity. Yet, to 
protect these very traits, they must be violated. Herein lays the central paradox of hospitality: its 
ability to be enacted depends on a violation of its ideal principles.  
This chapter will argue that the paradox found in Sophia’s conclusion is evident in many 
other eighteenth-century novels’ resolutions. These novels encounter the paradox in the 
descriptions of hospitable practice that ultimately must be resolved on one side of the paradox. 
Comedies, such as Sophia, praise the ideal characteristics of benevolence and disinterest; 
however, these novels tend to embrace the limits that allow for a happy union to be continued. 
Willing to overlook the moral inconsistencies of such a position, these novels, here represented 
by Humphry Clinker, suggest that the preservation of positive hospitality is worth the restrictions 
placed on welcome. Tragedies emphasize the opposite side of the paradox, suggesting the 
impossibility of the ideal of hospitality to be enacted in practice. Detailing how worldly forces 
cannot be controlled or easily limited, these texts, including the tragic sequel to David Simple, 
argue that pure hospitality cannot be practiced in such a flawed world. The chapter will end by 
examining Burney’s illustrations of the hospitality paradox in Cecilia. Though the novel ends in 
a marriage between virtuous characters, the limitations necessary for such a happy union are not 
enforced; rather, elements of tragic perspectives pervade the text, mitigating the happy ending 
but emphasizing a more realistic practice. Ultimately, none of these texts are able to yoke ideal 
and practice together; rather, they indicate the fragile and unstable nature of hospitality and the 
relationships it creates.  
 
Limitations at the Threshold 
 All of these novels acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling the hospitable ideal with the 
practice of hospitality. While the ideal calls for openness and unlimited benevolence, practice 
requires boundaries and rules. Even when problems of perception and association discussed in 
chapters one and two are overcome in positive exchanges of hospitality, new problems of 







 As the previous chapter discussed, the guest works to exclude 
hosts and create a community of like-minded guests as a means of self-preservation. In doing so, 
these guest communities risk retiring from the hospitality exchange all together as they seek to 
separate themselves from selfish hosts. In the case of Sophia, for example, Sir Charles and 
Sophia have matched their benevolent intentions to their actions towards one another; yet, to 
preserve this balanced state, they must stop opening their home to all others. Their hospitable 
relationship thus leaves less room for new connections and in many ways separates the couple 
from any larger exchange of hospitality. Like Sophia, other eighteenth-century novels sought to 
determine how best to limit hospitality. This question is particularly difficult for literary texts 
because of their emphasis on the guest position. The balance between limits and openness, then, 
is particularly fraught in these novels and, in many cases, not completely resolved.  
 The practice of limiting hospitality was not new in the eighteenth-century. Limitations 
had long been an accepted part of earlier systems of hospitality. Felicity Heal relates how early 
modern hospitality was primarily limited to family members and only occasionally opened to 
others who were often of the same socio-economic class.
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 In each case, these exchanges, like 
the positive hospitality in the eighteenth-century novel, are limited according to similarities 
shared between the host and the guest. However, earlier forms of limitation looked primarily to 
outward markers of family and class while hospitality based on intentional ethics seeks to limit 
according to internal attributes of virtue. These older versions of limitation were thus easier to 
reconcile into an ethical code, often drawn from Saint Ambrose’s theories proposed in the fourth 
century. He outlined an ethics of hospitality based on a “series of concentric circles, the 
innermost one consisting of the household, since a man’s first duty was to his family, and then 
extending outwards to comprehend spiritual and other kin, neighbours, friends, and finally 
strangers and enemies” (Heal 19). This system, which privileged family, was used as a guide for 
conduct throughout the medieval and early modern eras and worked to reconcile an ideal with a 
practice. The ideal was to include more and more “circles” into the hospitality exchange but also 
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type of violence and thus at odds with hospitality ethics: “No hospitality in the classic sense, without sovereignty of 
oneself over one’s home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by 
filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence” (55). 
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condoned limiting welcome to those guests most similar to the host. In the eighteenth century, 
the growing importance of intentions complicated this practice. Though these novels still draw 
their circles around family members, families are now defined not by blood but by dispositions 
as like-minded couples are united in matrimony. Sophia literalized this shift; Sophia’s new 
relationship with Charles based on shared dispositions allows her to sever old ties with her blood 
relations. Her sister, in the new hospitality system, receives less welcome than a like-minded, 
chosen guest, especially those like Charles who are still marked as family. A new model of 
concentric circles based on intentions and dispositions is developed, and novels attempt to adapt 
these new markers of similarity into an old model of hospitable practice.  
 Philosophy attempted to reconcile old methods of limitation with new intentional criteria 
to better conceive hospitable ideals into practice. Many such theories allow for a “natural” 
impulse which limits openness while simultaneously encouraging a broader benevolence. These 
works uphold the ideal of intentional ethics and the importance of disposition and openness but 
also includes a family first model as an aside. For example, Richard Cumberland first proposes a 
“Benevolence…towards all” but then adds that “a more particular Regard and Kindness toward 
chosen Friends” is to be expected and encouraged (311). Adapting a theory of limitations, 
Cumberland here replaces the family with a group of chosen friends. While he acknowledges a 
need to limit hospitality, he does so according to choice rather than blood. Though vague in how 
he would construct such limitations, Cumberland suggests that they do have a place in the 
practice of hospitality. Francis Hutcheson creates a more complex pattern of limitation in his 
version of intentional ethics. He allows that hospitality and benevolence is first extended to those 
most like us before being offered more universally. He notes that some limitation is good 
because it keeps us from being “distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues 
would equally recommend them to our regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to 
the Multitudes at vast distances”; and to combat this problem “Nature has more powerfully 
determined us to admire, and love the morally Qualitys of others which affect our selves, and has 
given us more powerful Impressions of Goodwill toward those who are beneficent to our selves” 
(148-9). For Hutcheson, hospitality is an open benevolence to others but, to remain possible in 
the world, must be limited to those individuals more closely connected to the host. He believes 





therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of 
Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of external interest” (186). Hutcheson 
acknowledges that an entirely open benevolence would exhaust hosts and guests. Limited 
hospitality here helps encourage good intentions to practice or to inspire intention to “Motives to 
Industry.” In this case, these motives can be used to develop hospitality among smaller, limited 
groups of people and then developed to inspire more extensive hospitality.
127
 What these 
acknowledgements of limitation begin to show is both a need for limits and a more flexible idea 
of how limitations might be applied.  
 Flexibility in these limiting factors creates new problems for the practice of hospitality. It 
is useful to think of these problems as problems at the threshold of hospitality or problems that 
plague hospitality as it attempts to move from ideal to practice or from intention to action. The 
threshold is he place of initiation but also of limitation and marks the moment of decision 
between opening the door and closing it. The threshold also symbolically stands for the moment 
when identities, and thus responsibilities, of host and guest are accepted. Using Saint Ambrose’s 
theory of concentric circles helped to define more clearly the liminal space of the threshold; 
helping to determine whom to open the door to, this system made identities and obligations more 
clear cut. In the new intentional system, the threshold is harder to navigate. First, judgments to 
determine similar disposition take time and perception; as discussed earlier, such judgment 
struggles to determine the proper connections between the actions seen and the intentions 
motivating them. Second, the guest has more difficulty regulating the threshold than the host; the 
host has the power to open or close the door, while the guest can only make his case for being 
allowed entrance. In many ways, the guest position that the novel uses places the protagonists on 
the wrong side of the door to be able to implement any sort of limitation. Third, as these guests 
found a means to limit by seeking hospitality from other guests, their ability to maintain their 
obligations and to remain disinterested and passive become more difficult.
128
 In putting up these 
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 Hume does not modify St. Ambrose’s limitations as much as his peers. He argues that “whoever is united to us 
by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportion’d to the connexion, without enquiring into his 
other qualities. Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to 
their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens” (qtd. in Gottlieb 352).  For Hume, 
blood relation trumps that of disposition.  
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 Though their studies take very different approaches to the eighteenth-century novel, both Spacks and Gordon 





barriers, these guests work counter to the responsibilities of the guest. These factors suggest that 
reconciling the paradox of hospitality is impossible. Jacques Derrida inherits this paradox in his 
modern theories and also looks to the threshold as the place for limitations. He finds in 
hospitality an “axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction…from the outset, hospitality limits 
itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of itself, it governs the threshold—
and hence it forbids in some way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold to pass 
across it” (Hostipitality 14). This hesitation—the unfulfilled possibility of hospitality—marks the 
ends of these novels. Surrounded by others capable of ideal hospitality as these novels have 
defined it, the narratives stop short of calling it hospitality, instead transforming these 
relationships into filial ones that threaten hospitality in their imposition of limits. In these novels’ 
conclusions, the authors show some hesitation in their ability to define hospitality—as though 




Humphry Clinker and the Development of Limits 
 Different literary genres approach limitations and their resulting ethical quandaries 
according to their specific conventions. Comedic ending underscore the return to stability found 
in new hospitable unions; in doing so, comedies tend to praise limitations and the happy unions 
they preserve. Generally terminating in nuptial scenes, examples of this genre rarely 
acknowledge the ethical paradoxes found in these limitations or explore how positive hospitality 
can continue following the marriage. The lack of ethical consistency in comedic endings is 
particularly noteworthy in the eighteenth century when many of these texts claim a didactic 
purpose. John Mullan finds these inconsistencies frustrating in novels of sensibility, which are 
particularly concerned with depicting characters’ benevolent intentions. Mullan argues that the 
“benevolence depicted in novels of sentiment fails to live up to this model of a ‘universal’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
self-interest” helped structure modern conceptions of social interaction, while “the discourse of disinterestedness” 
offered “a more palatable self-image” that encouraged social progress (Passive 10). Similarly, Spacks contends that 
philosophies of the day suggested “all virtue and happiness depend on selflessness” while acknowledging that “only 
the self can experience happiness.” This apparent contradiction, Spacks claims, helped structure the novel’s ethical 
conflicts (“Sisters” 126).    
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 Derrida then goes on to discuss the impossible—what can come “despite of” the threshold. A despite I don’t see 
in the eighteenth century novels. Derrida sees hospitality “only tak[ing] place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it 
come, overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is…In this sense, hospitality is 





capacity, to a general bond” because this benevolence fails to inspire reform in the system and is 
often characterized as “anomalous” and “fleeting” (144-45). He claims that the ethical standards 
presented in many eighteenth-century novels are not durable and are too limiting of the recipients 
of hospitality to inspire anything but superficial change; the acts, he complains, are far too 
personal to promote larger political change. In limiting the recipients of hospitality to those with 
similar dispositions, the ethical exchange of hospitality is removed from the larger world. The 
happy marriages signal the reward for virtuous characters but also the end to the hospitality 
search. To preserve their hospitable relationships, these benevolent guests abandon larger 
attempts to find and promote hospitality in the world. The comedic ending of Humphry Clinker 
reveals the abandonment of the hospitality journey and the embrace of regulation. Because it 
follows a less conventional protagonist and ending than its more romantic counterparts, 
including Sophia, Humphry Clinker exposes more fully hospitality’s need for limitations as well 
as the narrative’s abandonment of larger social reform.   
 Matthew Bramble is no damsel in distress but rather an older man in questionable health 
seeking relief for his physical ailments. His journey, rather than one that continually opens to 
new hospitality relationships, gradually limits Bramble’s interactions with society to help 
manage his physical ailments and social distress. Hospitality is still highly valuable to Bramble 
and offers some relief to his mind and body. For example, Bramble finds some relief when 
among his old naval friends, who also suffer health problems; they find that good company and 
hospitality “seemed to triumph over the wreck of their constitutions” that trouble them when in 
private (52). The opposite is true of the larger crowds found in Bath; Bramble’s nephew observes 
that his uncle finds “the general mixture of all degrees assembled in our public rooms…[to be] a 
monstrous jumble of heterogeneous principles; a vile mob of noise and impertinence, without 
decency or subordination” (45-6). For his own comfort, then, Bramble requires limiting 
invitation and interaction.
130
 As the novel progresses, Bramble defines these limitations 
according to internal dispositions rather than external markers. He writes to his friend, Dr. Lewis, 
that he is willing to “put up with many inconveniences for the sake of agreeable society” but then 
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number of ‘connexions’ to which his mind and body most respond” (127). Rather than remain open to large groups 





qualifies that he is only willing to do so for society of a certain disposition; he wishes to exclude 
many of those he has met in Bath and London because they are “too much engrossed by schemes 
of interest or ambition, to have any room left for sentiment or friendship” (116). Such a 
statement suggests that it is not the “mixing of all degrees” that causes Bramble’s health fits but 
the mixing, indeed prevalence, of self-interested individuals into his society of disinterested 
friends.  
 These limitations by disposition, however, generally take the form of more classical 
limitations. Like Saint Ambrose’s model, Bramble generally limits according to family and then 
social class. Indeed, Charlotte Sussman argues that these worthy and unworthy dispositions are 
defined according to conservative definitions of class. Sussman claims that what threatens 
Bramble’s constitution are “innovative forms of consumption” displayed by those who selfishly 
and ostentatiously display their wealth and are represented as members of a rising middle class. 
Sussman connects luxury to a very classist disposition to keep out “socio-economic disruptions,” 
and argues that Bramble’s rejection of these forces calls for a reestablishment of an old order 
wherein family relationships were part of the social hierarchy (610). However, such limitations 
also work to keep out those with different dispositions. Because a proper hospitable disposition 
rejects economic notions of relationship, these limitations are often along such class lines.
131
 
Though certainly using older lines of limitation, Smollett adapts these older, accepted versions of 
exclusion to promote limitations based on a newer, internalized criterion. Bramble’s class 
exclusions, like the marriages of Lydia to Dennison and Lismahago to Tabitha, circumscribe a 
new circle based on disposition in the old form of family relationship. Smollett, unsure how to 
define the limitations this new group of hospitable friends will require, returns to an old formula 
that allowed for exclusions of those less similar.  
 The novel culminates in an example of stable limitations. George Dennison, an 
industrious farmer in northern England, serves as an example to Bramble and his family. 
Following Bramble’s near drowning and its associated traveling impediments, Dennison extends 
an invitation to the entire ensemble to join his family at their farm rather than stay at a local inn. 
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Following all etiquette of good hosting, Dennison takes in the entire entourage, at whose house 
Bramble finds a picture of hospitality: Bramble writes that, upon arrival, “the tea ready prepared 
by his lady, an amiable matron, who received us with all the benevolence of hospitality—The 
house is old fashioned and irregular, but lodgeable and commodious” (293). The secret to 
Dennison’s hospitality, Bramble learns, is frugality and limiting guests. Though Dennison’s 
house is open to distressed strangers (of a certain sort), it is not open to many of his neighbors. 
He tells his guests that  
when a gay equipage came to my gates, I was never at home; those who visited me in a 
modest way, I received; and according to the remarks I made on their characters and 
conversation, either rejected their advances, or returned their civility.—I was in general 
despised among the fashionable company, as a low fellow, both in breeding and 
circumstances; nevertheless, I found a few individuals of moderate fortune, who gladly 
adopted my style of living; and many others would have acceded to our society, had they 
not been prevented by the pride, envy, and ambition of their wives and daughters. (300)  
Dennison here clearly excludes those of his neighbors without the proper disposition to enter his 
circle of guests. He “rejected the advances” of those who pursued luxurious lifestyles or showed 
characters driven by self-interest. He accepted into his company only those who resembled 
himself or “adopted my style of living.” All who fail to conform to this rather narcissistic model 
were excluded from Dennison’s company. These stringent limitations, Dennison suggests, are 
what allow for his ideal hospitality to Bramble and his travelling companions.
132
  
 However, Dennison’s limitations reveal how limitations also challenge the ability to 
perform hospitality. In preserving his house for only those like himself, Dennison acts 
inhospitably to all others: he lies to his neighbors and refuses to allow them to cross his 
threshold, he judges his neighbors for their worth, and he conceitedly speaks of his society as so 
clearly above that of his less worthy neighbors, they can only hope to “accede” to his group. The 
perfect hospitality Bramble so admires in Dennison is thus predicated on inhospitality. Yet, 
Bramble clearly embraces Dennison’s lifestyle and methods for limitation. He eagerly tours the 
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farm and enlists Dennison in the reform of his friend Baynard. Their connection is also co-opted 
into a filial relationship as Lydia, Bramble’s niece, marries Dennison’s son. United in disposition 
and family, the novel ends when Bramble takes leave of the Dennisons to return to his own estate 
in Wales. The novel suggests that Bramble will attempt to recreate Dennison’s domestic 
happiness when he is once again instated as host but the comedy ends before this aftermath is 
fully investigated.
133
 However, some indications of future difficulty are present. First, Bramble, 
though capable of hosting, continually seeks the guest position in the narrative; as such, it is 
difficult to imagine him denying his neighbors entrance into his home or refusing to accept an 
invitation. Indeed, his passive character seems ill-adapted for Dennison’s aggressive, active form 
of hospitality. Second, Bramble’s sister Tabitha remains a self-interested character. Her marriage 
to Lismahago suggests the continuation of his and Bramble’s positive hospitality; however, the 
marriage itself hardly promises to be one of uninterrupted happiness. Bramble will certainly 
continue to associate with, and even feel affection for, his self-interested sister. This one instance 
of inability to regulate the intentions of others or exclude such company suggests a larger 
problem in implementing such limitations in practice. Humphry Clinker and other comedic 
narratives thus argue for the importance of limitations to hospitality but raise unanswered 
questions about the ethical responsibilities of hospitality.  
 
David Simple and the Intruding World 
 Sarah Fielding’s David Simple also ends with a comedic dual marriage of David and 
Camilla and Valentine and Cynthia, an ending which restores stability and creates a circle of 
like-minded guests to preserve the continued exchange of hospitality. United as family and living 
in perfect equality together, the group retires to the country to live off David’s fortune. Unlike 
other families, this family is united not by blood but by their hospitable dispositions; they are, as 
David’s description of a friend outlines, people “who could be trusted...whose every Action 
proceeded either from obedience to the Divine Will, or from the Delight he took in doing good; 
who could not see another’s suffering without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing them” (68-
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69). Having found one another, the group has no further need for larger society and no longer 
seeks or offers hospitality. As in Humphry Clinker, this happy union is based on the exclusion of 
other company. Yet, this comedic ending also raises questions as to the ethical message of the 
text and the practice of hospitality. As Scott Paul Gordon puts it, the balance of disinterested 
hospitality is never shown “working outside the safety of the ‘laboratory’” and thus the larger 
practice of positive hospitality is questioned; the only way to preserve the happy community 
“seems to be withdrawal from the world” (Quixote 77). Such retirement, however, counters the 
David’s disinterested desire to learn of the sufferings of others; indeed, his disinterested nature is 
hard to imagine limited to only his family. Moreover, the ending of the novel shows David’s 
completed quest—he has found a true friend—but the problem of society that the text points out 
is not resolved.
134
 Without a means to actively combat these problems, the family will certainly 
still remain susceptible to the interests of others. The novel, then, offers a happy ending only in 
so far as the characters are able to detach themselves from the vice-filled world around them but 
does not show how this exclusionary hospitality would be practiced.  
 Unlike Smollett, however, Fielding returns to this hospitable community and explores 
these ethical inconsistencies. Dissatisfied with the impracticality of the comedic ending, Fielding 
returned to the text nine years later to add a sequel, Volume the Last.
135
 This volume changes the 
narrative from a comedy to a tragedy as the family experiences a series of hardships, illnesses, 
separations and deaths as David’s fortune dwindles away.
136
 Unable to maintain their happy 
isolation because of physical necessity, the family abandons the boundaries set around their 
happy community and once again seeks hospitality from the outside world. The reversal of 
fortune Fielding depicts illustrates tragedy’s different approach to the paradox of hospitality. 
Whereas comedic endings support imposing limitations on hospitality in order to preserve ideal 
relationships, tragedy emphasizes how difficult these limitations are in practice, particularly for 
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the passive guest. Indeed, Fielding’s happy union of disinterested guests is never able to offer the 
protection of a true host, and the family spends most of the sequel searching for such a protector. 
Ultimately, Fielding’s additions refute any ability to safely or permanently limit hospitality even 
as the need for such limits in an inhospitable world escalates.  
 The prelude to the sequel, authored by a “friend of the author,” suggests that Fielding is 
preoccupied with the paradox of hospitality. Here, Fielding is described to be struggling to 
deliver a version of positive hospitality that can be practiced in the context of an intruding, 
selfish world. The prelude claims that Fielding wishes to “illustrate that well-known 
Observation, that ‘The Attainment of our Wishes is but too often the Beginning of our Sorrows’” 
(285). This conventional saying marks the shift from comedy to tragedy but also suggests that 
the attainment of ideal hospitality is impossible to protect; the impulse to extend this hospitality 
found in a comedic ending must always come to an end. The prelude suggests that the sequel 
does not abandon hospitality as an ethic but no longer offers hospitality as a safe haven from the 
pressures of an inhospitable world; rather, the positive hospitality enacted by the Simple family 
will show that “every Evil may be lessened and alleviated” but the prelude does not suggest that 
such evils can be avoided (285). Fielding herself offers a more pessimistic version of this moral 
and questions the possibility for hospitality to exist in the world. She writes that her sequel 
illustrates the “Truth of the Observation… ‘That solid and lasting Happiness is not to be attained 
in this World,’ adding only that “a frequent Repetition of this Observation is necessary, in order 
to remind People of its Truth” (291-292). Here, hospitality is seen as a vulnerable condition and 
as an ethic that cannot be practiced in an inhospitable world. Clearly, Fielding wishes to revise 
her original message; limitations are deemed impossible, and hospitality is impossible without 
limits. As unsatisfactory as the closed group was to a hospitable ethic of openness, a return to 
that openness appears even more damaging. Thus, Fielding pursues the paradox of hospitality: in 
order to enact hospitality, it must be limited; at the same time, hospitality must remain open to 
the untrusted stranger.  
 Fielding’s sequel reiterates the need for limitations found in her original text. As in 
David’s original quest for a true friend, the potential hosts in Volume the Last are too self-
interested to offer hospitality. Fielding highlights the difference between these bad hosts to the 





outside their positive exchange of hospitality. For example, Mrs. Orgueil repeatedly estimates 
Cynthia and Camilla’s relationship according to her own interested motives.
137
 Taking an 
extreme disliking to Cynthia, she attempts to usurp her enemy in Camilla’s affection through 
tactics meant to divide their self interests. Because both Camilla and Cynthia practice a 
disinterested hospitality, attempts to arouse jealousy or offers of social promotion have little 
affect on their relationship. Mrs. Orgueil’s lack of success, and her decision to even attempt such 
an usurpation, illustrates her misunderstanding of their shared hospitality. In another instance, 
David attempts to explain his family’s disinterested relationship in order to beg for aid for his 
family; the loan shark he seeks aid from, however, is incapable of understanding such shared 
hospitality. David asks for a loan to support his family, offering Valentine’s promise to send 
money as collateral. Because Valentine is not legally obliged to share this money with David, the 
loan shark refuses the collateral, mystifying David who can only complain that “the Word 
Obligation was never one thought of by either of us, from our first Acquaintance” (345). 
Because the loan shark sees the world from a more selfish viewpoint, he fails to trust in such 
generosity. In a world that is not united or disinterested, the Simple family finds their hospitable 
circle continually at odds with those outside their circle. For protection from such a world, 
limitations are necessary for the practice of hospitality.  
 However, the guest in need of hospitality cannot enact these necessary limitations but 
instead must remain vulnerable. David and his family find themselves in the position of a 
supplicating guest as David’s fortune gradually diminishes. This change in financial position 
affects their ability to remain segregated from the rest of society; they must open their circle in 
order to ask for external aid. The volume is introduced, then, not by a change in the characters, 
but by a “strange and unexpected change of Fortune” that they face (349). Though their 
hospitable dispositions experience “no Alteration” (349), this lack of self-interest ultimately 
leads them once again into need; had David taken a more active, assertive role in managing his 
wealth, such a change in situation might not have occurred. Passively hospitable, the family’s 
luck fails passively as well; their fortune slowly diminishes not because of luxury but because of 
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the family’s passive acceptance of Mr. Ratcliffe’s, a beneficiary later discovered to be self-
interested, financial advice. The family discovers that, as their need for hospitality increases, 
their ability to act on their good will once again decreases; the world thus returns the family to 
their former precarious station and out into the open system of hospitality that they had 
attempted to escape. The family members cannot separate themselves from society or protect 
themselves from subsequent threats of intruding inhospitable forces. The sequel thus once again 
follows the plight of the guest who must remain passive to the host.  
 Fielding escalates the moral complexities of this position in her sequel. While the original 
text outlines how David misread hospitality exchanges because of his own disinterested nature 
and position as a guest, the sequel complicates this perspective further by David’s financial 
distress. His family’s need and the general threat of want make disinterest nearly impossible for 
David; though not concerned for himself, he is rarely thinking of the needs of potential hosts he 
approaches for help. This mindset further obscures David’s ability to see the intentions behind 
the hospitality he does receive. Indeed, the story enumerates how the very unity, morality, and 
filial love the group shares only makes them more vulnerable to negative forms of hospitality. 
David is found repeating his earlier errors in judgment because his love for his family clouds his 
ability to see deception. The narrator, in hyperbolic detail, reveals that Mr. Ratcliff and Mr. 
Orgueil  
got an Ascendancy over the Mind of David Simple, that no Creature on Earth could ever 
have obtained, had SELF alone been his Consideration. Not even if they had found him 
in a sick Bed, loaded with Poverty and Pain, no human Arm extended for his Assistance, 
his only Support a Conscience void of Offence, and Hope in another Life. But he was 
entangled in the snare of Love for others, and his Inclination blinded his Judgment, till he 
in a manner forced himself to fancy he believed that Ratcliff and Orgueil would be his 
Friends, against that almost infallible Proof to the contrary, that the true Words of 
Kindness never fell from their Lips. (326-327) 
 Here, Fielding drives home that it is the connection made with the rest of his family that causes 
David to make mistakes. His poor judgment is no longer the product of his guest position or 
benevolence but a result of his own interested desire to provide for his family. While his 





closest hospitality circle in the larger system of exchange.
138
 Indeed, this dependence is far 
different from David’s earlier search for a friend; during that search, David easily severed ties 
with anyone once he found them unsuitable to be called his friend. Moreover, David had before 
been seeking benevolent individuals for his hospitable group but now only needs a more material 
hospitality. Desperate for assistance, David no longer uses the same criteria to choose his 
acquaintance and appears less hospitable himself as he seeks out society members with influence 
and money and thus the capacity to assist him. Armed with a desire to see only good intentions 
in others and an interest in gaining material assistance, David reenters the system of hospitality 
ill-equipped to properly manage it. 
The family’s need not only obscures David’s ability to properly perceive hospitality 
exchanges, it also limits his ability to act when inconsistencies between a host’s declared 
intentions and actions are found. In this way, the entire Simple family find themselves in the 
situation of a toad-eater. Dependent on the hospitality of Orguiel and Ratcliff, the family must 
remain grateful for the inhospitable aid they do receive, must flatter their hosts to continue the 
relationship, and continually find themselves made hopeful by promises of hospitality that are 
never realized. Such inconsistencies determine the Simple family’s relationship with the 
Orguiels; the family expresses gratitude for hospitality received to bolster the reputation of the 
Orgueil family and remain hopeful that vague promises of further aid will materialize. Indeed, 
like the mountebank’s boy, the family is repeatedly asked to “swallow a toad” but then 
supplicated when given “something to expel it again, that they may be ready to swallow the next 
[the mountebanks] think proper to prepare for them” (103). In one such moment, the Simples are 
convinced to remain in close connection to the Orguiels when they agree to pay for the burial of 
Camilla and Valentine’s father, an act which “again enslaved [David’s] Mind to Orgueil, and 
fixed his Chain as strong as ever” (336). The narrator is quick to remind the reader that David’s 
“Blindness” is not caused by “Flattery” or the “Prospect of Favour” but by “Fears and 
Apprehensions of our Friends Miseries, and ardent Wishes for their Happiness” (336). David’s 
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interest in preserving his family here motivates his acceptance of hospitality from unworthy 
hosts. The family’s moral disposition does not save them from inhospitality, then, but forces 
them to suffer more; indeed, interest in preserving this union only further limits David’s ability 
to act in exchanges of hospitality.  
 David’s efforts at preservation, however, are not enough and the hospitable community 
slowly dissolves under the pressure of the family’s need and dependency on others. Valentine 
and Cynthia are convinced to move to Jamaica in hopes of making money and again establishing 
the community’s self-sufficiency. Their separation marks the beginning of a long bout of worries 
about hunger, housing and health for the rest of the family and culminates in the deaths of 
Valentine, Camilla, their father, and all but one of their collective children. The novel ends with 
David’s death and his death bed realization of the paradox of hospitality; David relates to 
Cynthia how the finding of positive hospitality imposed needs for impossible limits that 
ultimately threatened both the practice and ideal of hospitality. He tells Cynthia, “little did I 
imagine, that the greatest Misery, and sharpest Sting of my Life, was to arise from a Woman’s 
permitting me to love and esteem her…that the attaining a faithful and tender Friend, that strong 
Pursuit of my Life, and which I thought the Height of Happiness, should lead to its very contrary, 
and by that Means shew me the short sightedness of all Human Wisdom” (401). The delights of 
friendship and hospitality, David claims, are “more than weigh[ed] down” by the sadness it also 
ushers in. The creation of the ideal hospitality community makes David more vulnerable to 
unhappiness and replaced his disinterested disposition with an interest in his family’s well-being. 
Moreover, his concern for those closest to him—those that he hoped to live with in happy 
solitude—create a new dependency on and vulnerability to inhospitable hosts. He recounts to 
Cynthia that “ in obtaining my Wishes, I had multiplied my Cares; … when Poverty broke in 
upon us, I found, that to bear the Poverty of many, was almost insupportable. –Then, indeed, my 
Mind began to be seized with Fear—I was no longer my former Self—Pictures of the Distress of 
my Family began to succeed each other in my Mind, and Terror and Timidity conquered my 
better Judgment” (401-402). David is certainly still benevolent and his concerns for the suffering 
of his family indicate his continued passive disinterest; however, David confines this disinterest 





disinterest. Because David relinquishes his disinterested passivity to more actively advocate for 
the interests of his family, the ideal of hospitality is revealed as an impossible standard.  
Moreover, David’s interests for his family harm his judgment and made the family more 
vulnerable to negative hospitality. In finding a community of hospitable guests, David did not 
escape the problems of hospitality found in the original novel but actually increases his 
vulnerability to bad hosts and also questions the ability for positive hospitality to be practiced. 
Desperate for his family, David admits into his circle “Persons more properly called Persecutors” 
than friends. These “fancied Friends became my Plagues, and my real ones, by their sufferings, 
tore up my Heart by the Roots, and frightened me into bearing the insolent Persecutions of the 
others—I found my Mind in such Chains as are much worse than any Slavery of the Body” 
(402). David finds he must accept the inhospitable to maintain his hospitable circle of friends. To 
keep his close friends happy and healthy, he must admit those less worthy into his circle. It is 
only with the death of Camilla that David again seeks to cut off his family from the rest of 
society. Following her death, he tells Cynthia, “my Eyes were forced wide open, to discover the 
Fallacy of fancying any real or lasting Happiness can arise from an Attachment to Objects 
subject to Infirmities, Diseases, and to certain Death: and I would not, for any Thing this World 
can give, lead over again the last Twelve-month of my Life” (402). No longer attached to much 
or many in the world, David again returns to a policy of exclusions, though now his isolation is 
from all worldly objects. David here finds hospitality a paradox: when it is on the threshold of 
reality, it disappears. Hospitality needs more prudence, foresight, and caution, David Simple 
argues, than are possible. Even with a group of perfectly reciprocal individuals, hospitality 
cannot quite exist in the world but must continue to be pursued.  
Fielding ends her sequel not only acknowledging the impossibility for hospitality in the 
world but also suggesting a necessary belief in hospitality. Cynthia promises David that she and 
his one remaining daughter will remain safe after his death because of an unnamed man’s 
hospitality. She speaks highly of her new host as “one whose Power assisted his Inclination to 
confer the highest Benefits. Then she related the Manner and the Kindness with which she was 
received, and the Joy with which it inspired her, till she made his Pleasure and Gratitude equal 
with her own” (400). Cynthia hopes for hospitality and her relation of her host seems promising. 





eater, the future looks less promising. Cynthia needs hospitality and, as a guest, cannot suspect 
the motives of her host. The reader is left wondering if this is another instance of bad judgment 
but also knowing that Cynthia has no other choice. Hospitality, Fielding suggests, may be 
unattainable and unsustainable but is still worthy of pursuit.  
 
Cecilia and the Problem of Society 
 Frances Burney’s Cecilia also questions the possibility of attaining positive hospitality 
but makes more palatable flawed versions of hospitality. Burney balances the hospitality paradox 
by showing the contradiction between limitations and an ideal of openness. However, unlike her 
comedic counterparts, Burney rejects the instatement of limitations and instead promotes a 
continued openness and passivity despite the vulnerability associated with this state. In fact, this 
ethical stance mitigates Burney’s conclusion of the novel. Her comedy is not conventional; 
though the virtuous couple is united at the end of the novel, their happiness is moderated by their 
continued involvement with the outside world and the larger system of hospitality. Indeed, in 
many ways, this marriage is less than ideal; the union requires Cecila to relinquish her sizable 
fortune to allow the proud Delviles to continue their family line with name intact. To 
accommodate the Delvile family torment, the couple part immediately following the wedding 
ceremony; as a result, Cecilia is forced to leave her house, and eventually experiences a mental 
breakdown while attempting to find her husband in London. Even when happily restored to her 
friends and even some fortune, the book ends with Cecilia’s measured happiness; she has  
all the happiness human life seems capable of receiving:--yet human it was, and as such  
imperfect! She knew that, at times, the whole family must murmur at her loss of fortune, 
 and at times she murmured herself to be thus portionless, tho’ and HEIRESS. Rationally,  
however, she surveyed the world at large, and finding that  of the few who had any 
happiness, there were none without some misery, she checked the rising sigh of repining 
mortality, and, grateful with general felicity, bore partial evil with chearfullest 
resignation. (941) 
These final sentences of the novel are certainly not in the style of a “happily-ever-after” marriage 





experiences throughout the novel, a move which readers and critics alike found puzzling.
139
 Yet, 
in this style of conclusion, Burney’s novel does what Sophia and Humphry Clinker did not—
namely, it does not forget the novel’s earlier lessons and so cannot paint a picture of perfect 
hospitality. Cecilia’s end refuses to limit hospitality even as it acknowledges a need to do so. The 
ending, dissatisfying as it may be, refers back to two trends of hospitality explored earlier in the 
novel: Cecilia attempts to set limits and exclude others from her hospitable circle as a guest and 
as a host. Her lessons on the necessity but impossibility of such limits inform the less classically 
happy ending.     
 Cecilia first attempts to close her hospitality circle while a guest in the Harrel’s house are 
ultimately unsuccessful. As a guest in someone else’s home, she is unable to regulate her 
company or her time. She attempts to anyway, formulating a “scheme of happiness” that would 
allow her “to drop all idle and uninteresting acquaintance, who while they contribute neither to 
use nor pleasure, make so large a part of the community…[and] to select such only as by their 
piety could elevate her mind, by their knowledge improve her understanding, or by their 
accomplishments and manners delight her affections” (55). This decision would certainly offer 
Cecilia some control over her environment but would also seriously limit her interactions. 
Indeed, such a plan would force her to ignore her own hosts. As such, the plan is impossible to 
set in motion and Cecilia must structure the plan as a future goal; she acknowledges that “the 
society she meant to form could not be selected in the house of another, where, though to some 
she might show a preference, there were none she could reject” (56). Cecilia’s ideal plan would 
be to limit her company and close her circle; as a guest, however, such behavior would go 
against her duties as a guest. Indeed, such limitations work against the demands of hospitality to 
be open. 
Even Cecilia’s modified plan proves to be too narrow for her role as a guest. Though she 
decides to structure her own time and limit her visits to others, Cecilia soon finds even these 
limits are beyond her abilities. Only days after forming her resolution, she finds herself visiting 
Miss Larolles—a woman whose company she does not wish to include in her ideal circle of 
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hospitality. Yet, she finds that she must visit to placate Mrs. Harrel and rectify her perceived 
inhospitality. This event teaches Cecilia that “the impracticability of beginning at present the 
alteration of her way of life she had projected, and therefore thought it most expedient to assume 
no singularity till her independency should enable her to support it with consistency” (70). In 
other words, Cecilia learns that she has little control over her company and her time while a 
guest. Moreover, Cecilia finds that her plan to limit her company is far too strict to be practical 
or pleasurable. She finds herself too fully alone and completely outside any exchange of 
hospitality; she reasons that “a rigid seclusion from company was productive of a lassitude as 
little favourable to active virtue as dissipation itself, she resolved to soften her plan, and by 
mingling amusement with benevolence, to try, at least, to approach that golden mean” (131). Her 
limitations isolate her and affect her ability to function in a community; Cecilia must interact 
with others, including those less ideal for her closed community. 
  Though this experience causes Cecilia to look expectantly towards her future autonomy, 
she finds that this form of limitation does not work as a host either. She had imagined her plan 
would be easier to enact when she was a host and in her own home, but she finds new difficulties 
enacting her plan then as well. She resolves to structure her time as a host as well and live 
“without regard to unmeaning wonder or selfish remonstrances” (792). This plan includes 
limiting her guests and excluding members of society from her company. Cecilia again designs 
to surround herself only with those who share her disposition. She begins to enact “the plan she 
had early formed at Mrs. Harrel’s” but finds “that part by which the useless or frivolous were to 
be excluded from her house, she found could only be supported by driving from her half her 
acquaintance” (792). To enact such a plan would place her in the inhospitable situation of the 
Delvile castle. There, no neighbors visited because Lord Delvile’s pride excluded them; here, 
Cecilia finds that her own determination to limit her company would threaten to do the same. In 
order to remain connected to the community and involved at all in hospitality, she must allow 
some whom she might wish to exclude from her company.  
Moreover, Cecilia finds that she cannot control her guests. She first learns this lesson 
when she invites Mrs. Harrel to be her guest, a duty she feels compelled to do in gratitude for her 
previous hosting and because of Mrs. Harrel’s obvious need. But Cecilia finds that, as a host, she 





than a trouble and incumbrance; with no inherent resources, she was continually in search of 
occasional supplies; she fatigued Cecilia with wonder at the privacy of her life, and tormented 
her with proposals of parties and entertainments” (792). Mrs. Harrel’s widowed state has not 
made her more inclined towards Cecilia’s lifestyle, and Cecilia’s guest finds her house 
inhospitable as Cecilia formerly found hers. Moreover, those whom Cecilia might wish to 
cultivate relationships with are also uncontrollable. She finds that the “wise, good, and 
intelligent” were only “with difficulty attainable.” Because of these valuable traits, “all who 
possessed at once both talents and wealth, were so generally courted they were rarely to be 
procured; and all who to talents alone owed their consequence, demanded, if worth acquiring, 
time and delicacy to be obtained” (793). Thus, Cecilia finds enacting her plans of exclusion to be 
more difficult than she had imagined and, on a certain level, virtually impossible to enact. 
Though these limits sound prudent and desirable—indeed, they should allow hospitality to be 
performed well—Cecilia is not able to control her environment enough to enact them. She 
requires a connection to society to pursue her plans of benevolence, and limitations would 
counter this project.  
In other words, Cecilia requires society to build hospitality but that very requirement 
implies a lack of control. To remain hospitable, Cecilia must also remain vulnerable to the 
interests of others and open to other configurations of hospitality. The inability to limit 
hospitality is found in her marriage with Mortimer. The ideal couple will continue their positive 
exchange of disinterested hospitality with one another but do not segregate themselves from less 
worthy society. Instead, Cecilia acknowledges with self-interest the sacrifice of her name and 
fortune for the marriage, and does not censor the perspective of the more interested world but 
rather “murmurs” along with them. Though she concludes that her hospitable marriage was 
worth the sacrifice, Cecilia does not reject all self-interest from her own perspective or from 
those of her guests. Indeed, her sacrifice allows for the continued self-interest of the Delviles; 
their family name in tact, the Delviles have asserted their interest on the hospitable union of 
Mortimer and Cecilia. Thus, remaining open to the interests of others and maintaining 
relationships with her new self-interested blood relations, the hospitable union in Cecilia 
suggests that hospitality must make room for dissimilar dispositions and seek to accommodate 






 Though each of the texts explored here offers a different means to balance hospitality 
with self-preservation, they all grapple with the same paradox of hospitality. The ideal of 
hospitality calls for openness while the practice requires limitations. This paradox is complicated 
by the ethical responsibilities inherent in hospitality exchanges. These novels each emphasize a 
different ethical perspective, arguing for the ethical necessity to limit or for the necessity to 
remain open. Yet, each author qualifies the positive hospitality relationships created in the texts. 
These novels thus suggest that hospitality is never able to reach its ideal. As intentions are both 
hard to control and hard to know, so too is hospitality riddled with the complexities of the 
individuals who create them. Though the benevolent guest can choose how to respond to this 









 I began this study with a discussion of Vicemius Knox’s opinions on the ethical 
implications of traditional forms of hospitality. It is now appropriate to reconsider the passage 
that I quoted at the outset: 
The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors 
were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country 
crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against 
modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality 
was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the 
nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and 
its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from 
the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all 
their consequent vices. (231) 
It is perhaps easy to see the eighteenth-century “railer” might look nostalgically on a depiction of 
hospitality based on action. Easier to enact, this idea of Elizabethan hospitality offers an escape 
from the exhaustion of moral questioning eighteenth-century novels suggest was associated with 
hospitality. At the same time, Knox’s distrust of such markers of hospitality indicates that 
hospitality cannot return to an active definition; intention has become too important to the moral 
landscape to eradicate the “just doubt” of “indiscriminate hospitality.” Hospitality is in ethical 
crisis and, as this project attempts to show, this crisis is only multiplied when examined closely. 
If anything, the nuances of the crisis muddy the larger picture of hospitality. 
In many ways this project ends where it begins: hospitality in ethical crisis because ill-
defined and difficult to enact. Beginning with the task to imagine a hospitable system based on 
intentional ideals, eighteenth-century novels end still seeking this image. The task to imagine 
hospitality differently continued after the eighteenth century and persists today. However, there 
is no single image of hospitality that can encompass all of its forms and meanings; hospitality is 
an ethic that, admirably, draws no conclusions and, frustratingly, draws to no conclusions. Peter 
Melville, studying hospitality in the Romantic era embraces the eighteenth-century’s bequeathal 





structural impossibility is what makes hospitality meaningful, then it is the historical or 
contextual singularity of particular instances of such failure that are the meaning” (18). This 
project hopes to illuminate the “singularity” of the eighteenth-century moment and the meaning 
that literary texts created from the failures of hospitality at that time.  
In doing so, I endeavored to show that an era of British narrative literature often 
dismissed as merely didactic is, in fact, intimately intertwined in the ethical quandaries that 
define the modern era. Intimately engaged in philosophical discussions that helped define 
individuals by their intentions, these texts do not merely apply a new system of ethics but instead 
question an action’s foundations and consequences. These texts do not follow a tidy revelation to 
illuminate the modern subject through personal interiority but examine interiority’s interaction 
with the external world. As the depictions of hospitality show, the relation between interior 
desire and exterior world is not easily balanced. By taking the guest perspective, these narratives 
humanize rational theories, exposing the vulnerabilities, conflicts of interests, and lack of 
authority that riddle the practice of these new ethical standards. In so doing, these novels also 
question the ideals that create such uncomfortable positions. The readers are left with a variety of 
answers from these narratives as a whole but also from any one narrative in its singularity; 
neither version of hospitality that Knox outlines is adequate but the fluctuation between poles 
does offer some hope for respite in the company of others.  
  These lessons are worth recalling in our own time, when hospitality is once again being 
redefined. The eighteenth century reminds us that hospitality does little good as an ethic if it is 
unable to be practiced; the impossibility of hospitality can only be celebrated if worldly solutions 
are also explored. In the absence of such practice, narrative shows us, guests are the ones who 
suffer and bad hosts are rarely punished. It is also worth noting that the suffering found in these 
eighteenth-century novels are lessened by limitations; though hospitality is ideally an ethic of 
openness to difference, its practice asks us to search for similarity in a society where openness to 
others poses dangers to self-preservation. The eighteenth-century novel shows us how the very 
definition of similarity can be redefined; rejecting the sameness of family, class or gender, these 
novels define sameness by an elective relation rather than a filial relation. As we encounter new 
differences in our hospitable circumstances, it is worth remembering the eighteenth century’s 
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